The opening: knowledge, conception and assent

الحَمْدُ لِلّٰهِ الَّذِي أَبْدَعَ الأَفْلاكَ وَالأَرَضِينَ، وَالصَّلاةُ عَلَى مَنْ كانَ نَبِيًّا وَآدَمُ بَيْنَ الماءِ وَالطِّينِ، وَعَلَى آلِهِ وَأَصْحابِهِ أَجْمَعِينَ. وَبَعْدُ: فَهٰذِهِ عِدَّةُ فُصُولٍ فِي عِلْمِ المِيزانِ لا بُدَّ مِنْ حِفْظِها وَ ضَبْطِها لِمَنْ أَرادَ أَنْ يَتَذَكَّرَ مِنْ أُولِي الأَذْهانِ، وَعَلَى اللهِ التَّوَكُّلُ وَهُوَ المُسْتَعانُ.

Praise be to God, who originated the celestial spheres and the earths. Blessings be upon him who was a prophet while Adam was still between water and clay, and upon his family and his companions, all of them. To proceed: these are a number of chapters on the science of the balance (ʿilm al-mīzān) which anyone of understanding who wishes to take heed must memorise and master. In God is our trust, and He is the one whose help is sought.

al-Mirqāt · p. 2

مُقَدِّمَةٌ

اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ العِلْمَ يُطْلَقُ عَلَى مَعانٍ: أَحَدُها حُصُولُ صُورَةِ الشَّيْءِ فِي العَقْلِ، ثانِيها الصُّورَةُ الحاصِلَةُ مِنَ الشَّيْءِ عِنْدَ العَقْلِ، ثالِثُها الحاضِرُ عِنْدَ المُدْرِكِ، رابِعُها قَبُولُ النَّفْسِ لِتِلْكَ الصُّورَةِ، خامِسُها الإِضافَةُ الحاصِلَةُ بَيْنَ العالِمِ وَالمَعْلُومِ. وَيَنْقَسِمُ عَلَى قِسْمَيْنِ: أَحَدُهُما يُقالُ لَهُ التَّصَوُّرُ، وَثانِيهِما يُعَبَّرُ عَنْهُ بِالتَّصْدِيقِ. أَمّا التَّصَوُّرُ فَهُوَ الإِدْراكُ الخالِي عَنِ الحُكْمِ، وَالمُرادُ بِالحُكْمِ نِسْبَةُ أَمْرٍ إِلَى أَمْرٍ إِيجابًا أَوْ سَلْبًا، وَإِنْ شِئْتَ قُلْتَ: إِيقاعًا أَوِ انْتِزاعًا، وَقَدْ يُفَسَّرُ الحُكْمُ بِوُقُوعِ النِّسْبَةِ أَوْ لا وُقُوعِها؛ كَما إِذا تَصَوَّرْتَ زَيْدًا وَحْدَهُ أَوْ قائِمًا وَحْدَهُ مِنْ دُونِ أَنْ تُثْبِتَ القِيامَ لِزَيْدٍ أَوْ تَسْلُبَهُ عَنْهُ. أَمّا التَّصْدِيقُ فَهُوَ عَلَى قَوْلِ الحُكَماءِ عِبارَةٌ عَنِ الحُكْمِ المُقارِنِ لِلتَّصَوُّراتِ، فَالتَّصَوُّراتُ الثَّلاثَةُ شَرْطٌ لِوُجُودِ التَّصْدِيقِ، وَمِنْ ثَمَّ لا يُوجَدُ تَصْدِيقٌ بِلا تَصَوُّرٍ. وَالإِمامُ الرّازِيُّ يَقُولُ: إِنَّهُ عِبارَةٌ عَنْ مَجْمُوعِ الحُكْمِ وَتَصَوُّراتِ الأَطْرافِ؛ فَإِذا قُلْتَ: «زَيْدٌ قائِمٌ» وَأَذْعَنْتَ بِقِيامِ زَيْدٍ تَحْصُلُ لَكَ عُلُومٌ ثَلاثَةٌ: أَحَدُها عِلْمُ زَيْدٍ، وَثانِيها إِدْراكُ مَعْنَى قائِمٍ، وَثالِثُها عِلْمُ المَعْنَى الرّابِطِ الَّذِي يُعَبَّرُ عَنْهُ فِي الفارِسِيَّةِ بِـ«هَسْت» فِي الإِيجابِ وَ«نِيسْت» فِي السَّلْبِ، وَ«ہے» وَ«نہیں» فِي الهِنْدِيَّةِ، وَيُقالُ لِهٰذا المَعْنَى الحُكْمُ تارَةً وَالنِّسْبَةُ الحُكْمِيَّةُ أُخْرَى. فَإِذا أَتْقَنْتَ ما عَلَّمْناكَ فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّ الحَكِيمَ يَزْعُمُ أَنَّ التَّصْدِيقَ لَيْسَ إِلّا إِدْراكَ المَعْنَى الرّابِطِيِّ، وَالإِمامَ يَزْعُمُ أَنَّ التَّصْدِيقَ مَجْمُوعُ الإِدْراكاتِ الثَّلاثَةِ، أَعْنِي تَصَوُّرَ المَحْكُومِ عَلَيْهِ وَتَصَوُّرَ المَحْكُومِ بِهِ وَإِدْراكَ النِّسْبَةِ الحُكْمِيَّةِ المُسَمَّى بِالحُكْمِ.

