Demonstration

فَصْلٌ فِي البُرْهانِ وَما يَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ

اعْلَمْ أَنَّ البُرْهانَ قِياسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنَ اليَقِينِيّاتِ، بَدِيهِيَّةً كانَتْ أَوْ نَظَرِيَّةً مُنْتَهِيَةً إِلَيْها، وَلَيْسَ الأَمْرُ كَما زُعِمَ أَنَّ البُرْهانَ إِنَّما يَتَأَلَّفُ مِنَ البَدِيهِيّاتِ فَحَسْبُ. ثُمَّ البَدِيهِيّاتُ سِتَّةٌ: أَحَدُها الأَوَّلِيّاتُ، وَهِيَ قَضايا يَجْزِمُ العَقْلُ فِيها بِمُجَرَّدِ الالْتِفاتِ وَالتَّصَوُّرِ، وَلا يَحْتاجُ إِلَى واسِطَةٍ، كَقَوْلِكَ: «الكُلُّ أَعْظَمُ مِنَ الجُزْءِ». وَثانِيها الفِطْرِيّاتُ، وَهِيَ ما يُفْتَقَرُ إِلَى واسِطَةٍ غَيْرِ غائِبَةٍ عَنِ الذِّهْنِ أَصْلًا، وَيُقالُ لِهٰذِهِ القَضايا: قَضايا قِياساتُها مَعَها، نَحْوُ: «الأَرْبَعَةُ زَوْجٌ»؛ فَإِنَّ مَنْ تَصَوَّرَ مَفْهُومَ الأَرْبَعَةِ، وَتَصَوَّرَ مَفْهُومَ الزَّوْجِ بِأَنَّهُ هُوَ الَّذِي يَنْقَسِمُ بِمُتَساوِيَيْنِ، حَكَمَ بَداهَةً بِأَنَّ الأَرْبَعَةَ زَوْجٌ؛ وَنَحْوُ قَوْلِنا: «الواحِدُ نِصْفُ الاثْنَيْنِ»؛ فَإِنَّ العَقْلَ يَحْكُمُ بِهِ بَعْدَ أَنْ يُلاحِظَ مَفْهُومَ نِصْفِ الاثْنَيْنِ وَالواحِدِ. وَثالِثُها الحَدْسِيّاتُ، وَهُوَ ظُهُورُ المَبادِي دَفْعَةً واحِدَةً مِنْ دُونِ أَنْ يَكُونَ هُناكَ حَرَكَةٌ فِكْرِيَّةٌ. وَالفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الحَدْسِ وَالفِكْرِ أَنَّهُ لا بُدَّ فِي الفِكْرِ مِنَ الحَرَكَتَيْنِ لِلنَّفْسِ، بِخِلافِ الحَدْسِ؛ فَإِنَّ الذِّهْنَ بَعْدَ ما حَصَلَ لَهُ المَطْلُوبُ بِوَجْهٍ ما يَتَحَرَّكُ فِي المَعانِي المَخْزُونَةِ وَالمَبادِي المَكْنُونَةِ طالِبًا لِما يَكُونُ لَها تَناسُبٌ بِالمَطْلُوبِ، حَتَّى يَجِدَ مَعْلُوماتٍ مُناسِبَةً لَهُ، فَهٰهُنا تَمَّ الحَرَكَةُ الأُولَى، ثُمَّ يَرْجِعُ القَهْقَرَى وَيَتَحَرَّكُ ثانِيًا مُرَتِّبًا لِتِلْكَ المَعْلُوماتِ المَخْزُونَةِ الَّتِي وَجَدَها تَرْتِيبًا تَدْرِيجِيًّا، حَتَّى وَصَلَ إِلَى المَطْلُوبِ، وَتَمَّ الحَرَكَةُ الثّانِيَةُ، فَمَجْمُوعُ هاتَيْنِ الحَرَكَتَيْنِ يُسَمَّى بِالفِكْرِ. مَثَلًا: إِذا كُنْتَ تَصَوَّرْتَ الإِنْسانَ بِوَجْهٍ مِنَ الوُجُوهِ، كَالكاتِبِ وَالضّاحِكِ مَثَلًا، ثُمَّ صِرْتَ طالِبًا لِماهِيَّةِ الإِنْسانِ، فَحَرَّكْتَ ذِهْنَكَ نَحْوَ المَعانِي الَّتِي عِنْدَكَ مَخْزُونَةً، فَوَجَدْتَ الحَيَوانَ وَالنّاطِقَ مُناسِبًا لِمَطْلُوبِكَ، فَتَمَّ الحَرَكَةُ الأُولَى، وَمَبْدَؤُهُ المَطْلُوبُ المَعْلُومُ مِنْ وَجْهٍ، وَمُنْتَهاهُ الحَيَوانُ وَالنّاطِقُ. ثُمَّ تُرَتِّبُ الحَيَوانَ وَالنّاطِقَ بِأَنْ تُقَدِّمَ الحَيَوانَ الَّذِي هُوَ الجِنْسُ عَلَى النّاطِقِ، هُوَ الفَصْلُ، وَقُلْتَ: الحَيَوانُ النّاطِقُ، وَهٰهُنا انْقَطَعَ الحَرَكَةُ الثّانِيَةُ وَحَصَلَ المَطْلُوبُ. وَأَمّا الحَدْسُ فَفِيهِ انْتِقالُ الذِّهْنِ مِنَ المَطْلُوبِ إِلَى المَبادِي دَفْعَةً، وَمِنْها إِلَى المَطْلُوبِ كَذٰلِكَ، وَأَكْثَرُ ما يَكُونُ الحَدْسُ عَقِيبَ الشَّوْقِ وَالتَّعَبِ، وَقَدْ تَكُونُ بِدُونِهِما. وَالنّاسُ مُخْتَلِفُونَ فِي الحَدْسِ: فَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ هُوَ قَوِيُّ الحَدْسِ كَثِيرُهُ، يَحْصُلُ لَهُ مِنَ المَطالِبِ أَكْثَرُها بِالحَدْسِ، كَالمُؤَيَّدِ بِالقُوَّةِ القُدْسِيَّةِ كَالحُكَماءِ وَالأَوْلِياءِ وَالأَنْبِياءِ؛ وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ هُوَ قَلِيلُ الحَدْسِ ضَعِيفُهُ؛ وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ لا حَدْسَ لَهُ، كَالمُنْتَهِي فِي البَلادَةِ. وَمِنْ هٰذا يُعْلَمُ أَنَّ البَداهَةَ وَالنَّظَرِيَّةَ مُخْتَلِفانِ بِالأَشْخاصِ وَالأَوْقاتِ؛ فَرُبَّ حَدْسِيٍّ عِنْدَ فاقِدِ القُوَّةِ القُدْسِيَّةِ يَكُونُ نَظَرِيًّا، وَبَدِيهِيًّا عِنْدَ صاحِبِها. وَرابِعُها المُشاهَداتُ، وَهِيَ القَضايا