al-Ṣughrā al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī

Know that whatever comes into the mind, if it is free of a judgement, is called conception (taṣawwur), such as the conception of man; and if it comes with a judgement, it is called assent (taṣdīq), such as “Zayd is a writer”. A judgement is the relating of one thing to another, either by way of establishing it, which is called affirmation (ījāb), as in “man is a writer”, or by way of removing it, which is called negation (salb), as in “man is not a writer”.

اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ كُلَّ مَا يَأْتِي إِلَى الذِّهْنِ إِنْ كَانَ خَالِيًا عَنِ الْحُكْمِ سُمِّيَ تَصَوُّرًا، كَتَصَوُّرِ الْإِنْسَانِ مَثَلًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَعَ الْحُكْمِ سُمِّيَ تَصْدِيقًا، كَقَوْلِكَ: زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ مَثَلًا. وَالْحُكْمُ نِسْبَةُ أَمْرٍ إِلَى أَمْرٍ آخَرَ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْإِيقَاعِ، وَيُسَمَّى إِيجَابًا، كَقَوْلِنَا: الْإِنْسَانُ كَاتِبٌ، أَوْ عَلَى وَجْهِ الِانْتِزَاعِ، وَيُسَمَّى سَلْبًا، كَقَوْلِنَا: الْإِنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ.

Each of conception and assent, if it is had without reflection, is called necessary (ḍarūrī) and self-evident (badīhī), such as the conception of heat and cold and the assent that fire is hot; and if it is had through reflection, it is called theoretical (naẓarī) and acquired (kasbī), such as the conception of the spirit and the assent that the world came to be.

وَكُلٌّ مِنَ التَّصَوُّرِ وَالتَّصْدِيقِ إِنْ حَصَلَ بِلَا فِكْرٍ سُمِّيَ ضَرُورِيًّا وَبَدِيهِيًّا، كَتَصَوُّرِ الْحَرَارَةِ وَالْبُرُودَةِ وَالتَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ النَّارَ حَارَّةٌ، وَإِنْ حَصَلَ بِالْفِكْرِ سُمِّيَ نَظَرِيًّا وَكَسْبِيًّا، كَتَصَوُّرِ الرُّوحِ وَالتَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ الْعَالَمَ حَادِثٌ.

Reflection (fikr) is working on what is known, arranging some of it with some, in a way that leads to knowing what is unknown. Whatever one reflects on that leads to another conception is called a definer (muʿarrif) and an explanatory phrase (qawl shāriḥ): for instance, you know separately the meaning of “animal”, a substance, a growing body that senses and moves by will, and the meaning of “rational”, one that grasps intelligibles; then you put the two together and say “rational animal”, and here the conception of man is had. And whatever one reflects on that leads to an assent is called a proof (dalīl, ḥujja): as when you say “the world changes, and everything that changes came to be; so the world came to be”.

وَالْفِكْرُ أَنْ يُتَصَرَّفَ فِي الْمَعْلُومَاتِ بِتَرْتِيبِ بَعْضِهَا مَعَ بَعْضٍ عَلَى وَجْهٍ يُؤَدِّي إِلَى مَعْرِفَةِ الْمَجْهُولِ. وَمَا يُتَفَكَّرُ فِيهِ فَيُؤَدِّي إِلَى تَصَوُّرٍ آخَرَ يُسَمَّى مُعَرِّفًا وَقَوْلًا شَارِحًا، كَمَا إِذَا عَلِمْتَ مُتَفَرِّقًا مَعْنَى الْحَيَوَانِ، وَهُوَ الْجَوْهَرُ الْجِسْمُ النَّامِي الْحَسَّاسُ الْمُتَحَرِّكُ بِالْإِرَادَةِ، وَمَعْنَى النَّاطِقِ، وَهُوَ الْمُدْرِكُ لِلْمَعْقُولَاتِ، ثُمَّ جَمَعْتَهُمَا فَقُلْتَ: حَيَوَانٌ نَاطِقٌ، فَهُنَا يَحْصُلُ تَصَوُّرُ الْإِنْسَانِ. وَمَا يُتَفَكَّرُ فِيهِ فَيُؤَدِّي إِلَى تَصْدِيقٍ يُسَمَّى دَلِيلًا وَحُجَّةً، كَقَوْلِكَ: الْعَالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حَادِثٌ، فَالْعَالَمُ حَادِثٌ.

Section on single terms. Whatever is conceived, if it prevents being shared among many, is called a real particular (juzʾī ḥaqīqī), such as the person of Zayd; and if it does not prevent it, it is called a universal (kullī), such as the concept man. Those many are called its individuals and its relative particulars (juzʾiyyāt iḍāfī), such as Zayd, ʿAmr, Bakr and others.

فَصْلