The causes of error

فَصْلٌ فِي أَسْبابِ الغَلَطِ

اعْلَمْ أَنَّ أَسْبابَ الغَلَطِ مَعَ كَثْرَتِها راجِعَةٌ إِلَى أَمْرَيْنِ: أَحَدُهُما سُوءُ الفَهْمِ فَقَطْ، وَثانِيهِما اشْتِباهُ الكَواذِبِ بِالصَّوادِقِ. وَالأَوَّلُ إِنَّما يَكُونُ بِسَبَبِ انْغِماسِ النَّفْسِ فِي ظُلُماتِ الوَهْمِ، حَتَّى يَسْتَيْقِنَ الكَواذِبَ صادِقَةً بَلْ ضَرُورِيَّةً، نَحْوُ: «كُلُّ ما لَيْسَ بِمُبْصَرٍ لَيْسَ بِجِسْمٍ، فَالهَواءُ لَيْسَ بِجِسْمٍ». وَأَمّا الثّانِي فَفِيهِ تَفْصِيلٌ عَلَى ما سَيَأْتِي. وَقالَ بَعْضُ المُحَقِّقِينَ: تَرْجِعُ إِلَى أَمْرٍ واحِدٍ، وَهُوَ عَدَمُ التَّمْيِيزِ بَيْنَ الشَّيْءِ وَشِبْهِهِ فَقَطْ.

Know that the causes of error, many as they are, come back to two things: the first is mere misunderstanding, and the second is false [propositions] being mistaken for true ones. The first comes about only through the soul's immersion in the darkness of estimation, until it takes false propositions to be certainly true, or even necessary, as in: “Everything that is not visible is not a body, so air is not a body.” As for the second, it has a detailed account, as will come. One of the verifying scholars said: they come back to a single thing, namely failing to distinguish between a thing and what resembles it, and nothing else.

al-Mirqāt · p. 54

فَصْلٌ

عَدَمُ التَّمْيِيزِ بَيْنَ الشَّيْءِ وَشِبْهِهِ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ وَإِلَى ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالمَعانِي. القِسْمُ الأَوَّلُ، أَعْنِي ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ، قِسْمانِ: الأَوَّلُ ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ لا مِنْ جِهَةِ التَّرْكِيبِ، وَالثّانِي ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِها مِنْ حَيْثُ التَّرْكِيبُ. ثُمَّ المُتَعَلِّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ لا مِنْ جِهَةِ التَّرْكِيبِ قِسْمانِ: الأَوَّلُ ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ أَنْفُسِها، وَذٰلِكَ بِأَنْ يَكُونَ الأَلْفاظُ مُخْتَلِفَةً فِي الدَّلالَةِ، فَيَقَعُ فِيهِ الاشْتِباهُ فِيما هُوَ المَرامُ، كَالغَلَطِ الواقِعِ بِسَبَبِ كَوْنِ اللَّفْظِ مُشْتَرَكًا لَفْظِيًّا بَيْنَ مَعْنَيَيْنِ أَوْ أَكْثَرَ، وَكَوْنِ أَحَدِ مَعانِيهِ حَقِيقِيًّا وَالأُخَرِ مَجازِيًّا، وَيَنْدَرِجُ فِيهِ الاسْتِعارَةُ وَأَمْثالُها، وَكُلُّ ذٰلِكَ يُسَمَّى بِالاشْتِراكِ اللَّفْظِيِّ. كَما تَقُولُ لِعَيْنِ الماءِ: «هٰذِهِ عَيْنٌ، وَكُلُّ عَيْنٍ يَسْتَضِيءُ بِها العالَمُ، فَهٰذِهِ العَيْنُ يَسْتَضِيءُ بِها العالَمُ»؛ أَوْ تَقُولُ: «زَيْدٌ أَسَدٌ، وَكُلُّ أَسَدٍ لَهُ مَخالِبُ، فَزَيْدٌ لَهُ مَخالِبُ». وَالغَلَطُ فِي الأَوَّلِ كَوْنُ لَفْظِ العَيْنِ مُشْتَرَكًا لَفْظِيًّا بَيْنَ عَيْنِ الماءِ وَالشَّمْسِ، وَفِي الثّانِي كَوْنُ إِطْلاقِ لَفْظِ الأَسَدِ عَلَى زَيْدٍ مَجازِيًّا، وَعَلَى الحَيَوانِ المُفْتَرِسِ حَقِيقِيًّا. وَالثّانِي ما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ بِسَبَبِ التَّصْرِيفِ، كَالاشْتِباهِ الواقِعِ فِي لَفْظِ المُخْتارِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ إِذا كانَ بِمَعْنَى الفاعِلِ كانَ أَصْلُهُ مُخْتَيِرًا بِكَسْرِ الياءِ، وَإِذا كانَ بِمَعْنَى المَفْعُولِ كانَ أَصْلُهُ مُخْتَيَرًا بِفَتْحِها؛ أَوْ بِسَبَبِ الإِعْجامِ وَالإِعْرابِ، كَما يَقُولُ القائِلُ: «غلام حسن» مِنْ غَيْرِ إِعْرابٍ، فَيُظَنُّ تارَةً تَرْكِيبًا تَوْصِيفِيًّا، وَالأُخْرَى تَرْكِيبًا إِضافِيًّا. وَالمُتَعَلِّقُ بِالأَلْفاظِ مِنْ جِهَةِ التَّرْكِيبِ: فَإِمّا بِالنَّظَرِ إِلَى اخْتِلافِ المَرْجِعِ، نَحْوُ: «ما يَعْلَمُهُ الحَكِيمُ فَهُوَ يَعْمَلُ بِما يَعْلَمُهُ»، فَإِنْ عادَ الضَّمِيرُ إِلَى الحَكِيمِ صَدَقَ، وَإِلّا كَذَبَ؛ وَإِمّا بِإِفْرادِ المُرَكَّبِ، نَحْوُ: «النّارَنْجُ حُلْوٌ حامِضٌ» صادِقٌ، وَإِنْ أُفْرِدَ وَقِيلَ: «هٰذا حُلْوٌ وَحامِضٌ» لَمْ يَصْدُقْ؛ وَإِمّا بِجَمْعِ المُنْفَصِلِ، نَحْوُ: «زَيْدٌ طَبِيبٌ وَماهِرٌ» صَدَقَ، وَإِنْ جُمِعَ وَقِيلَ: «طَبِيبٌ ماهِرٌ» كَذَبَ.

Failing to distinguish between a thing and what resembles it divides into what concerns utterances and what concerns meanings. The first kind, I mean what concerns utterances, is of two kinds: the first concerns utterances not with respect to their composition, and the second concerns them with respect to composition. Then what concerns utterances not with respect to composition is of two kinds. The first concerns the utterances themselves: the utterances differ in what they signify, so that confusion arises about what is meant. An example is the error that arises because an utterance is equivocal (mushtarak lafẓī) between two or more meanings, or because one of its meanings is literal and the others figurative; under this fall metaphor and the like, and all of this is called equivocity (al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī). As when you say of a spring of water: “This is an ʿayn, and by every ʿayn the world is lit; so by this ʿayn the world is lit”; or you say: “Zayd is a lion, and every lion has claws; so Zayd has claws.” The error in the first is that the word ʿayn is equivocal between a spring of water and the sun; in the second, that applying the word “lion” to Zayd is figurative, while applying it to the predatory animal is literal. The second concerns utterances because of their morphology (taṣrīf), like the confusion that arises in the word mukhtār: when it has the sense of the active participle, its underlying form is mukhtayir, with i on the yāʾ, and when it has the sense of the passive participle, its underlying form is mukhtayar, with a on it. Or [it arises] because of dotting and case endings, as when someone says “غلام حسن” (ghulām ḥasan) without case endings, and it is taken at one time as a noun with its adjective [“a handsome boy”] and at another as a genitive construction [“Ḥasan's boy”]. What concerns utterances with respect to composition is either due to a difference in what [a pronoun] refers back to, as in “Whatever the philosopher knows, he acts on what he knows”: if the pronoun refers back to the philosopher, it is true; otherwise it is false. Or it is due to separating what is compound, as in “The bitter orange is sweet-sour”, which is true; but if it is separated and one says “This is sweet, and [it is] sour”, it is not true. Or it is due to combining what is separate, as in “Zayd is a physician, and [he is] skilled”, which is true; but if it is combined and one says “[He is] a skilled physician”, it is false.

al-Mirqāt · p. 54