فَصْلٌ فِي الأَغالِيطِ الَّتِي تَقَعُ بِسَبَبِ المَعْنَى
وَهٰذا أَيْضًا أَقْسامٌ؛ لِأَنَّها إِمّا مِنْ جِهَةِ المادَّةِ أَوْ مِنْ جِهَةِ الصُّورَةِ. أَمّا الَّتِي مِنْ جِهَةِ المادَّةِ: كَما يَكُونُ بِحَيْثُ إِذا رُتِّبَ المَعانِي فِيهِ عَلَى وَجْهٍ يَكُونُ صادِقًا لَمْ يَكُنْ قِياسًا، وَإِذا رُتِّبَ عَلَى وَجْهٍ يَكُونُ قِياسًا لَمْ يَكُنْ صادِقًا، كَقَوْلِكَ: «الإِنْسانُ ناطِقٌ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ ناطِقٌ، وَلا شَيْءَ مِنَ النّاطِقِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ ناطِقٌ بِحَيَوانٍ، فَلا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإِنْسانِ بِحَيَوانٍ»؛ إِذْ مَعَ اعْتِبارِ قَيْدِ «مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ ناطِقٌ» يَكْذِبُ الصُّغْرَى، وَمَعَ حَذْفِهِ عَنْها يَكْذِبُ الكُبْرَى، وَإِنْ حُذِفَ مِنَ الصُّغْرَى وَأُثْبِتَ فِي الكُبْرَى يَلْزَمُ اخْتِلالُ هَيْئَةِ القِياسِ لِعَدَمِ الاشْتِراكِ. وَأَمّا الَّتِي مِنْ جِهَةِ الصُّورَةِ فَكَما يَكُونُ عَلَى هَيْئَةٍ غَيْرِ ناتِجَةٍ، وَجَمِيعُ ذٰلِكَ سُوءُ التَّأْلِيفِ، كَقَوْلِ القائِلِ: «الزَّمانُ مُحِيطٌ بِالحَوادِثِ، وَالفَلَكُ مُحِيطٌ بِها أَيْضًا»، يُنْتِجُ: «فَالزَّمانُ هُوَ الفَلَكُ»، وَهُوَ شَكْلٌ ثانٍ، وَقَدْ فاتَ فِيهِ شَرْطُ اخْتِلافِ المُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ إِيجابًا وَسَلْبًا؛ لِكَوْنِهِما مُوجَبَتَيْنِ هٰهُنا. وَالآنَ نَذْكُرُ بَعْضَ المُغالَطاتِ الَّتِي سَبَبُ وُقُوعِها فَسادُ الصُّورَةِ، فَنَقُولُ: مِنَ المُغالَطاتِ الصُّورِيَّةِ المُصادَرَةُ عَلَى المَطْلُوبِ، نَحْوُ: «زَيْدٌ إِنْسانٌ؛ لِأَنَّهُ بَشَرٌ، وَكُلُّ بَشَرٍ إِنْسانٌ». وَمِنْها أَخْذُ ما بِالعَرَضِ مَكانَ ما بِالذّاتِ، نَحْوُ: «الجالِسُ فِي السَّفِينَةِ مُتَحَرِّكٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَحَرِّكٍ لا يَثْبُتُ فِي مَوْضِعٍ واحِدٍ». وَمِنْها أَنْ لا يَتَكَرَّرَ الأَوْسَطُ بِتَمامِهِ، كَما يُقالُ: «الإِنْسانُ لَهُ شَعْرٌ، وَكُلُّ شَعْرٍ يَنْبُتُ»، يُنْتِجُ: «الإِنْسانُ يَنْبُتُ»؛ فَإِنَّ الأَوْسَطَ «لَهُ الشَّعْرُ»، وَلَمْ يُجْعَلْ بِتَمامِهِ مَوْضُوعَ الكُبْرَى. وَمِنْها أَنْ لا يَكُونَ الأَوْسَطُ مُتَشابِهًا فِي المُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ لِاخْتِلافِهِ بِالقُوَّةِ وَالفِعْلِ، نَحْوُ: «السّاكِتُ مُتَكَلِّمٌ، وَالمُتَكَلِّمُ لَيْسَ بِساكِتٍ»، يُنْتِجُ: «السّاكِتُ لَيْسَ بِساكِتٍ». وَمِنْها اخْتِلالُ التَّرْكِيبِ بِسَبَبِ شَكٍّ وَقَعَ بِأَنَّ القَيْدَ مِنَ المَوْضُوعِ أَوْ مِنَ المَحْمُولِ، كَقَوْلِهِمْ: «الإِنْسانُ وَحْدَهُ ضاحِكٌ، وَكُلُّ ضاحِكٍ حَيَوانٌ»، يُنْتِجُ: «الإِنْسانُ وَحْدَهُ حَيَوانٌ»؛ وَالغَلَطُ إِنَّما نَشَأَ مِنْ تَوَهُّمِ أَنَّ لَفْظَ «وَحْدَهُ» جُزْءٌ مِنَ المَوْضُوعِ، وَلَوْ جُعِلَ جُزْءًا مِنَ المَحْمُولِ وَقِيلَ: «الإِنْسانُ هُوَ وَحْدَهُ ضاحِكٌ، وَكُلُّ ما هُوَ وَحْدَهُ ضاحِكٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوانٌ» لَصَدَقَتِ النَّتِيجَةُ؛ لِأَنَّها إِذْ ذاكَ «الإِنْسانُ حَيَوانٌ»؛ فَالغَلَطُ فِي هٰذا المِثالِ بِسَبَبِ سُوءِ اعْتِبارِ الحَمْلِ. وَمِنْها أَنْ لا يَكُونَ الأَكْبَرُ مَحْمُولًا عَلَى جَمِيعِ أَفْرادِ الأَوْسَطِ فِي الكُبْرَى، وَذٰلِكَ كَما تَقُولُ: «كُلُّ إِنْسانٍ حَيَوانٌ، وَالحَيَوانُ عامٌّ أَوْ جِنْسٌ أَوْ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيرِينَ مُخْتَلِفِي الحَقِيقَةِ»، فَيُنْتِجُ: «كُلُّ إِنْسانٍ عامٌّ أَوْ جِنْسٌ أَوْ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيرِينَ مُخْتَلِفِي الحَقِيقَةِ»، وَهُوَ باطِلٌ قَطْعًا، وَالسَّبَبُ فِي الغَلَطِ إِنَّما هُوَ إِهْمالُ كُلِّيَّةِ الكُبْرَى؛ إِذِ الكُبْرَى طَبِيعِيَّةٌ فَلا يَتَعَدَّى الحُكْمُ. وَمِنْها يَقَعُ بِسَبَبِ تَقَدُّمِ الرَّوابِطِ وَتَأَخُّرِها عَنِ السُّلُوبِ، وَكَذا تَقَدُّمِ الجِهَةِ عَلَى السُّلُوبِ وَتَأَخُّرِها عَنْها، نَحْوُ: «زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ هُوَ بِقائِمٍ» وَ«زَيْدٌ هُوَ لَيْسَ بِقائِمٍ»، وَ«بِالضَّرُورَةِ أَنْ لا يَكُونَ» وَ«لَيْسَ بِالضَّرُورَةِ أَنْ يَكُونَ»، وَلا يَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ يَلْزَمُ أَنْ لا يَكُونَ، وَتَكَثُّرُ السُّلُوبِ مِنْ هٰذا البابِ؛ فَإِنَّ مَراتِبَ الشَّفْعِيَّةِ، كَسَلْبِ سَلْبٍ وَسَلْبِ سَلْبِ سَلْبِ سَلْبٍ، إِثْباتٌ، وَالوَتْرِيَّةَ، كَسَلْبِ سَلْبِ السَّلْبِ وَغَيْرِها، سَلْبٌ. وَمِنْها أَخْذُ الاعْتِباراتِ الذِّهْنِيَّةِ وَالمَحْمُولاتِ العَقْلِيَّةِ أُمُورًا عَيْنِيَّةً، كَما إِذا قِيلَ: «إِنَّ الإِنْسانَ كُلِّيٌّ»، فَيُظَنُّ أَنَّهُ فِي الأَعْيانِ كَذٰلِكَ، وَلَيْسَ هٰذا الظَّنُّ بِصَوابٍ؛ فَإِنَّ الكُلِّيَّةَ إِنَّما تَعْرِضُ الأَشْياءَ فِي الذِّهْنِ دُونَ الخارِجِ. وَمِنْ هٰذا التَّحْقِيقِ يَنْحَلُّ أُغْلُوطَةٌ أُخْرَى، تَقْرِيرُها أَنْ يُقالَ: «المُمْتَنِعُ مَوْجُودٌ؛ لِأَنَّهُ إِنِ امْتَنَعَ شَيْءٌ فِي الخارِجِ لَكانَ امْتِناعُهُ حاصِلًا فِي الخارِجِ، فَيَكُونُ المُمْتَنِعُ مَوْجُودًا فِي الخارِجِ»، فَيَلْزَمُ وُجُودُ المُمْتَنِعِ، وَهُوَ باطِلٌ قَطْعًا. وَجْهُ الانْحِلالِ أَنَّ الامْتِناعَ اعْتِبارٌ ذِهْنِيٌّ، لا يَلْزَمُ مِنِ اتِّصافِ شَيْءٍ بِهِ وُجُودُهُ فِي الخارِجِ لِيَلْزَمَ وُجُودُ المُتَّصِفِ بِهِ فِي الخارِجِ. وَمِنْها أَخْذُ مِثالِ الشَّيْءِ مَكانَهُ، كَما تَقُولُ لِمِثالِ النّارِ: «إِنَّهُ نارٌ، وَكُلُّ نارٍ مُحْرِقٌ، فَهُوَ مُحْرِقٌ»؛ وَهٰذا الاشْتِباهُ هُوَ الَّذِي احْتَجَّ بِهِ المُنْكِرُونَ لِلوُجُودِ الذِّهْنِيِّ، حَيْثُ قالُوا: لَوْ حَصَلَتِ الأَشْياءُ بِأَنْفُسِها لَزِمَ احْتِراقُ الذِّهْنِ عِنْدَ تَصَوُّرِ النّارِ، وَاخْتِراقُهُ عِنْدَ تَصَوُّرِ الجَبَلِ، وَاتِّصافُهُ بِالبَياضِ وَالسَّوادِ عِنْدَ تَصَوُّرِهِما، وَهٰكَذا. وَحَلُّهُ أَنَّهُ مِنْ بابِ أَخْذِ ما بِالعَرَضِ مَكانَ ما بِالذّاتِ؛ يَعْنِي أَنَّ الإِحْراقَ وَالخَرْقَ وَغَيْرَهُما مِنَ العَوارِضِ الَّتِي تَلْحَقُ الشَّيْءَ إِذا وُجِدَ بِوُجُودٍ أَصْلِيٍّ خارِجِيٍّ، وَلَيْسَتْ مِنَ العَوارِضِ لِلوُجُودِ الظِّلِّيِّ الذِّهْنِيِّ. وَمِنْها أَخْذُ جُزْءِ العِلَّةِ مَكانَ العِلَّةِ، كَما إِذا حَمَلَ سَبْعُونَ رَجُلًا حَجَرًا ثَقِيلًا سَبْعِينَ فَرْسَخًا مَثَلًا، فَيُتَوَهَّمُ أَنَّ الواحِدَ مِنْهُمْ يَحْمِلُهُ فَرْسَخًا واحِدًا. وَمِنْها إِجْراءُ طَرِيقِ الأَوْلَوِيَّةِ عِنْدَ الاخْتِلافِ، كَما تَقُولُ: «الإِنْسانُ لَيْسَ بِأَوْلَى بِإِفاضَةِ النَّفْسِ النّاطِقَةِ مِنَ العُصْفُورِ بَعْدَما اشْتَرَكا فِي الحَيَوانِيَّةِ». وَمِنْها ما وَقَعَ مِنْ قِلَّةِ المُبالاةِ بِالحَيْثِيّاتِ وَتَرْكِ الاعْتِناءِ بِها، كَقَوْلِ القائِلِ: «كُلُّ أَبْيَضَ دَخَلَ فِي حَقِيقَتِهِ البَياضُ، وَزَيْدٌ أَبْيَضُ»، فَيَلْزَمُ دُخُولُ البَياضِ فِي حَقِيقَتِهِ؛ وَمَنْشَأُ الغَلَطِ فِيهِ أَنَّ البَياضَ فِي مَفْهُومِ الأَبْيَضِ مِنْ حَيْثُ إِنَّهُ أَبْيَضُ، لا مِنْ حَيْثُ إِنَّهُ حَيَوانٌ وَإِنْسانٌ. وَمِنْها قَوْلُهُمْ: مُماثِلُ المُماثِلِ مُماثِلٌ، نَحْوُ: «الإِنْسانُ مُماثِلٌ لِلنَّخْلَةِ، وَالنَّخْلَةُ مُماثِلَةٌ لِلحَجَرِ فِي كَوْنِهِ غَيْرَ ذِي نَفْسٍ»، فَيَلْزَمُ كَوْنُ زَيْدٍ جَمادًا؛ وَوَجْهُ التَّغْلِيطِ فِيهِ أَنَّ مُماثَلَةَ النَّخْلَةِ لِلإِنْسانِ فِي أَمْرٍ، وَهُوَ الطُّولُ مَثَلًا، وَمُماثَلَتَها لِلحَجَرِ فِي شَيْءٍ آخَرَ. وَمِمّا يُوقِعُ فِي الغَلَطِ أَخْذُ العَدَمِ المُقابِلِ لِلمَلَكَةِ مَكانَ الضِّدِّ وَالنَّقِيضِ، كَالسُّكُونِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ عَدَمُ الحَرَكَةِ عَمّا مِنْ شَأْنِهِ أَنْ يَتَحَرَّكَ، وَكَالعَمَى؛ فَإِنَّهُ عَدَمُ البَصَرِ عَمّا مِنْ شَأْنِهِ أَنْ يَكُونَ بَصِيرًا، فَيُظَنُّ أَنَّ الحَجَرَ ساكِنَةٌ وَالجِدارَ أَعْمَى. وَمِنَ المُغالَطاتِ المَشْهُورَةِ قَوْلُهُمْ: لا يُمْكِنُ تَحْصِيلُ مَجْهُولٍ؛ لِأَنَّ ذٰلِكَ المَجْهُولَ إِذا حَصَلَ فَبِمَ يُعْرَفُ أَنَّهُ مَطْلُوبُكَ؟ فَلا بُدَّ مِنْ بَقاءِ الجَهْلِ، أَوْ وُجُودِ العِلْمِ قَبْلَهُ حَتَّى تَعْرِفَ أَنَّهُ هُوَ، وَعَلَى التَّقْدِيرَيْنِ يَمْتَنِعُ تَحْصِيلُهُ: أَمّا عَلَى الأَوَّلِ فَلِاسْتِحالَةِ مَعْرِفَتِهِ إِذا وُجِدَ، وَأَمّا عَلَى الثّانِي فَلِامْتِناعِ تَحْصِيلِ الحاصِلِ. وَالجَوابُ أَنَّ المَطْلُوبَ مَعْلُومٌ مِنْ وَجْهٍ وَمَجْهُولٌ مِنْ وَجْهٍ، فَبَعْدَ حُصُولِ المَجْهُولِ يُعْلَمُ بِالوَجْهِ المَعْلُومِ المُخَصِّصِ أَنَّهُ المَطْلُوبُ، وَهٰذا كَمِثْلِ عَبْدٍ آبِقٍ إِذا وُجِدَ؛ فَإِنَّهُ كانَ مَعْلُومَ الذّاتِ مَجْهُولَ المَكانِ، فَبَعْدَما وُجِدَ عَرَفْتَ بِما كُنْتَ عارِفًا بِهِ مِنْ ذاتِهِ وَصُورَتِهِ أَنَّهُ آبِقُكَ.
These too are of several kinds, for they arise either from the matter or from the form. Those that arise from the matter: as when [an ] is such that, if the meanings in it are arranged in a way that makes it true, it is not a , and if they are arranged in a way that makes it a syllogism, it is not true. For example: “Human is rational insofar as it is rational, and nothing rational, insofar as it is rational, is an animal; so no human is an animal.” For if the qualification “insofar as it is rational” is kept, the is false; if it is dropped from it, the is false; and if it is dropped from the minor premise and kept in the major, the form of the syllogism breaks down, because [the ] is not shared. Those that arise from the form: as when [an argument] has a form that does not produce [a ]; all of that is faulty composition (sūʾ al-taʾlīf). For example, someone's saying: “Time encompasses events, and the celestial sphere also encompasses them”, producing “So time is the celestial sphere.” This is the second , and the condition that the two differ in and is missing in it, since here both are affirmative. Now we mention some of the fallacies (mughālaṭāt) whose cause is a defect in the form. We say: among the formal fallacies is begging the question (al-muṣādara ʿalā l-maṭlūb), as in “Zayd is a human, because he is a human being (bashar), and every human being is a human.” Among them is taking what is so accidentally (bi-l-ʿaraḍ) in place of what is so essentially (bi-l-dhāt), as in “The one sitting in the ship is moving, and nothing that moves stays fixed in one place.” Among them is the middle term's not being repeated in full, as when it is said: “Human has hair, and all hair grows [like a plant]”, producing “Human grows [like a plant].” For the middle term