Know that the word “knowledge” (ʿilm) is used in several senses. The first is the occurrence of a thing's form in the intellect. The second is the form of the thing that has occurred with the intellect. The third is what is present to the one who grasps it. The fourth is the soul's receiving that form. The fifth is the relation that comes about between the knower and the known. Knowledge is divided into two kinds: one is called conception (taṣawwur), and the other is expressed as assent (taṣdīq). Conception is a grasp free of judgement (ḥukm). By judgement is meant relating one thing to another affirmatively or negatively; or, if you like, positing [the relation] or removing it. Judgement is also sometimes explained as [grasping] that the relation obtains or does not obtain. [Conception is] as when you conceive Zayd alone, or standing alone, without affirming standing of Zayd or denying it of him. As for assent, according to the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) it is the judgement accompanied by conceptions; so the three conceptions are a condition for the existence of assent, and for this reason there is no assent without conception. Imām al-Rāzī, however, says that it is the sum of the judgement and the conceptions of the [two] sides. So when you say “Zayd is standing” and accept that Zayd is standing, three pieces of knowledge come to you. The first is the knowledge of Zayd; the second is the grasp of the meaning of “standing”; and the third is the knowledge of the linking meaning, which is expressed in Persian by “hast” [“is”] in affirmation and “nīst” [“is not”] in negation, and in Hindi [Urdu] by “ہے” (hai, “is”) and “نہیں” (nahīṉ, “not”). This meaning is sometimes called the judgement and at other times the relation of judgement (al-nisba al-ḥukmiyya). Once you have mastered what we have taught you, know that the philosopher holds that assent is nothing but the grasp of the linking meaning, while the Imām holds that assent is the sum of the three grasps, I mean the conception of what is judged about, the conception of what is judged of it, and the grasp of the relation of judgement, which is called the judgement.

al-Mirqāt · p. 3

فَصْلٌ

التَّصَوُّرُ قِسْمانِ: أَحَدُهُما بَدِيهِيٌّ، أَيْ حاصِلٌ بِلا نَظَرٍ وَكَسْبٍ، كَتَصَوُّرِنا الحَرارَةَ وَالبُرُودَةَ، وَيُقالُ لَهُ الضَّرُورِيُّ أَيْضًا؛ وَثانِيهِما نَظَرِيٌّ، أَيْ يَحْتاجُ فِي حُصُولِهِ إِلَى الفِكْرِ وَالنَّظَرِ، كَتَصَوُّرِنا الجِنَّ وَالمَلائِكَةَ، فَإِنّا مُحْتاجُونَ فِي أَمْثالِ هٰذِهِ التَّصَوُّراتِ إِلَى تَجَشُّمِ فِكْرٍ وَتَرْتِيبِ نَظَرٍ، وَيُقالُ لَهُ الكَسْبِيُّ أَيْضًا. وَالتَّصْدِيقُ أَيْضًا قِسْمانِ: أَحَدُهُما البَدِيهِيُّ، أَيِ الحاصِلُ مِنْ غَيْرِ فِكْرٍ وَكَسْبٍ، وَثانِيهِما النَّظَرِيُّ المُفْتَقِرُ إِلَيْهِ؛ مِثالُ الأَوَّلِ: «الكُلُّ أَعْظَمُ مِنَ الجُزْءِ» وَ«الاِثْنانِ نِصْفُ الأَرْبَعَةِ»، وَمِثالُ الثّانِي: «العالَمُ حادِثٌ» وَ«الصّانِعُ مَوْجُودٌ»، وَنَحْوُ ذٰلِكَ.

