Indian path · level 2 · al-Mirqāt · Lesson 19 of 25
19
Induction, analogy, reductio, matter and form
Syllogism
القِيَاس
Arabic text after the print of Deoband after 1336/1917 · translation by The Mantiqi, draft
About this text
al-Mirqāt المِرْقاة
Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1243 or 1244/1828–29)
Text
Arabic: al-Mirqāt, with al-Shīrkūtī's gloss al-Mirʾāt (gloss not reproduced), checked against the Delhi print of 1286/1869 (Sayyid al-Maṭābiʿ); vowel marks added by The Mantiqi (draft), Kutub Khāna Iʿzāziyya, Deoband after 1336/1917 View the scan
Translation
The Mantiqi's own; a draft.
Review
Draft, awaiting review by Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf.
The text Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī
فصل
الاسْتِقْراءُ هو الحُكْمُ على كُلِّيٍّ بتَتَبُّعِ أكْثَرِ الجُزْئِيّاتِ، كقَوْلِنا: «كُلُّ حَيَوانٍ يُحَرِّكُ فَكَّهُ الأسْفَلَ عِنْدَ المَضْغِ»؛ لأنّا اسْتَقْرَيْنا ـ أي تَتَبَّعْنا ـ الإنْسانَ والفَرَسَ والبَعِيرَ والحَمِيرَ والطُّيُورَ والسِّباعَ فوَجَدْنا كُلَّها كذلك، فحَكَمْنا بَعْدَ تَتَبُّعِ هذه الجُزْئِيّاتِ المُسْتَقْرِيَةِ أنّ كُلَّ حَيَوانٍ يُحَرِّكُ فَكَّهُ الأسْفَلَ عِنْدَ المَضْغِ. والاسْتِقْراءُ لا يُفِيدُ اليَقِينَ، وإنّما يُحَصِّلُ الظَّنَّ الغالِبَ؛ لجَوازِ أنْ لا يَكُونَ جَمِيعُ أفْرادِ هذا الكُلِّيِّ بهذه الحالَةِ، كما يُقالُ: إنّ التِّمْساحَ لَيْسَ على هذه الصِّفَةِ، بل يُحَرِّكُ فَكَّهُ الأعْلى.
(istiqrāʾ) is judging about a by examining most of its , as when we say: “Every animal moves its lower jaw when chewing”; for we have inducted, that is, examined, the human, the horse, the camel, donkeys, birds and beasts of prey and found all of them to be so, and so, after examining these inducted particulars, we judged that every animal moves its lower jaw when chewing. Induction does not yield certainty; it brings about only preponderant opinion (ẓann ghālib), since it is possible that not all the individuals of this universal are in this state. As is said, the crocodile does not have this attribute: it moves its upper jaw.
(tamthīl) is establishing a judgement in one because it exists in another particular, on account of a uniting factor (maʿnā jāmiʿ) shared by the two, as when we say: “The world is composite, so it has come to be, like a house.” To establish that the shared factor is the cause of the judgement mentioned, they have many methods, set out in the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl). The chief of them are two. The first is co-variation (dawarān), as the later scholars call it; the earlier ones used to call it presence and absence together (al-ṭard wa-l-ʿaks). It is that the judgement turns with the shared factor in existence and non-existence: when the factor is found, the judgement is found, and when the factor is absent, the judgement is absent. So co-variation is evidence that what it turns on (madār), I mean the factor, is the cause of what turns (dāʾir), that is, the judgement. The second method is probing and division (al-sabr wa-l-taqsīm). It is that they enumerate the attributes of the base case (aṣl), then establish that everything apart from the shared factor is unfit to require the judgement, because those attributes are found in another place where the judgement fails to follow. For example, in the example mentioned they say: the cause of the house's having come to be is either contingency, or existence, or being a substance, or being a body, or being composite; and none of these except being composite is fit to be the cause of having come to be; otherwise everything contingent, every substance, everything existent and every body would have come to be, whereas the Necessary [Being], exalted is He, the separate substances and the ethereal bodies are not so.
Among the compound syllogisms is one called the reductio (qiyās al-khulf). It comes down to two syllogisms. The first is a composed of two . The second is an , one of whose is implicative (luzūmiyya), I mean the of the first syllogism, while the other premise is one in which the of the is affirmed. It is set out as follows: the claim holds; for if the claim did not hold, its contradictory would hold; and whenever its contradictory holds, the absurd holds. This produces: if the claim did not hold, the absurd would hold. This is the first of the two syllogisms. Then we make this conclusion the and say: “If the claim did not hold, the absurd would hold”, and we join to it an exceptive and say: “But the absurd does not hold.” So, necessarily, the claim holds; otherwise both contradictories would be removed. If you wish to grasp this in a example, you say: “Every human is an animal” is true; for if it were not true, “Some human is not an animal” would be true; and whenever “Some human is not an animal” is true, the absurd follows. This produces: whenever the claim is not true, the absurd follows. But the absurd does not hold; so the claim's not holding does not hold; so the claim holds.
It should be known that every must have a form (ṣūra) and a matter (mādda). The form is the arrangement that arises from ordering the and placing some of them next to others. You have come to know the four and have learned their conditions of productivity; what remains is the matter. The earlier scholars, up to and including the Shaykh al-Raʾīs [Ibn Sīnā], were most concerned with setting out the matters of syllogisms in detail and making them clear, and gave most care to the inquiry into expanding and refining them. That is because knowing this is of fuller benefit and wider return to those who seek the . But the later scholars have spoken at length on explaining the forms of syllogisms and expanded on them to the utmost, especially on syllogisms made of and conditionals, though these discussions are of little use; and they cast aside the matter, confining themselves, in explaining it, to giving the definitions of the five arts. I do not know what led them to this, or what motive drew them there. The perceptive, intelligent [student] must devote the utmost care to these discussions, which are of great standing and of dazzling proof, and seek this great goal and lofty aim in the books of the skilled ancients and the writings of the earliest masters, those enchanters [of the art]. So, dear son, you must listen to my counsel and not forget my advice. I shall set before you only fragments of what concerns these arts, relying on the One who suffices for every concern.
Hear, then, that the syllogism, with respect to its matter, divides into five kinds, which are called the five arts: the first is the demonstrative, the second the dialectical, the third the rhetorical, the fourth the poetic and the fifth the sophistical.
3 questions on what the commentary explains. With 6 out of 10 or more (two stars) the next lesson opens.
Question 1
To show that the shared factor in an analogy is the cause of the judgement, what is the method al-Mirqāt calls probing and division (al-sabr wa-l-taqsīm)?
The first description is co-variation (dawarān); probing and division enumerates the attributes, as with the house: contingency, existence, substance and body fail, so only being composite is the cause of having come to be.
Question 2
According to al-Mirqāt, of which two syllogisms is the reductio (qiyās al-khulf) composed?
First: “if the claim did not hold, its would hold; and whenever its contradictory holds, the absurd holds”. Its is then joined to the “but the absurd does not hold”, so the claim holds.
Question 3
What is the form (ṣūra) of a syllogism, and what does al-Mirqāt fault in the later scholars?
Al-Mirqāt defines the form as the arrangement of the and complains that the later scholars spoke at length on forms, which are of little use, while confining the matter to the definitions of the .