يُحْكَمُ فِيها بِواسِطَةِ المُشاهَدَةِ وَالإِحْساسِ، وَهِيَ تَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى قِسْمَيْنِ: الأَوَّلُ ما شُوهِدَ بِإِحْدَى الحَواسِّ الظّاهِرَةِ، وَهِيَ خَمْسٌ: الباصِرَةُ وَالسّامِعَةُ وَالشّامَّةُ وَالذّائِقَةُ وَاللّامِسَةُ، وَيُسَمَّى هٰذا القِسْمُ بِالحِسِّيّاتِ؛ وَالثّانِي ما أُدْرِكَ بِالمُدْرِكاتِ مِنَ الحَواسِّ الباطِنَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ أَيْضًا خَمْسٌ: الحِسُّ المُشْتَرَكُ المُدْرِكُ لِلصُّوَرِ، وَالخَيالُ الَّتِي هِيَ خِزانَةٌ لَهُ، وَالوَهْمُ المُدْرِكُ لِلمَعانِي الشَّخْصِيَّةِ وَالجُزْئِيَّةِ، وَالحافِظَةُ الَّتِي هِيَ خِزانَةٌ لِلمَعانِي الجُزْئِيَّةِ، وَالمُتَصَرِّفَةُ الَّتِي تَتَصَرَّفُ فِي الصُّوَرِ وَالمَعانِي بِالتَّحْلِيلِ وَالتَّرْكِيبِ، وَيُسَمَّى هٰذا القِسْمُ بِالوِجْدانِيّاتِ؛ وَمُدْرَكاتُ العَقْلِ الصِّرْفِ، أَعْنِي الكُلِّيّاتِ، غَيْرُ مُنْدَرِجٍ فِي هٰذا القِسْمِ. مِثالُ القِسْمِ الثّانِي: كَما حَكَمْنا بِأَنَّ لَنا جُوعًا أَوْ عَطَشًا. وَخامِسُها التَّجْرِبِيّاتُ، وَهِيَ قَضايا يَحْكُمُ العَقْلُ بِها بِواسِطَةِ تَكْرارِ المُشاهَدَةِ وَعَدَمِ التَّخَلُّفِ حُكْمًا كُلِّيًّا، كَالحُكْمِ بِأَنَّ شُرْبَ السَّقَمُونْيا مُسْهِلٌ لِلصَّفْراءِ. وَسادِسُها المُتَواتِراتُ، وَهِيَ قَضايا يُحْكَمُ بِها بِواسِطَةِ إِخْبارِ جَماعَةٍ يَسْتَحِيلُ العَقْلُ تَواطُؤَهُمْ عَلَى الكَذِبِ. وَاخْتَلَفُوا فِي أَقَلِّ عَدَدِ هٰذِهِ الجَماعَةِ: قِيلَ: إِنَّ أَقَلَّهُ أَرْبَعَةٌ، وَقِيلَ: عَشَرَةٌ، وَقِيلَ: أَرْبَعُونَ؛ وَالأَشْبَهُ أَنَّ هٰذا العَدَدَ يَخْتَلِفُ بِاخْتِلافِ حالِ الَّذِينَ أَخْبَرُوهُ وَاخْتِلافِ الواقِعَةِ، فَلا يَتَعَيَّنُ عَدَدٌ، وَالضّابِطَةُ أَنْ يَبْلُغَ إِلَى حَدٍّ يُفِيدُ اليَقِينَ. فَهٰذِهِ السِّتَّةُ هِيَ مَبادِي البَراهِينِ، وَمَقاطِعُ الدَّلِيلِ، وَمُنْتَهَى اليَقِينِ.

