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The simple utterance and its kinds

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Indian path · level 2 · al-Mirqāt · Lesson 4 of 25

The simple utterance and its kinds

Utterances and signification

الأَلْفَاظ وَالدَّلَالَة

Arabic text after the print of Deoband after 1336/1917 · translation by The Mantiqi, draft

About this text

al-Mirqāt المِرْقاة

Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1243 or 1244/1828–29)

Text
Arabic: al-Mirqāt, with al-Shīrkūtī's gloss al-Mirʾāt (gloss not reproduced), checked against the Delhi print of 1286/1869 (Sayyid al-Maṭābiʿ); vowel marks added by The Mantiqi (draft), Kutub Khāna Iʿzāziyya, Deoband after 1336/1917 View the scan
Translation
The Mantiqi's own; a draft.
Review
Draft, awaiting review by Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf.

The text Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī

فَصْلٌ

اللَّفْظُ الدّالُّ إِمّا مُفْرَدٌ وَإِمّا مُرَكَّبٌ؛ فَالمُفْرَدُ ما لا يُقْصَدُ بِجُزْئِهِ الدَّلالَةُ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَعْناهُ، كَدَلالَةِ هَمْزَةِ الاِسْتِفْهامِ عَلَى مَعْناهُ، وَدَلالَةِ «زَيْدٍ» عَلَى مُسَمّاهُ، وَدَلالَةِ «عَبْدِ اللهِ» عَلَى المَعْنَى العَلَمِيِّ؛ وَالمُرَكَّبُ ما يُقْصَدُ بِجُزْئِهِ الدَّلالَةُ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَعْناهُ، كَدَلالَةِ «زَيْدٌ قائِمٌ» عَلَى مَعْناهُ، وَدَلالَةِ «رامِي السَّهْمِ» عَلَى فَحْواهُ. ثُمَّ المُفْرَدُ عَلَى أَنْحاءٍ ثَلاثَةٍ؛ لِأَنَّهُ إِنْ كانَ مَعْناهُ مُسْتَقِلًّا بِالمَفْهُومِيَّةِ، أَيْ لَمْ يَكُنْ فِي فَهْمِهِ مُحْتاجًا إِلَى ضَمِيمَةٍ فَهُوَ اسْمٌ إِنْ لَمْ يَقْتَرِنْ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى بِزَمانٍ مِنَ الأَزْمِنَةِ الثَّلاثَةِ، وَكَلِمَةٌ إِنِ اقْتَرَنَ بِهِ؛ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ مَعْناهُ مُسْتَقِلًّا فَهُوَ أَداةٌ فِي عُرْفِ المِيزانِيِّينَ، وَحَرْفٌ فِي اصْطِلاحِ النَّحْوِيِّينَ، هٰذا.

A signifying is either or composite. A simple utterance (mufrad) is one whose part is not meant to signify a part of its meaning, like the interrogative hamza signifying its meaning, “Zayd” signifying the one named by it, and “ʿAbd Allāh” signifying its meaning as a proper name. A (murakkab) is one whose part is meant to signify a part of its meaning, like “Zayd is standing” signifying its meaning and “thrower of the arrow” signifying what it conveys. Next, the simple utterance is of three kinds. For if its meaning is independent in being understood, that is, if understanding it does not need anything joined to it, then it is a noun (ism) if that meaning is not tied to one of the three times, and a kalima [the ' verb] if it is tied to one. If its meaning is not independent, it is a tool (adāt) in the usage of the logicians and a particle (ḥarf) in the technical usage of the grammarians. Mark this.