is “has hair”, and it was not made, in full, the of the major premise. Among them is the middle term's not being the same in the two premises, because it differs as to potentiality and actuality, as in “The silent one is a speaker, and the speaker is not silent”, producing “The silent one is not silent.” Among them is a flaw in the construction arising from a doubt whether a qualification belongs to the subject or to the , as in their saying: “Human alone is laughing, and everything laughing is an animal”, producing “Human alone is an animal.” The error arose only from imagining that the word “alone” is part of the subject. Had it been made part of the predicate, so that one said: “Human is: that which alone is laughing; and everything that alone is laughing is an animal”, the conclusion would be true, because it would then be “Human is an animal.” So the error in this example comes from a faulty view of the predication. Among them is the 's not being predicated, in the major premise, of all the individuals of the middle term, as when you say: “Every human is an animal, and animal is general, or a , or said of many that differ in their ”, which produces “Every human is general, or a genus, or said of many that differ in their realities.” That is certainly false. The cause of the error is only the neglect of the universality of the major premise: the major premise is a natural (ṭabīʿiyya), so the judgement does not pass on [to the individuals]. Among them is [the error] that occurs because the copulas come before or after the negations, and likewise because the modality (jiha) comes before or after the negations: as in “Zayd is not standing” (Zayd laysa huwa bi-qāʾim) and “Zayd is not-standing” (Zayd huwa laysa bi-qāʾim); “necessarily it is not” and “it is not necessarily”; and “it is not required that it be” [as against] “it is required that it not be”. The multiplying of negations also belongs to this chapter: the even degrees, such as the negation of a negation, and the negation of the negation of the negation of a negation, are affirmation; and the odd ones, such as the negation of the negation of a negation, and so on, are negation. Among them is taking mental considerations (iʿtibārāt dhihniyya) and intellectual predicates as things in external reality: as when it is said “Human is ”, and one supposes that it is so in external things. That supposition is not correct, for universality attaches to things only in the mind, not outside it. Through this verification another fallacy (ughlūṭa) is resolved. It is set out as follows: “The impossible exists; for if something were impossible outside [the mind], its impossibility would obtain outside, and so the impossible would exist outside.” So the existence of the impossible would follow, which is certainly false. The way it is resolved: impossibility is a mental consideration; a thing's being qualified by it does not require that [impossibility] exist outside, so as to require that what is qualified by it exist outside. Among them is taking the image (mithāl) of a thing in place of the thing, as when you say of an image of fire: “It is fire, and all fire burns, so it burns.” This confusion is what the deniers of mental existence argued from, when they said: if things were present [in the mind] in themselves, the mind would have to burn when it fire, be pierced when it conceives a mountain, and be qualified by whiteness and blackness when it conceives them, and so on. Its resolution is that it belongs to taking what is so accidentally in place of what is so essentially. That is, burning, piercing and the like are among the accidents that attach to a thing when it exists with original, external existence; they are not among the accidents of shadow, mental existence (al-wujūd al-ẓillī al-dhihnī). Among them is taking part of the cause in place of the cause: as when seventy men carry a heavy stone seventy parasangs, say, and one imagines that one of them alone would carry it one parasang. Among them is applying the argument from priority (awlawiyya) where [the two cases] differ, as when you say: “Human has no more claim than the sparrow to receive the rational soul, since the two share in animality.” Among them is what arises from carelessness about the respects (ḥaythiyyāt) [in which something is said] and from not attending to them, as in someone's saying: “Every white thing has whiteness entering into its reality, and Zayd is white”, so that whiteness would have to enter into his reality. The source of the error here is that whiteness is in the concept of “white” insofar as it is white, not insofar as it is an animal and a human. Among them is their saying: the like of a like is a like; as in “Human is like the palm tree, and the palm tree is like the stone in not having a soul”, so it would follow that Zayd is inanimate. What misleads here is that the palm tree's likeness to human is in one thing, say tallness, and its likeness to the stone is in something else. Among the things that lead into error is taking the privation that is opposed to possession (al-ʿadam al-muqābil li-l-malaka) in place of the contrary and the . Such is rest: it is the absence of motion in what is apt to move; and such is blindness: it is the absence of sight in what is apt to see. So one supposes that the stone is at rest and the wall is blind. Among the well-known fallacies is their saying: an unknown cannot be . For when that unknown is obtained, by what would it be known that it is what you were seeking? So either the ignorance must remain, or the [of it] must exist beforehand so that you recognise that it is the one; and on either supposition acquiring it is impossible: on the first, because it is impossible to recognise it when it is found; on the second, because it is impossible to acquire what has already been acquired. The answer is that what is sought is known in one respect and unknown in another. So after the unknown is obtained, it is known, through the known respect that singles it out, that it is what was sought. This is like a runaway slave when he is found: he was known in his person and unknown in his whereabouts, so once he was found you recognised, by what you already knew of his person and his appearance, that he was your runaway.
al-Mirqāt · p. 55