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Indian path · level 2 · al-Mirqāt · Lesson 21 of 25

Dialectic, rhetoric, poetics and sophistry

The five arts

الصِّنَاعَات الخَمْس

Arabic text after the print of Deoband after 1336/1917 · translation by The Mantiqi, draft

About this text

al-Mirqāt المِرْقاة

Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1243 or 1244/1828–29)

Text
Arabic: al-Mirqāt, with al-Shīrkūtī's gloss al-Mirʾāt (gloss not reproduced), checked against the Delhi print of 1286/1869 (Sayyid al-Maṭābiʿ); vowel marks added by The Mantiqi (draft), Kutub Khāna Iʿzāziyya, Deoband after 1336/1917 View the scan
Translation
The Mantiqi's own; a draft.
Review
Draft, awaiting review by Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf.

The text Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī

فَصْلٌ

القِياسُ الجَدَلِيُّ قِياسٌ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْ مُقَدِّماتٍ مَشْهُورَةٍ أَوْ مُسَلَّمَةٍ عِنْدَ الخَصْمِ، صادِقَةً كانَتْ أَوْ كاذِبَةً. وَالأَوَّلُ ما تَطابَقَ فِيهِ آراءُ قَوْمٍ: إِمّا لِمَصْلَحَةٍ عامَّةٍ، نَحْوُ: «العَدْلُ حَسَنٌ» وَ«الظُّلْمُ قَبِيحٌ» وَ«قَتْلُ السّارِقِ واجِبٌ»؛ أَوْ لِرِقَّةٍ قَلْبِيَّةٍ، كَقَوْلِ أَهْلِ الهِنْدِ: «ذَبْحُ الحَيَوانِ مَذْمُومٌ»؛ أَوِ انْفِعالاتٍ خُلُقِيَّةٍ أَوْ مِزاجِيَّةٍ؛ فَإِنَّ لِلأَمْزِجَةِ وَالعاداتِ دَخْلًا عَظِيمًا فِي الاعْتِقاداتِ، فَأَصْحابُ الأَمْزِجَةِ الشَّدِيدَةِ يَرَوْنَ الانْتِقامَ مِنْ أَهْلِ الشَّرارَةِ حَسَنًا، وَأَصْحابُ الأَمْزِجَةِ اللَّيِّنَةِ يَرَوْنَ العَفْوَ خَيْرًا؛ وَلِذٰلِكَ تَرَى النّاسَ مُخْتَلِفِينَ فِي العاداتِ وَالرُّسُومِ، وَلِكُلِّ قَوْمٍ مَشْهُوراتٌ خاصَّةٌ بِهِمْ، وَكَذا لِكُلِّ صِناعَةٍ؛ فَمِنْ مَشْهُوراتِ النَّحْوِيِّينَ: «الفاعِلُ مَرْفُوعٌ، وَالمَفْعُولُ مَنْصُوبٌ، وَالمُضافُ إِلَيْهِ مَجْرُورٌ»، وَمِنْ مَشْهُوراتِ الأُصُولِيِّينَ: «الأَمْرُ لِلوُجُوبِ». وَالثّانِي ما يُؤَلَّفُ مِنَ المُسَلَّماتِ بَيْنَ المُتَخاصِمَيْنِ. وَلِلمَشْهُوراتِ شَبَهٌ بِالأَوَّلِيّاتِ، وَتَجْرِيدُ الذِّهْنِ وَتَدْقِيقُ النَّظَرِ يُفَرِّقُ بَيْنَهُما. وَالغَرَضُ مِنْ صِناعَةِ الجَدَلِ إِلْزامُ الخَصْمِ وَحِفْظُ الرَّأْيِ.

The dialectical is a syllogism composed of that are widely accepted (mashhūra) or conceded (musallama) by the opponent, whether they are true or false. The first are those on which the views of a people agree: either because of a common interest, as in “Justice is good”, “Injustice is bad” and “Killing the thief is obligatory”; or out of tenderness of heart, as in the saying of the people of India: “Slaughtering animals is blameworthy”; or because of affections of character or temperament. For temperaments and customs have a great share in beliefs: people of fierce temperament regard taking revenge on evildoers as good, and people of gentle temperament regard forgiveness as better. That is why you see people differing in customs and usages; every people has widely accepted premises of its own, and so does every . Among the widely accepted premises of the grammarians are: “The agent is in the nominative, the object in the accusative, and the second term of a genitive construction in the genitive”; and among those of the scholars of legal theory (uṣūliyyūn): “A command indicates obligation.” The second are those composed of what is conceded between the two disputants. Widely accepted premises resemble ; freeing the mind [of such influences] and careful tell them apart. The purpose of the art of is to bind the opponent [to a concession] and to protect one's view.