Know that demonstration is a syllogism composed of certain premises, whether self-evident (badīhī) or acquired ones that end in them. The matter is not as has been claimed, that demonstration is composed only of self-evident premises. The self-evident premises are six. The first is first principles (awwaliyyāt): propositions in which the intellect is decisive merely by turning to them and conceiving [their terms], without needing an intermediary, as when you say: “The whole is greater than the part.” The second is innate premises (fiṭriyyāt): those that need an intermediary which is never absent from the mind. These propositions are also called “propositions that carry their proofs with them”, as in “Four is even”; for whoever conceives the concept of four, and conceives the concept of even as that which divides into two equal [parts], judges self-evidently that four is even. And as when we say: “One is half of two”; for the intellect judges this once it has considered the concept of half of two and of one. The third is intuitive premises (ḥadsiyyāt). [Intuition] is the starting points appearing all at once, without any movement of thought there. The difference between intuition (ḥads) and thinking (fikr) is that thinking requires two movements of the soul, unlike intuition. For the mind, after the thing sought has come to it in some respect, moves among the stored meanings and hidden starting points, seeking what is related to the thing sought, until it finds known items that suit it; here the first movement is complete. Then it turns back and moves a second time, ordering the stored known items it has found, step by step, until it reaches the thing sought; and the second movement is complete. The two movements together are called thinking. For example: if you have conceived the human in some respect, such as the writer and the laughing [being], and then come to seek the quiddity of the human, you move your mind towards the meanings stored with you and find animal and rational suited to what you seek; so the first movement is complete, its starting point being the thing sought, known in one respect, and its end animal and rational. Then you order animal and rational by putting animal, which is the genus, before rational, which is the differentia, and say: “rational animal”. Here the second movement ends and the thing sought is obtained. In intuition, by contrast, the mind passes from the thing sought to the starting points all at once, and from them to the thing sought likewise. Intuition most often comes after longing and effort, though it may come without them. People differ in intuition: some are strong and abundant in intuition, so that most of what they seek comes to them by intuition, such as one supported by the holy power (al-quwwa al-qudsiyya), like the philosophers, the saints and the prophets; some have little and weak intuition; and some have no intuition at all, like one extreme in dullness. From this it is known that being self-evident and being acquired differ with persons and times: many an intuitive [proposition] is acquired for one who lacks the holy power and self-evident for one who has it. The fourth is observations (mushāhadāt): propositions judged by means of observation and sensation. They divide into two kinds. The first is what is observed by one of the outer senses, which are five: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch; this kind is called sensory premises (ḥissiyyāt). The second is what is perceived by the perceiving faculties among the inner senses, which are also five: the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak), which perceives forms; imagination (khayāl), which is its storehouse; estimation (wahm), which perceives individual and particular meanings; memory (ḥāfiẓa), which is the storehouse of particular meanings; and the compositive faculty (mutaṣarrifa), which works on forms and meanings by separating and combining. This kind is called introspective premises (wijdāniyyāt). What the pure intellect perceives, I mean universals, does not fall under this kind. An example of the second kind: as when we judge that we have hunger or thirst. The fifth is experiential premises (tajribiyyāt): propositions that the intellect judges with a universal judgement by means of repeated observation and [the effect] never failing to follow, like the judgement that drinking scammony purges bile. The sixth is widely transmitted premises (mutawātirāt): propositions judged by means of reports from a group whose agreeing on a lie the intellect deems impossible. They differ on the least number of this group: it has been said that the least is four, or ten, or forty. The likeliest view is that the number varies with the state of those who report and with the event [reported], so no number is fixed; the rule is that it reaches a point that yields certainty. These six are the starting points of demonstrations, where proof comes to rest and certainty reaches its end.

