Composite modal propositions

فصل في المركبات

المُرَكَّبَةُ قَضِيَّةٌ رُكِّبَتْ حَقِيقَتُها مِن إيجابٍ وسَلْبٍ، والاعْتِبارُ في تَسْمِيَتِها مُوجَبَةً أو سالِبَةً لِلْجُزْءِ الأوَّلِ؛ فإنْ كانَ الجُزْءُ الأوَّلُ مُوجَبًا كقَوْلِكَ: «بالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ كاتِبٍ مُتَحَرِّكُ الأصابِعِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا لا دائِمًا» سُمِّيَتْ مُوجَبَةً، وإنْ كانَ الجُزْءُ الأوَّلُ سالِبًا كقَوْلِنا: «بالضَّرُورَةِ لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الكاتِبِ بساكِنِ الأصابِعِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا لا دائِمًا» سُمِّيَتْ سالِبَةً. ومِنَ المُرَكَّباتِ المَشْرُوطَةُ الخاصَّةُ، وهي المَشْرُوطَةُ العامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللّادَوامِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، ومَرَّ مِثالُها إيجابًا وسَلْبًا. ومِنْها العُرْفِيَّةُ الخاصَّةُ، وهي العُرْفِيَّةُ العامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللّادَوامِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، كما تَقُولُ: «دائِمًا كُلُّ كاتِبٍ مُتَحَرِّكُ الأصابِعِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا لا دائِمًا» و«دائِمًا لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الكاتِبِ بساكِنِ الأصابِعِ ما دامَ كاتِبًا لا دائِمًا». ومِنْها الوُجُودِيَّةُ اللّاضَرُورِيَّةُ، وهي المُطْلَقَةُ العامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللّاضَرُورَةِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، كقَوْلِنا: «كُلُّ إنْسانٍ كاتِبٌ بالفِعْلِ لا بالضَّرُورَةِ» في الإيجابِ، و«لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بكاتِبٍ بالفِعْلِ ولا بالضَّرُورَةِ» في السَّلْبِ. ومِنْها الوُجُودِيَّةُ اللّادائِمَةُ، وهي المُطْلَقَةُ العامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللّادَوامِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، كقَوْلِكَ في الإيجابِ: «كُلُّ إنْسانٍ ضاحِكٌ بالفِعْلِ لا دائِمًا»، وقَوْلِكَ في السَّلْبِ: «لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بضاحِكٍ بالفِعْلِ لا دائِمًا». ومِنْها الوَقْتِيَّةُ، وهي الوَقْتِيَّةُ المُطْلَقَةُ إذا قُيِّدَ باللّادَوامِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، كقَوْلِنا: «بالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ قَمَرٍ مُنْخَسِفٌ وَقْتَ حَيْلُولَةِ الأرْضِ بَيْنَهُ وبَيْنَ الشَّمْسِ لا دائِمًا» و«بالضَّرُورَةِ لا شَيْءَ مِنَ القَمَرِ بمُنْخَسِفٍ وَقْتَ التَّرْبِيعِ لا دائِمًا». ومِنْها المُنْتَشِرَةُ، وهي المُنْتَشِرَةُ المُطْلَقَةُ المُقَيَّدَةُ باللّادَوامِ بحَسَبِ الذّاتِ، مِثالُها: «بالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ إنْسانٍ مُتَنَفِّسٌ في وَقْتٍ ما لا دائِمًا» و«بالضَّرُورَةِ لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بمُتَنَفِّسٍ وَقْتًا ما لا دائِمًا». ومِنْها المُمْكِنَةُ الخاصَّةُ، وهي الّتي حُكِمَ فيها بارْتِفاعِ الضَّرُورَةِ المُطْلَقَةِ عن جانِبَيِ الوُجُودِ والعَدَمِ جَمِيعًا، كقَوْلِكَ: «بالإمْكانِ الخاصِّ كُلُّ إنْسانٍ ضاحِكٌ» و«بالإمْكانِ الخاصِّ لا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بضاحِكٍ».

A composite (murakkaba) [modal] is a proposition whose reality is composed of an affirmation and a negation. Whether it is named affirmative or negative depends on the first part. If the first part is affirmative, as when you say “By necessity every writer has moving fingers as long as he is a writer, not always”, it is called affirmative; if the first part is negative, as when we say “By necessity no writer has still fingers as long as he is a writer, not always”, it is called negative. Among the composites is the special conditional: the general conditional with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect to the essence; its example, affirmative and negative, has already been given. Among them is the special conventional: the general conventional with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect to the essence, as you say: “Always every writer has moving fingers as long as he is a writer, not always” and “Always no writer has still fingers as long as he is a writer, not always”. Among them is the non-necessary existential: the general absolute with the restriction of non-necessity with respect to the essence, as when we say “Every human is a writer actually, not by necessity” for the affirmative, and “No human is a writer actually, and not by necessity” for the negative. Among them is the non-perpetual existential: the general absolute with the restriction of non-perpetuity with respect to the essence, as when you say for the affirmative “Every human is laughing actually, not always”, and for the negative “No human is laughing actually, not always”. Among them is the temporal: the absolute temporal when it is restricted by non-perpetuity with respect to the essence, as when we say “By necessity every moon is eclipsed at the time the earth comes between it and the sun, not always” and “By necessity no moon is eclipsed at the time of quadrature, not always”. Among them is the spread: the absolute spread restricted by non-perpetuity with respect to the essence; its example: “By necessity every human breathes at some time, not always” and “By necessity no human breathes at some time, not always”. Among them is the special possible: one in which it is judged that absolute necessity is removed from both sides together, existence and non-existence, as when you say “By special possibility every human is laughing” and “By special possibility no human is laughing”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 28

فصل

اللّادَوامُ إشارَةٌ إلى مُطْلَقَةٍ عامَّةٍ، واللّاضَرُورَةُ إشارَةٌ إلى مُمْكِنَةٍ عامَّةٍ؛ فإذا قُلْتَ: «كُلُّ إنْسانٍ مُتَعَجِّبٌ بالفِعْلِ لا دائِمًا» فكأنّكَ قُلْتَ: «كُلُّ إنْسانٍ مُتَعَجِّبٌ بالفِعْلِ، ولا شَيْءَ مِنَ الإنْسانِ بمُتَعَجِّبٍ بالفِعْلِ»، وإذا قُلْتَ: «كُلُّ حَيَوانٍ ماشٍ بالفِعْلِ لا بالضَّرُورَةِ» فكأنّكَ قُلْتَ: «كُلُّ حَيَوانٍ ماشٍ بالفِعْلِ، ولا شَيْءَ مِنَ الحَيَوانِ بماشٍ بالإمْكانِ».

Non-perpetuity points to a general absolute, and non-necessity points to a general possible. So if you say “Every human is wondering actually, not always”, it is as if you had said “Every human is wondering actually, and no human is wondering actually”; and if you say “Every animal is walking actually, not by necessity”, it is as if you had said “Every animal is walking actually, and no animal is walking by possibility”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 29