al-Mirqāt · p. 50

فَصْلٌ

القِياسُ الخَطابِيُّ قِياسٌ مُفِيدٌ لِلظَّنِّ، وَمُقَدِّماتُهُ مَقْبُولاتٌ مَأْخُوذاتٌ مِمَّنْ يُحْسَنُ الظَّنُّ فِيهِمْ، كَالأَوْلِياءِ وَالحُكَماءِ. وَأَمّا المَأْخُوذاتُ مِنَ الأَنْبِياءِ عَلَيْهِمْ وَعَلَى نَبِيِّنا الصَّلاةُ وَالسَّلامُ، فَلَيْسَتْ مِنَ الخَطابَةِ؛ لِأَنَّها أَخْبارٌ صادِقَةٌ مِنْ مُخْبِرٍ صادِقٍ دَلَّ عَلَى صِدْقِهِ المُعْجِزَةُ، وَلا مَجالَ لِلوَهْمِ فِيها حَتَّى يَتَطَرَّقَ إِلَيْها الخَطَأُ وَالخَلَلُ، فَالقِياسُ المُرَكَّبُ مِنْها بُرْهانِيٌّ قَطْعِيُّ المُقَدِّماتِ؛ أَوْ مَظْنُوناتٌ يُحْكَمُ فِيها بِسَبَبِ الرُّجْحانِ، وَيَنْدَرِجُ فِيها الحَدْسِيّاتُ وَالتَّجْرِبِيّاتُ وَالمُتَواتِراتُ الَّتِي لَمْ تَبْلُغْ إِلَى حَدِّ الجَزْمِ، بِسَبَبِ عَدَمِ شُعُورِ العِلَّةِ، أَوْ عَدَمِ بُلُوغِ عَدَدِ المُخْبِرِينَ إِلَى مَبْلَغِ التَّواتُرِ. وَلِهٰذِهِ الصِّناعَةِ مَنْفَعَةٌ عَظِيمَةٌ فِي تَنْظِيمِ أُمُورِ المَعاشِ وَتَنْسِيقِ أَحْكامِ المَعادِ، إِمّا بِاسْتِعْمالِها أَوْ بِالاحْتِرازِ عَنْها؛ وَلِذٰلِكَ كِبارُ الحُكَماءِ يَسْتَعْمِلُونَ تِلْكَ الصِّناعَةَ كَثِيرًا، وَيَعِظُونَ بِالكَلامِ الخَطابِيِّ جَمًّا غَفِيرًا، لا بُدَّ أَنْ تَكُونَ المُقَدِّماتُ المُسْتَعْمَلَةُ فِيها مُقْنِعَةً لِلسّامِعِينَ، مُفِيدَةً لِلواعِظِينَ.

The rhetorical is a syllogism that yields opinion (ẓann). Its are either accepted premises (maqbūlāt), taken from people of whom one thinks well, like the saints and the philosophers. Those taken from the prophets, upon them and upon our Prophet be blessings and peace, are not , because they are true reports from a truthful reporter whose truthfulness is shown by the miracle; there is no room in them for estimation such that error and defect could creep into them. So a syllogism composed of them is demonstrative, with premises that are certain. Or [its premises are] probable premises (maẓnūnāt), judged on account of their preponderance. Under these fall , and premises that have not reached the level of firm conviction, because the cause is not perceived or because the number of reporters has not reached the extent of wide transmission (tawātur). This has great benefit in ordering the affairs of this life and arranging the rulings of the life to come, either by using it or by guarding against it. That is why the great philosophers use this art often and admonish great crowds with rhetorical speech. The premises used in it must be persuasive to the listeners and useful to those who admonish.