al-Mirqāt · p. 46

فائِدَةٌ

زَعَمَ قَوْمٌ أَنَّ المُقَدِّماتِ النَّقْلِيَّةَ لا تُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي القِياسِ البُرْهانِيِّ، ظَنًّا مِنْهُمْ أَنَّ النَّقْلَ يَتَطَرَّقُ إِلَيْهِ الغَلَطُ وَالخَطَأُ مِنْ وُجُوهٍ شَتَّى، فَكَيْفَ يَكُونُ مَبادِيَ القِياسِ البُرْهانِيِّ الَّذِي يُفِيدُ القَطْعَ؟ وَإِنَّ هٰذا الظَّنَّ إِثْمٌ؛ لِأَنَّ النَّقْلَ كَثِيرًا ما يُفِيدُ القَطْعَ إِذا رُوعِيَ فِيهِ شَرائِطُ وَانْضَمَّ إِلَيْهِ العَقْلُ. نَعَمْ، لَوْ قِيلَ: إِنَّ النَّقْلَ الصِّرْفَ بِلا اعْتِبارِ انْضِمامِ العَقْلِ مَعَهُ لا يُعْتَبَرُ وَلا يُفِيدُ، لَكانَ لَهُ وَجْهٌ.

Some have claimed that transmitted premises (naqliyya) are not used in a demonstrative syllogism, supposing that error and mistake creep into transmission in many ways: how, then, could they be starting points of a demonstrative syllogism, which yields certainty? This supposition is a sin, for transmission very often yields certainty when certain conditions are observed in it and the intellect is joined to it. Yes, if it were said that bare transmission, without the intellect being joined to it, is not taken into account and yields nothing, that would have some ground.

al-Mirqāt · p. 49

فَصْلٌ

البُرْهانُ قِسْمانِ: لِمِّيٌّ وَإِنِّيٌّ. أَمّا اللِّمِّيُّ فَهُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ الأَوْسَطُ فِيهِ عِلَّةً لِثُبُوتِ الأَكْبَرِ لِلأَصْغَرِ فِي الواقِعِ، كَما أَنَّهُ واسِطَةٌ فِي الحُكْمِ، يُسَمَّى بِهِ لِإِفادَتِهِ اللِّمِّيَّةَ وَالعِلِّيَّةَ. وَأَمّا الإِنِّيُّ فَهُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ الأَوْسَطُ فِيهِ عِلَّةً لِلحُكْمِ فِي الذِّهْنِ فَقَطْ، وَلَمْ يَكُنْ عِلَّةً فِي الواقِعِ، بَلْ قَدْ يَكُونُ مَعْلُولًا لَهُ. مِثالُ اللِّمِّيِّ قَوْلُكَ: «زَيْدٌ مَحْمُومٌ؛ لِأَنَّهُ مُتَعَفِّنُ الأَخْلاطِ، وَكُلُّ مُتَعَفِّنِ الأَخْلاطِ مَحْمُومٌ، فَزَيْدٌ مَحْمُومٌ»؛ فَكَما أَنَّ فِي هٰذا القِياسِ الأَوْسَطَ عِلَّةٌ لِثُبُوتِ الحُمَّى لِزَيْدٍ فِي ذِهْنِكَ، كَذٰلِكَ هُوَ عِلَّةٌ لِوُجُودِ الحُمَّى فِي الواقِعِ. وَمِثالُ الإِنِّيِّ قَوْلُكَ: «زَيْدٌ مُتَعَفِّنُ الأَخْلاطِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ مَحْمُومٌ، وَكُلُّ مَحْمُومٍ مُتَعَفِّنُ الأَخْلاطِ، فَزَيْدٌ مُتَعَفِّنُ الأَخْلاطِ»؛ فَوُجُودُ الحُمَّى عِلَّةٌ لِثُبُوتِ كَوْنِهِ مُتَعَفِّنَ الأَخْلاطِ فِي ذِهْنِكَ، وَلَيْسَ عِلَّةً فِي نَفْسِ الأَمْرِ، بَلْ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُونَ الأَمْرُ فِي الواقِعِ بِالعَكْسِ.

Demonstration is of two kinds: limmī and innī. The limmī is the one in which the middle term is the cause of the major term holding of the minor in reality, just as it is the intermediary in the judgement; it is so called because it gives the limmiyya [the “why”], that is, the cause. The innī is the one in which the middle term is the cause of the judgement in the mind only, and is not the cause in reality; rather, it may be its effect. An example of the limmī is your saying: “Zayd is feverish, because his humours are putrefied; and everyone whose humours are putrefied is feverish; so Zayd is feverish.” Just as in this syllogism the middle term is the cause of fever being established for Zayd in your mind, so it is the cause of the fever's existing in reality. An example of the innī is your saying: “Zayd's humours are putrefied, because he is feverish; and everyone feverish has putrefied humours; so Zayd's humours are putrefied.” The existence of the fever is the cause, in your mind, of its being established that his humours are putrefied, but it is not the cause in the thing itself (nafs al-amr); rather, in reality the matter may well be the reverse.

al-Mirqāt · p. 50