Predication, further divisions and modal propositions

فصل

قد جَرَتْ عادَةُ المِيزانِيِّينَ أنّهم يُعَبِّرُونَ عنِ المَوْضُوعِ بـ«ج» وعنِ المَحْمُولِ بـ«ب»، فمَتى أرادُوا التَّعْبِيرَ عنِ المُوجَبَةِ الكُلِّيَّةِ يَقُولُونَ: «كُلُّ ج ب»، ومَقْصُودُهم مِن ذلك الإيجازُ ودَفْعُ تَوَهُّمِ الانْحِصارِ.

The logicians (al-mīzāniyyūn) have made it their custom to express the subject by J and the predicate by B. So when they want to express the universal affirmative, they say “Every J is B”. Their aim in this is brevity, and to prevent the impression that [the rule] is confined [to one subject matter].

al-Mirqāt · p. 25

فصل

الحَمْلُ في اصْطِلاحِهِمُ اتِّحادُ المُتَغايِرَيْنِ في المَفْهُومِ بحَسَبِ الوُجُودِ؛ فَفي قَوْلِكَ: «زَيْدٌ كاتِبٌ» و«عَمْرٌو شاعِرٌ» مَفْهُومُ «زَيْدٍ» مُغايِرٌ لمَفْهُومِ «كاتِبٍ» لكنّهما مَوْجُودانِ بوُجُودٍ واحِدٍ، وكذا مَفْهُومُ «عَمْرٍو» و«شاعِرٍ» مُتَغايِرانِ وقَدِ اتَّحَدا في الوُجُودِ. ثُمَّ الحَمْلُ على قِسْمَيْنِ؛ لأنّه إنْ كانَ بواسِطَةِ «في» أو «ذُو» أوِ اللّامِ كما في قَوْلِكَ: «زَيْدٌ في الدّارِ» و«المالُ لِزَيْدٍ» و«خالِدٌ ذُو مالٍ» يُسَمّى الحَمْلَ بالاشْتِقاقِ، وإنْ لم يَكُنْ كذلك بل يُحْمَلُ شَيْءٌ على شَيْءٍ بلا واسِطَةِ هذه الوَسائِطِ يُقالُ لَهُ: الحَمْلُ بالمُواطاةِ، نحوُ: «عَمْرٌو طَبِيبٌ» و«بَكْرٌ فَصِيحٌ».

Predication (ḥaml), in their terminology, is the union, in existence, of two things that differ in concept. So in your saying “Zayd is a writer” and “ʿAmr is a poet”, the concept of “Zayd” differs from the concept of “writer”, but the two exist by one existence; likewise the concepts of “ʿAmr” and “poet” differ, yet they are united in existence. Predication, further, is of two kinds. If it is by means of “in” (fī), “possessor of” (dhū) or the lām [“belonging to”], as when you say “Zayd is in the house”, “The wealth belongs to Zayd” and “Khālid is possessed of wealth”, it is called predication by derivation (bi-l-ishtiqāq). If it is not so, but one thing is predicated of another without these intermediaries, it is called predication by concordance (bi-l-muwāṭāt), as in “ʿAmr is a physician” and “Bakr is eloquent”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 25

فصل

تَقْسِيمٌ آخَرُ لِلْحَمْلِيَّةِ: مَوْضُوعُ الحَمْلِيَّةِ إنْ كانَ مَوْجُودًا في الخارِجِ وكانَ الحُكْمُ فيها باعْتِبارِ تَحَقُّقِ المَوْضُوعِ ووُجُودِهِ في الخارِجِ كانَتِ القَضِيَّةُ خارِجِيَّةً، نحوُ: «الإنْسانُ كاتِبٌ»، وإنْ كانَ مَوْجُودًا في الذِّهْنِ وكانَ الحُكْمُ باعْتِبارِ خُصُوصِ وُجُودِهِ في الذِّهْنِ كانَتْ ذِهْنِيَّةً، نحوُ: «الإنْسانُ كُلِّيٌّ»، وإنْ كانَ الحُكْمُ باعْتِبارِ تَقَرُّرِهِ في الواقِعِ مَعَ عَزْلِ النَّظَرِ عن خُصُوصِيَّةِ ظَرْفِ الخارِجِ أوِ الذِّهْنِ سُمِّيَتِ القَضِيَّةُ حَقِيقِيَّةً، نحوُ: «الأرْبَعَةُ زَوْجٌ» و«السِّتَّةُ ضِعْفُ الثَّلاثَةِ».

Another division of the categorical: if the subject of the categorical exists in the external world, and the judgement in it is made with regard to the subject's being realised and existing in the external world, the proposition is external (khārijiyya), as in “Man is a writer”. If it exists in the mind, and the judgement is made with regard to its existence in the mind specifically, it is mental (dhihniyya), as in “Man is a universal”. If the judgement is made with regard to its being established in fact (fī l-wāqiʿ), setting aside the particular container, whether the external world or the mind, the proposition is called real (ḥaqīqiyya), as in “Four is even” and “Six is double three”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 25

فصل

القَضِيَّةُ المُوجَبَةُ وكذا السّالِبَةُ تَنْقَسِمانِ إلى مَعْدُولَةٍ وغَيْرِ مَعْدُولَةٍ؛ فالمَعْدُولَةُ ما يَكُونُ فيه حَرْفُ السَّلْبِ جُزْءًا مِنَ المَوْضُوعِ أو مِنَ المَحْمُولِ أو كِلَيْهِما. مِثالُ الأوَّلِ قَوْلُنا: «اللّاحَيُّ جَمادٌ»، مِثالُ الثّاني: «زَيْدٌ لا عالِمٌ»، مِثالُ الثّالِثِ: «اللّاحَيُّ لا عالِمٌ»؛ هذا في الإيجابِ. أمّا في السَّلْبِ فمِثالُ الأوَّلِ: «اللّاحَيُّ لَيْسَ بعالِمٍ»، ومِثالُ الثّاني: «العالِمُ لَيْسَ بلا حَيٍّ»، ومِثالُ الثّالِثِ: «اللّاحَيُّ لَيْسَ بلا جَمادٍ». وغَيْرُ المَعْدُولَةِ بخِلافِها، ويُسَمّى غَيْرُ المَعْدُولَةِ في المُوجَبَةِ بالمُحَصَّلَةِ، وفي السّالِبَةِ بالبَسِيطَةِ.

The affirmative proposition, and likewise the negative, divides into metathetic (maʿdūla) and non-metathetic. The metathetic is one in which the particle of negation is part of the subject, or of the predicate, or of both. An example of the first is our saying “The non-living is inanimate”; of the second, “Zayd is non-learned”; of the third, “The non-living is non-learned”. That is in the affirmative. In the negative, an example of the first is “The non-living is not learned”; of the second, “The learned is not non-living”; and of the third, “The non-living is not non-inanimate”. The non-metathetic is the opposite of this. The non-metathetic is called positive (muḥaṣṣala) in the affirmative and simple (basīṭa) in the negative.

al-Mirqāt · p. 26

فصل

وقد يُذْكَرُ الجِهَةُ في القَضِيَّةِ فيُسَمّى مُوَجَّهَةً ورُباعِيَّةً أيْضًا. والمُوَجَّهاتُ خَمْسَةَ عَشَرَ: ثَمانِيَةٌ مِنْها بَسِيطَةٌ، وسَبْعَةٌ مِنْها مُرَكَّبَةٌ. أمّا البَسائِطُ فأحَدُها الضَّرُورِيَّةُ المُطْلَقَةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بضَرُورَةِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو سَلْبِهِ عنه ما دامَ ذاتُ المَوْضُوعِ مَوْجُودَةً، كقَوْلِكَ: «الإنْسانُ حَيَوانٌ بالضَّرُورَةِ» و«لَيْسَ بحَجَرٍ بالضَّرُورَةِ». والثّانِيَةُ الدّائِمَةُ المُطْلَقَةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بدَوامِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو سَلْبِهِ عنه، كقَوْلِكَ: «كُلُّ فَلَكٍ مُتَحَرِّكٌ بالدَّوامِ» و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الفَلَكِ بساكِنٍ بالدَّوامِ». والثّالِثَةُ المَشْرُوطَةُ العامَّةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بضَرُورَةِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو نَفْيِهِ عنه ما دامَ ذاتُ المَوْضُوعِ مَوْصُوفًا بالوَصْفِ العُنْوانِيِّ، والوَصْفُ العُنْوانِيُّ عِنْدَهم ما عُبِّرَ بِهِ عنِ المَوْضُوعِ، كقَوْلِنا: «كُلُّ كاتِبٍ مُتَحَرِّكُ الأصابِعِ بالضَّرُورَةِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا» و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الكاتِبِ بساكِنِ الأصابِعِ بالضَّرُورَةِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا». والرّابِعَةُ العُرْفِيَّةُ العامَّةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بدَوامِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو سَلْبِهِ عنه ما دامَ ذاتُ المَوْضُوعِ مُتَّصِفًا بالوَصْفِ العُنْوانِيِّ، كقَوْلِنا: «بالدَّوامِ كُلُّ كاتِبٍ مُتَحَرِّكُ الأصابِعِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا» و«بالدَّوامِ لا شَيْءَ مِنَ النّائِمِ بمُسْتَيْقِظٍ ما دامَ نائِمًا». والخامِسَةُ الوَقْتِيَّةُ المُطْلَقَةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بضَرُورَةِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو نَفْيِهِ عنه في وَقْتٍ مُعَيَّنٍ مِن أوْقاتِ الذّاتِ، كما تَقُولُ: «كُلُّ قَمَرٍ مُنْخَسِفٌ بالضَّرُورَةِ وَقْتَ حَيْلُولَةِ الأرْضِ بَيْنَهُ وبَيْنَ الشَّمْسِ» و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ القَمَرِ بمُنْخَسِفٍ بالضَّرُورَةِ وَقْتَ التَّرْبِيعِ». والسّادِسَةُ المُنْتَشِرَةُ المُطْلَقَةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بضَرُورَةِ ثُبُوتِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو نَفْيِهِ عنه في وَقْتٍ غَيْرِ مُعَيَّنٍ مِن أوْقاتِ الذّاتِ، نحوُ: «كُلُّ حَيَوانٍ مُتَنَفِّسٌ بالضَّرُورَةِ وَقْتًا ما» و «لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الحَجَرِ بمُتَنَفِّسٍ بالضَّرُورَةِ». والسّابِعَةُ المُطْلَقَةُ العامَّةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بوُجُودِ المَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْضُوعِ أو سَلْبِهِ عنه، أي في أحَدِ الأزْمِنَةِ الثَّلاثَةِ، كقَوْلِكَ: «كُلُّ إنْسانٍ ضاحِكٌ بالفِعْلِ» و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بضاحِكٍ». والثّامِنَةُ المُمْكِنَةُ العامَّةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بسَلْبِ ضَرُورَةِ الجانِبِ المُخالِفِ، كقَوْلِكَ: «كُلُّ نارٍ حارَّةٌ بالإمْكانِ العامِّ» و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ النّارِ ببارِدٍ بالإمْكانِ العامِّ».

The mode (jiha) is sometimes mentioned in a proposition, and it is then called modal (muwajjaha), and also four-part (rubāʿiyya). The modal propositions are fifteen: eight of them are simple and seven compound. Of the simple ones, the first is the absolute necessary (ḍarūriyya muṭlaqa): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is necessary as long as the essence of the subject exists, as when you say “Man is an animal by necessity” and “[Man] is not a stone by necessity”. The second is the absolute perpetual (dāʾima muṭlaqa): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is perpetual, as when you say “Every celestial sphere is moving, always” and “No celestial sphere is at rest, always”. The third is the general conditional (mashrūṭa ʿāmma): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is necessary as long as the essence of the subject is described by the descriptive title (waṣf ʿunwānī). The descriptive title, for them, is that by which the subject is expressed. [Examples are] our saying “Every writer is moving his fingers, by necessity, as long as he is writing” and “No writer has his fingers at rest, by necessity, as long as he is writing”. The fourth is the general conventional (ʿurfiyya ʿāmma): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is perpetual as long as the essence of the subject is qualified by the descriptive title, as in our saying “Always, every writer is moving his fingers as long as he is writing” and “Always, no sleeper is awake as long as he is asleep”. The fifth is the absolute temporal (waqtiyya muṭlaqa): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is necessary at a specific one of the times of the essence, as you say “Every moon is eclipsed, by necessity, at the time the earth comes between it and the sun” and “No moon is eclipsed, by necessity, at the time of quadrature”. The sixth is the absolute spread (muntashira muṭlaqa): one in which it is judged that the predicate's holding of the subject, or its being denied of it, is necessary at an unspecified one of the times of the essence, as in “Every animal is breathing, by necessity, at some time” and “No stone is breathing, by necessity”. The seventh is the general absolute (muṭlaqa ʿāmma): one in which it is judged that the predicate belongs to the subject, or is denied of it, that is, at one of the three times [past, present or future], as when you say “Every human is laughing, actually” and “No human is laughing”. The eighth is the general possible (mumkina ʿāmma): one in which it is judged that necessity on the opposite side is negated, as when you say “Every fire is hot by general possibility” and “No fire is cold by general possibility”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 26