Conception is of two kinds. One is immediate (badīhī), that is, attained without reflection and effort, like our conception of heat and cold; it is also called ḍarūrī (“necessary”). The other is acquired (naẓarī), that is, it needs thinking and reflection in order to be attained, like our conception of the jinn and the angels: for conceptions such as these we need to take the trouble of thinking and to arrange a reflection. It is also called kasbī (“earned”). Assent too is of two kinds. One is immediate, that is, attained without thinking and effort; the other is acquired, which needs them. Examples of the first are “The whole is greater than the part” and “Two is half of four”; examples of the second are “The world has come into being (ḥādith)” and “The Maker exists”, and the like.

al-Mirqāt · p. 4

فائِدَةٌ

وَإِذا عَلِمْتَ ما ذَكَرْنا أَنَّ النَّظَرِيّاتِ مُطْلَقًا تَصَوُّرِيًّا كانَتْ أَوْ تَصْدِيقِيًّا مُفْتَقِرَةٌ إِلَى نَظَرٍ وَفِكْرٍ، فَلا بُدَّ لَكَ أَنْ تَعْلَمَ مَعْنَى النَّظَرِ، فَأَقُولُ: النَّظَرُ فِي اصْطِلاحِهِمْ عِبارَةٌ عَنْ تَرْتِيبِ أُمُورٍ مَعْلُومَةٍ لِيَتَأَدَّى ذٰلِكَ التَّرْتِيبُ إِلَى تَحْصِيلِ المَجْهُولِ؛ إِذا رَتَّبْتَ المَعْلُوماتِ الحاصِلَةَ لَكَ مِنْ تَغَيُّرِ العالَمِ وَحُدُوثِ كُلِّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ، وَتَقُولُ: «العالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حادِثٌ»، فَحَصَلَ لَكَ مِنْ هٰذا النَّظَرِ وَالتَّرْتِيبِ عِلْمُ قَضِيَّةٍ أُخْرَى لَمْ يَكُنْ حاصِلًا لَكَ قَبْلُ، وَهِيَ «العالَمُ حادِثٌ».

Now that you know, from what we have said, that acquired things in general, whether conceptions or assents, need reflection and thinking, you must know what reflection means. So I say: reflection (naẓar), in their technical usage, is arranging known things so that this arrangement leads to obtaining what is unknown. [It is] as when you arrange the known things you have, namely that the world changes and that everything that changes has come into being, and say: “The world changes, and everything that changes has come into being.” From this reflection and arrangement you obtain knowledge of another proposition, which you did not have before, namely “The world has come into being.”