al-Mirqāt · p. 51

فَصْلٌ

القِياسُ الشِّعْرِيُّ قِياسٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنَ المُخَيَّلاتِ، الصّادِقَةِ أَوِ الكاذِبَةِ، المُسْتَحِيلَةِ أَوِ المُمْكِنَةِ، المُؤَثِّرَةِ فِي النَّفْسِ قَبْضًا وَبَسْطًا؛ وَلِلنَّفْسِ مُطاوَعَةٌ لِلتَّخْيِيلِ كَمُطاوَعَتِهِ لِلتَّصْدِيقِ، بَلْ أَشَدُّ مِنْهُ. وَالغَرَضُ مِنْ هٰذِهِ الصِّناعَةِ أَنْ تَنْفَعِلَ النَّفْسُ بِالتَّرْهِيبِ وَالتَّرْغِيبِ. وَاشْتُرِطَ فِي الشِّعْرِ أَنْ يَكُونَ الكَلامُ جارِيًا عَلَى قانُونِ اللُّغَةِ، مُشْتَمِلًا عَلَى اسْتِعاراتٍ بَدِيعَةٍ رائِقَةٍ، وَتَشْبِيهاتٍ أَنِيقَةٍ فائِقَةٍ، بِحَيْثُ يُؤَثِّرُ فِي النَّفْسِ تَأْثِيرًا عَجِيبًا، وَيُورِثُ فِيها حالًا يُوجِبُ تَرَحًا أَوْ فَرَحًا، ثُمَّ لا يَجُوزُ فِيهِ اسْتِعْمالُ الأَوَّلِيّاتِ الصّادِقَةِ، وَيُسْتَحْسَنُ اسْتِعْمالُ المُخَيَّلاتِ الكاذِبَةِ، كَما قالَ العارِفُ الگَنْجَوِيُّ مُخاطِبًا لِوَلَدِهِ وَفِلْذَةِ كَبِدِهِ، بَيْتٌ: «در شعر مپیچ و در فن او * چون اکذب اوست احسن او». وَكَقَوْلِ القائِلِ يَصِفُ الخَنْدَرِيسَ: «لَها البَدْرُ كَأْسٌ وَهْيَ شَمْسٌ يُدِيرُها * هِلالٌ، وَكَمْ يَبْدُو إِذا مُزِجَتْ نَجْمُ». وَقالَ الشّاعِرُ، شِعْرٌ: «لا تَعْجَبُوا مِنْ بِلَى غِلالَتِهِ * قَدْ زُرَّ أَزْرارُهُ عَلَى القَمَرِ»؛ فَشَبَّهَ المَحْبُوبَ بِالقَمَرِ، وَقالَ: لا تَعْجَبُوا مِنِ انْشِقاقِ غِلالَتِهِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ قَمَرٌ زُرَّ عَلَيْهِ الغِلالَةُ، وَكُلُّ قَمَرٍ كَذٰلِكَ فَغِلالَتُهُ تَنْشَقُّ، يُنْتِجُ: غِلالَةُ المَحْبُوبِ تَنْشَقُّ. وَقَدْ يُنْتِجُ اجْتِماعَ النَّقِيضَيْنِ، نَحْوُ: «أَنا مُضْمِرُ الحَوائِجِ بِاللِّسانِ، مُظْهِرُها بِالمَدامِعِ، وَكُلُّ مُضْمِرِ الحَوائِجِ صامِتٌ، وَكُلُّ مُظْهِرِها مُتَكَلِّمٌ»، يُنْتِجُ: «أَنا صامِتٌ مُتَكَلِّمٌ». وَلا يُشْتَرَطُ الوَزْنُ فِي الشِّعْرِ عِنْدَ أَرْبابِ المِيزانِ، نَعَمْ يُفِيدُهُ حُسْنًا، وَالكَلامُ الشِّعْرِيُّ إِذا أُنْشِدَ بِصَوْتٍ طَيِّبٍ ازْدادَ تَأْثِيرُهُ فِي النُّفُوسِ، حَتَّى رُبَّما يُزِيلُ فَرْطُ البَهْجَةِ العَمائِمَ عَنِ الرُّؤُوسِ. وَالأَوائِلُ مِنَ الحُكَماءِ اليُونانِيِّينَ كانُوا أَحْرَصَ النّاسِ عَلَى الشِّعْرِ.

The poetic is a syllogism composed of (mukhayyalāt), true or false, impossible or possible, that affect the soul with contraction or expansion. The soul yields to imaginative evocation (takhyīl) as it yields to , and even more. The purpose of this is that the soul be moved by deterrence and enticement. It is stipulated in poetry that the speech run according to the rules of the language and contain fine, pleasing metaphors and elegant, excellent similes, so that it affects the soul in a wondrous way and produces in it a state that brings sorrow or joy. Moreover, the use of true is not allowed in it, and the use of false imaginative premises is considered good, as the gnostic of Ganja [Niẓāmī] said, addressing his son, his own flesh and blood (literally “the piece of his liver”), in a verse: “در شعر مپیچ و در فن او * چون اکذب اوست احسن او” [“Do not get entangled in poetry and its craft, / since the most false of it is the finest of it”]. And as in the words of one who describes old wine: “لَها البَدْرُ كَأْسٌ وَهْيَ شَمْسٌ يُدِيرُها * هِلالٌ، وَكَمْ يَبْدُو إِذا مُزِجَتْ نَجْمُ” [“The full moon is her cup, and she is a sun that a crescent passes round; / and how many a star appears when she is mixed!”]. And the poet said, in verse: “لا تَعْجَبُوا مِنْ بِلَى غِلالَتِهِ * قَدْ زُرَّ أَزْرارُهُ عَلَى القَمَرِ” [“Do not wonder that his shirt wears through: / its buttons have been fastened over the moon”]. He likened the beloved to the moon and said: do not wonder that his shirt splits, because he is a moon over whom the shirt has been buttoned, and every moon of that kind has its shirt split; this produces: the beloved's shirt splits. It may even produce the coming together of two contradictories, as in: “I conceal my needs with my tongue and reveal them with my tears; everyone who conceals his needs is silent, and everyone who reveals them speaks”, which produces “I am silent and speaking.” Metre is not a condition of poetry for the masters of the balance [the ], though it does lend it beauty. When poetic speech is recited with a pleasing voice, its effect on souls increases, until excess of delight sometimes knocks the turbans off heads. The first of the Greek philosophers were the most devoted of people to poetry.