al-Mirqāt · p. 10

فَصْلٌ

اِعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ قَدْ ظَنَّ بَعْضُهُمْ أَنَّ الكَلِمَةَ عِنْدَ أَهْلِ المِيزانِ هِيَ ما يُسَمَّى فِي عِلْمِ النَّحْوِ بِالفِعْلِ، وَلَيْسَ هٰذا الظَّنُّ بِصَوابٍ؛ فَإِنَّ الفِعْلَ أَعَمُّ مِنَ الكَلِمَةِ، أَلا تَرَى أَنَّ نَحْوَ «أَضْرِبُ» وَ«نَضْرِبُ» وَأَمْثالَهُ فِعْلٌ عِنْدَ النُّحاةِ، وَلَيْسَ بِكَلِمَةٍ عِنْدَ المَنْطِقِيِّينَ؛ لِأَنَّ الكَلِمَةَ مِنْ أَقْسامِ المُفْرَدِ، وَنَحْوُ «أَضْرِبُ» مَثَلًا لَيْسَ بِمُفْرَدٍ، بَلْ هُوَ مُرَكَّبٌ؛ لِدَلالَةِ جُزْءِ اللَّفْظِ عَلَى جُزْءِ المَعْنَى، فَإِنَّ الهَمْزَةَ تَدُلُّ عَلَى المُتَكَلِّمِ، وَ«ضَرَبَ» عَلَى المَعْنَى الحَدَثِيِّ.

Know that some have thought that the kalima, for the , is what is called the verb (fiʿl) in grammar. This view is not right, because the verb is more general than the kalima. Do you not see that a form like “aḍribu” (“I strike”) or “naḍribu” (“we strike”) and the like is a verb for the grammarians but not a kalima for the logicians? For the kalima is one of the kinds of , while “aḍribu”, for example, is not simple but composite, since a part of the signifies a part of the meaning: the hamza signifies the speaker, and “ḍaraba” the meaning of the act.

al-Mirqāt · p. 11

فَصْلٌ

قَدْ يُقَسَّمُ المُفْرَدُ بِتَقْسِيمٍ آخَرَ، وَهُوَ أَنَّ المُفْرَدَ إِمّا أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْناهُ واحِدًا أَوْ يَكُونَ كَثِيرًا، وَالَّذِي لَهُ مَعْنًى واحِدٌ عَلَى ثَلاثَةِ أَضْرُبٍ؛ لِأَنَّهُ لا يَخْلُو إِمّا أَنْ يَكُونَ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى مُتَعَيِّنًا مُتَشَخِّصًا أَوْ لَمْ يَكُنْ؛ وَالأَوَّلُ يُسَمَّى عَلَمًا، كَـ«زَيْدٍ» وَ«هٰذا» وَ«هُوَ»، وَالأَوْلَى أَنْ يُسَمَّى هٰذا القِسْمُ بِالجُزْئِيِّ الحَقِيقِيِّ؛ وَالثّانِي، أَيْ ما لا يَكُونُ مَعْناهُ الواحِدُ مُتَشَخِّصًا بَلْ يَكُونُ لَهُ أَفْرادٌ كَثِيرَةٌ، هُوَ ضَرْبانِ: أَحَدُهُما أَنْ يَكُونَ صِدْقُ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى عَلَى سائِرِ أَفْرادِهِ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الاِسْتِواءِ مِنْ غَيْرِ أَنْ يَتَفاوَتَ بِأَوَّلِيَّةٍ أَوْ أَوْلَوِيَّةٍ أَوْ أَشَدِّيَّةٍ أَوْ أَزْيَدِيَّةٍ، وَيُسَمَّى هٰذا القِسْمُ بِالمُتَواطِئِ؛ لِتَواطُؤِ أَفْرادِهِ وَتَوافُقِها فِي تَصادُقِ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى العامِّ، كَالإِنْسانِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى زَيْدٍ وَعَمْرٍو وَبَكْرٍ؛ وَثانِيهِما أَنْ لا يَكُونَ صِدْقُ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى العامِّ فِي جَمِيعِ أَفْرادِهِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الاِسْتِواءِ، بَلْ يَكُونُ صِدْقُ ذٰلِكَ المَعْنَى عَلَى بَعْضِ الأَفْرادِ بِالأَوَّلِيَّةِ أَوِ الأَشَدِّيَّةِ أَوِ الأَوْلَوِيَّةِ، وَصِدْقُها عَلَى البَعْضِ الآخَرِ بِأَضْدادِ ذٰلِكَ، كَالوُجُودِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الواجِبِ جَلَّ مَجْدُهُ وَبِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى المُمْكِنِ، وَكَالبَياضِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الثَّلْجِ وَالعاجِ، وَيُسَمَّى هٰذا القِسْمُ مُشَكِّكًا؛ لِأَنَّهُ يُوقِعُ النّاظِرَ فِي الشَّكِّ فِي كَوْنِهِ مُتَواطِئًا أَوْ مُشْتَرَكًا.

The is sometimes divided in another way: its meaning is either one or many. What has one meaning is of three kinds, because that meaning must either be determinate and individuated or not. The first is called a proper name (ʿalam), like “Zayd”, “this” and “he”; it is more fitting to call this kind the real (al-juzʾī al-ḥaqīqī). The second, whose one meaning is not individuated but has many individuals, is of two kinds. In the first, that meaning is true of all its individuals equally, without differing by priority, by greater fittingness, by greater intensity or by greater amount. This kind is called univocal (mutawāṭiʾ), because its individuals agree (tawāṭuʾ) and concur in that general meaning's being true of them, like “human” relative to Zayd, ʿAmr and Bakr. In the second, that general meaning is not true of all its individuals equally: it is true of some individuals with priority, greater intensity or greater fittingness, and of the others with the opposite of these, like “existence” relative to the Necessarily Existent, glorious is His majesty, and relative to the possible, and like “whiteness” relative to snow and ivory. This kind is called graded (mushakkik), because it puts the one who considers it into doubt (shakk) whether it is univocal or homonymous.

al-Mirqāt · p. 11

فَصْلٌ

لِلْمُتَكَثِّرِ المَعْنَى لَهُ أَقْسامٌ عَدِيدَةٌ، وَجْهُ الحَصْرِ أَنَّ اللَّفْظَ الَّذِي كَثُرَ مَعْناهُ إِنْ وُضِعَ ذٰلِكَ اللَّفْظُ لِكُلِّ مَعْنًى ابْتِداءً بِأَوْضاعٍ مُتَعَدِّدَةٍ عَلَى حِدَةٍ يُسَمَّى مُشْتَرَكًا، كَالعَيْنِ وُضِعَ تارَةً لِلذَّهَبِ، وَتارَةً لِلْباصِرَةِ، وَتارَةً لِلرُّكْبَةِ؛ وَإِنْ لَمْ يُوضَعْ لِكُلٍّ ابْتِداءً بَلْ وُضِعَ أَوَّلًا لِمَعْنًى ثُمَّ اسْتُعْمِلَ فِي مَعْنًى ثانٍ لِأَجْلِ مُناسَبَةٍ بَيْنَهُما، فَإِنِ اشْتَهَرَ فِي الثّانِي وَتُرِكَ مَوْضُوعُهُ الأَوَّلُ يُسَمَّى مَنْقُولًا. وَالمَنْقُولُ بِالنَّظَرِ إِلَى النّاقِلِ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى ثَلاثَةِ أَقْسامٍ: أَحَدُها المَنْقُولُ العُرْفِيُّ بِاعْتِبارِ كَوْنِ النّاقِلِ عُرْفًا عامًّا، وَثانِيها المَنْقُولُ الشَّرْعِيُّ بِاعْتِبارِ كَوْنِهِ أَرْبابَ الشَّرْعِ، وَثالِثُها المَنْقُولُ الاِصْطِلاحِيُّ بِاعْتِبارِ كَوْنِهِ عُرْفًا خاصًّا وَطائِفَةً مَخْصُوصَةً. مِثالُ الأَوَّلِ كَلَفْظَةِ الدّابَّةِ، كانَ فِي الأَصْلِ مَوْضُوعًا لِما يَدِبُّ عَلَى الأَرْضِ، ثُمَّ نَقَلَهُ العامَّةُ لِلْفَرَسِ أَوْ لِذَواتِ القَوائِمِ الأَرْبَعِ؛ مِثالُ الثّانِي كَلَفْظِ الصَّلاةِ، كانَ فِي الأَصْلِ بِمَعْنَى الدُّعاءِ، ثُمَّ نَقَلَهُ الشّارِعُ إِلَى الأَرْكانِ المَخْصُوصَةِ؛ مِثالُ الثّالِثِ كَلَفْظِ الاِسْمِ، كانَ فِي اللُّغَةِ بِمَعْنَى العُلُوِّ، ثُمَّ نَقَلَهُ النُّحاةُ إِلَى كَلِمَةٍ مُسْتَقِلَّةٍ فِي الدَّلالَةِ غَيْرِ مُقْتَرِنَةٍ بِزَمانٍ مِنَ الأَزْمِنَةِ الثَّلاثَةِ. وَإِنْ لَمْ يَشْتَهِرْ فِي الثّانِي وَلَمْ يُتْرَكِ الأَوَّلُ، بَلْ يُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي المَوْضُوعِ الأَوَّلِ مَرَّةً وَفِي الثّانِي أُخْرَى، يُسَمَّى بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الأَوَّلِ حَقِيقَةً، وَبِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الثّانِي مَجازًا، كَالأَسَدِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الحَيَوانِ المُفْتَرِسِ وَالرَّجُلِ الشُّجاعِ، فَهُوَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الأَوَّلِ حَقِيقَةٌ، وَبِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الثّانِي مَجازٌ.