al-Mirqāt · p. 5

فَصْلٌ

إِيّاكَ وَأَنْ تَظُنَّ أَنَّ كُلَّ تَرْتِيبٍ يَكُونُ صَوابًا مُوصِلًا إِلَى عِلْمٍ صَحِيحٍ، كَيْفَ وَلَوْ كانَ الأَمْرُ كَذٰلِكَ لَما وَقَعَ الاِخْتِلافُ وَالتَّناقُضُ بَيْنَ أَرْبابِ النَّظَرِ، مَعَ أَنَّهُ قَدْ وَقَعَ؛ فَمِنْ قائِلٍ يَقُولُ: «العالَمُ حادِثٌ» وَيَسْتَدِلُّ بِقَوْلِهِ: «العالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حادِثٌ، فَالعالَمُ حادِثٌ»، وَمِنْ زاعِمٍ يَزْعُمُ أَنَّ العالَمَ قَدِيمٌ غَيْرُ مَسْبُوقٍ بِالعَدَمِ، وَيُبَرْهِنُ عَلَيْهِ بِقَوْلِهِ: «العالَمُ مُسْتَغْنٍ عَنِ المُؤَثِّرِ، وَكُلُّ ما هٰذا شَأْنُهُ فَهُوَ قَدِيمٌ». وَلا أَظُنُّكَ شاكًّا فِي أَنَّ أَحَدَ الفِكْرَيْنِ صَحِيحٌ حَقٌّ وَالآخَرَ فاسِدٌ غَلَطٌ، وَإِذا كانَ قَدْ وَقَعَ الغَلَطُ فِي فِكْرِ العُقَلاءِ فَعُلِمَ مِنْ ذٰلِكَ أَنَّ الفِطْرَةَ الإِنْسانِيَّةَ غَيْرُ كافِيَةٍ فِي تَمْيِيزِ الخَطَإِ مِنَ الصَّوابِ وَامْتِيازِ القِشْرِ عَنِ اللُّبابِ، فَجاءَتِ الحاجَةُ فِي ذٰلِكَ إِلَى قانُونٍ عاصِمٍ عَنِ الخَطَإِ فِي الفِكْرِ، يُبَيَّنُ فِيهِ طُرُقُ اكْتِسابِ المَجْهُولاتِ عَنِ المَعْلُوماتِ، وَهٰذا القانُونُ هُوَ المَنْطِقُ وَالمِيزانُ. أَمّا تَسْمِيَتُهُ بِالمَنْطِقِ فَلِتَأْثِيرِهِ فِي النُّطْقِ الظّاهِرِيِّ، أَعْنِي التَّكَلُّمَ؛ إِذِ العارِفُ بِهِ يَقْوَى عَلَى التَّكَلُّمِ ما لا يَقْوَى عَلَيْهِ الجاهِلُ، وَكَذا فِي النُّطْقِ الباطِنِيِّ، أَعْنِي الإِدْراكَ؛ لِأَنَّ المَنْطِقِيَّ يَعْرِفُ حَقائِقَ الأَشْياءِ، وَيَعْلَمُ أَجْناسَها وَفُصُولَها وَأَنْواعَها وَلَوازِمَها وَخَواصَّها، بِخِلافِ الغافِلِ عَنْ هٰذا العِلْمِ الشَّرِيفِ. وَأَمّا تَسْمِيَتُهُ بِالمِيزانِ فَلِأَنَّهُ قِسْطاسٌ لِلْعَقْلِ، يُوزَنُ بِهِ الأَفْكارُ الصَّحِيحَةُ، وَيُعْرَفُ بِهِ نُقْصانُ ما فِي الأَفْكارِ الفاسِدَةِ وَاخْتِلالُ ما فِي الأَنْظارِ الكاسِدَةِ. وَمِنْ ثَمَّ يُقالُ لَهُ العِلْمُ الآلِيُّ؛ لِكَوْنِهِ آلَةً لِجَمِيعِ العُلُومِ، لا سِيَّما لِلْعُلُومِ الحِكْمِيَّةِ.

Beware of thinking that every arrangement is correct and leads to sound knowledge. How could that be? If things were so, there would be no disagreement and contradiction among the people of reflection; yet there is. One person says “The world has come into being” and argues for it by saying: “The world changes, and everything that changes has come into being; so the world has come into being.” Another claims that the world is eternal (qadīm), not preceded by non-existence, and offers as proof: “The world has no need of anything to bring it about, and everything of this kind is eternal.” I do not think you doubt that one of these two thoughts is sound and true and the other corrupt and mistaken. And since error has occurred in the thinking of rational people, we learn from this that human nature is not enough to tell error from what is correct, or the husk from the kernel. So there arose a need for a rule (qānūn) that protects from error in thinking, in which the ways of acquiring unknown things from known things are set out. This rule is logic (manṭiq), also called the balance (mīzān). It is called logic (manṭiq) because of its effect on outward speech (nuṭq), I mean speaking: whoever knows it is able to speak in a way that the ignorant cannot. Likewise [because of its effect] on inward speech, I mean grasping: for the logician knows the realities of things, and knows their genera, their differentiae, their species, their concomitants and their propria, unlike someone who neglects this noble science. It is called the balance (mīzān) because it is a scale for the intellect: by it sound thoughts are weighed, and by it one recognises what is deficient in corrupt thoughts and what is faulty in worthless reflections. For this reason it is called the instrumental science (al-ʿilm al-ālī), since it is an instrument for all the sciences, especially the philosophical sciences.

al-Mirqāt · p. 5