al-Mirqāt · p. 52

فَصْلٌ

القِياسُ السَّفْسَطِيُّ، وَهُوَ قِياسٌ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنَ الوَهْمِيّاتِ الكاذِبَةِ المُخْتَرَعَةِ لِلوَهْمِ، كَقِياسِ غَيْرِ المَحْسُوسِ عَلَى المَحْسُوسِ، نَحْوُ: «كُلُّ مَوْجُودٍ مُشارٌ إِلَيْهِ». وَلِلوَهْمِيّاتِ مُشابَهَةٌ شَدِيدَةٌ بِالأَوَّلِيّاتِ، وَلَوْلا رَدُّ العَقْلِ وَالشَّرْعِ حُكْمَ الوَهْمِ لَدامَ الالْتِباسُ بَيْنَهُما؛ أَوْ مِنَ الكاذِبَةِ المُشَبَّهاتِ بِالصّادِقَةِ، وَهِيَ قَضايا يَعْتَقِدُها العَقْلُ بِأَنَّها أَوَّلِيَّةٌ أَوْ مَشْهُورَةٌ أَوْ مَقْبُولَةٌ أَوْ مُسَلَّمَةٌ، لِمَكانِ الاشْتِباهِ بِها لَفْظًا أَوْ مَعْنًى، فَتُوقِعُ فِي الغَلَطِ. وَهٰذِهِ الصِّناعَةُ كاذِبَةٌ مُمَوَّهَةٌ، غَيْرُ نافِعَةٍ بِالذّاتِ، نَعَمْ نافِعَةٌ بِالعَرَضِ، بِأَنَّ صاحِبَها لا يَغْلَطُ وَلا يُغالَطُ، وَيَقْدِرُ عَلَى أَنْ يُغالِطَ غَيْرَهُ، وَأَنْ يَمْتَحِنَ بِها أَوْ يُعانِدَهُ. وَصاحِبُ هٰذِهِ الصِّناعَةِ إِنْ قابَلَ الحَكِيمَ يُسَمَّى سُوفِسْطائِيًّا، فَهٰذِهِ الصِّناعَةُ سَفْسَطَةٌ، أَيْ حِكْمَةٌ مُمَوَّهَةٌ مُلَمَّعَةٌ، وَإِلّا فَيُسَمَّى مُشاغِبِيًّا، وَهٰذِهِ مُشاغَبَةٌ، وَعَلَى التَّقْدِيرَيْنِ فَصاحِبُهُ غالِطٌ فِي نَفْسِهِ، مُغالِطٌ لِغَيْرِهِ، وَصِناعَتُهُ مُغالَطَةٌ، وَهِيَ قِياسٌ فاسِدٌ: إِمّا مِنْ جِهَةِ المادَّةِ فَقَطْ، أَوْ مِنْ جِهَةِ الصُّورَةِ فَقَطْ، أَوْ كِلَيْهِما.

The sophistical is a syllogism composed of false (wahmiyyāt), invented by estimation, like judging what is not sensible by with what is sensible, as in “Everything existent can be pointed to.” Estimative premises bear a strong resemblance to ; were it not that the intellect and the revealed law reject the judgement of estimation, the confusion between them would last. Or [it is composed] of false premises that resemble true ones (mushabbahāt): the intellect believes to be first principles, or widely accepted, or accepted, or conceded, because they resemble these in wording or in meaning, and so they lead into error. This is false and counterfeit, not useful in itself, though useful incidentally: one who has it neither errs nor is led into error, and he is able to lead others into error and to test them with it or contend against them. If one who has this art opposes the philosopher [with it], he is called a sophist (sūfisṭāʾī), and this art is sophistics (safsaṭa), that is, a counterfeit, glossed-over philosophy (ḥikma); otherwise he is called a wrangler (mushāghibī), and this is wrangling (mushāghaba). On either assumption the one who has it is himself in error and leads others into error, and his art is (mughālaṭa). It is a corrupt syllogism, either on the side of matter only, or on the side of form only, or both.

al-Mirqāt · p. 53

Test yourself

3 questions on what the commentary explains. With 6 out of 10 or more (two stars) the next lesson opens.

  1. Question 1

    Why are premises taken from the prophets not rhetoric, according to al-Mirqāt?

  2. Question 2

    What is a dialectical syllogism composed of, and what is the purpose of dialectic?

  3. Question 3

    What kind of premise is “Everything existent can be pointed to”, according to al-Mirqāt?

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