Indian path · level 2 · al-Mirqāt · Lesson 8 of 25
8
Differentia, proprium, common accident
The five universals
الكُلِّيَّات الخَمْس
Arabic text after the print of Deoband after 1336/1917 · translation by The Mantiqi, draft
About this text
al-Mirqāt المِرْقاة
Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1243 or 1244/1828–29)
Text
Arabic: al-Mirqāt, with al-Shīrkūtī's gloss al-Mirʾāt (gloss not reproduced), checked against the Delhi print of 1286/1869 (Sayyid al-Maṭābiʿ); vowel marks added by The Mantiqi (draft), Kutub Khāna Iʿzāziyya, Deoband after 1336/1917 View the scan
The third is the : a said of a thing in answer to “which thing is it in its ?”, as when it is asked “Human: by which thing is it [distinguished] in its essence?” and the answer is that it is rational. It is of two kinds, and . The proximate is what distinguishes [a thing] from what shares its proximate , and the remote is what distinguishes [it] from what shares its remote genus. The first is like rational for human, and the second like sensing for it. The differentia has a relation to the , in which it is called constitutive (muqawwim), because it enters into the make-up (qiwām) and the of the species; and a relation to the genus, in which it is called divisive (muqassim), because it divides the genus and produces a division of it. Take rational: it is constitutive of human, because human is the rational animal; and it is divisive of animal, because through rational animal comes to have two divisions, one the rational animal and the other the non-rational animal.
Whatever is constitutive of the higher is constitutive of the lower. Take “receptive of dimensions”: it is constitutive of body, and so it is constitutive of growing body, animal and human. Or take growing: just as it is constitutive of growing body, it is also constitutive of animal and of human. Or take sensing and moving by will: just as they are constitutive of animal, so they are constitutive of human. But not everything constitutive of the lower is constitutive of the higher: rational is constitutive of human but not constitutive of animal.
Every that is divisive of the lower is divisive of the higher: just as rational divides animal into rational and non-rational, so it divides body as such into these two. But not everything divisive of the higher is divisive of the lower: sensing, for example, divides growing body into the sensing and the non-sensing growing body, but it does not divide animal into these two, for every animal is sensing, and no non-sensing animal exists.
The fourth is the (khāṣṣa): a universal lying outside the of the individuals, of individuals that fall under one reality only, like laughing for human, and writing for it.
The fifth of the is the : the universal lying outside [the ], said of the individuals of one reality and of others too, like walking, which is of the individuals of human and of horse.
Now that you have learned from what we have said that the are five, the first the , the second the , the third the , the fourth the and the fifth the , know that the first three are called the essentials (dhātiyyāt) and the last two the accidentals (ʿaraḍiyyāt). The name “” is sometimes restricted to the genus and the differentia only, and in this usage the word “essential” is not applied to the species.
The , I mean the and the , divides into (lāzim) and (mufāriq). The inseparable is what cannot be separated from the thing. This is either with regard to the , like evenness for four and oddness for three, for the separation of evenness from four and of oddness from three is impossible; or with regard to existence, like blackness for the Abyssinian, for the separation of blackness from the existence of the Abyssinian is impossible, but not from his quiddity, since his quiddity is human, and it is evident that blackness is not inseparable from human. The separable accident is that whose separation from what it accompanies (malzūm) is not impossible, like actual writing for a human, and actual walking for him.
The is of two kinds. The first is one whose follows from the conception of what it accompanies (malzūm), like sight for blindness. The second is one where conceiving what it accompanies and conceiving the inseparable [accident] itself entail certainty of the inseparability, like evenness for four: whoever conceives four and conceives the concept of evenness is certain, immediately, that four is even and divisible into two equal parts.
The , I mean what can be separated from what it attaches to (maʿrūḍ), is also of two kinds. One is that whose attaching to what it accompanies is permanent, like motion for the celestial sphere. The second is that which passes away from it, either quickly, like the redness of embarrassment and the pallor of fear, or slowly, like grey hair and youth.
3 questions on what the commentary explains. With 6 out of 10 or more (two stars) the next lesson opens.
Question 1
How does al-Mirqāt describe the relation of “rational” to “human” and to “animal”?
The is called constitutive in relation to the and divisive in relation to the : rational constitutes human, the rational animal, and divides animal.
Question 2
“Sensing” divides growing body into the sensing and the non-sensing, but it does not divide animal. What rule does al-Mirqāt draw from this?
Every animal is sensing, so sensing cannot divide animal, though it divides growing body; hence al-Mirqāt says not everything divisive of the higher is divisive of the lower.
Question 3
Blackness cannot be separated from the existence of the Abyssinian, but it can from his quiddity. How does al-Mirqāt classify it?
Al-Mirqāt explains that the Abyssinian's is human, and blackness is not from human; so blackness is inseparable from his existence only.