An with many meanings has several kinds. The reasoning behind the division is this. If an utterance that has many meanings was coined for each meaning from the start, by several separate acts of coining, it is called homonymous (mushtarak), like “ʿayn”, which was coined once for gold, once for the eye and once for the knee. If it was not coined for each from the start, but was first coined for one meaning and then used for a second meaning because of some affinity between the two, then, if it became well known in the second and its first meaning was abandoned, it is called transferred (manqūl). With respect to who transferred it, the transferred utterance is divided into three kinds. The first is the customary transferred utterance, the transferrer being general usage; the second is the legal transferred utterance, the transferrer being the authorities of the Sacred Law; and the third is the technical transferred utterance, the transferrer being a usage, a specific group. An example of the first is the word “dābba”: it was originally coined for whatever creeps (yadibbu) on the earth, and then common people transferred it to the horse, or to four-legged animals. An example of the second is the word “ṣalāh”: it originally meant supplication, and then the Lawgiver transferred it to the specific set of acts (arkān) [of the prayer]. An example of the third is the word “ism”: in the language it meant elevation (ʿuluww), and then the grammarians transferred it to a word that signifies independently and is not tied to any of the three times. If it did not become well known in the second meaning and the first was not abandoned, but it is used now for the first meaning and now for the second, it is called literal (ḥaqīqa) with respect to the first and figurative (majāz) with respect to the second. An example is “asad” (“lion”) relative to the predatory animal and the brave man: with respect to the first it is literal, and with respect to the second it is figurative.

al-Mirqāt · p. 12

فَصْلٌ

إِنْ كانَ اللَّفْظُ مُتَعَدِّدًا وَالمَعْنَى واحِدًا يُسَمَّى مُرادِفًا، كَالأَسَدِ وَاللَّيْثِ، وَالغَيْمِ وَالغَيْثِ.

If the are many and the meaning one, they are called synonymous (murādif), like “asad” and “layth” [both “lion”], and “ghaym” and “ghayth”.

al-Mirqāt · p. 13

Test yourself

3 questions on what the commentary explains. With 6 out of 10 or more (two stars) the next lesson opens.

  1. Question 1

    Why is “aḍribu” (“I strike”) a verb for the grammarians but not a kalima for the logicians?

  2. Question 2

    “Whiteness” is said of snow and of ivory, but not equally. What does al-Mirqāt call such an utterance?

  3. Question 3

    “Ṣalāh” first meant supplication; the Lawgiver then used it for the specific acts of the prayer, it became well known in that sense, and the first meaning was abandoned. What does al-Mirqāt call such a word?

Next lesson: The composite utterance

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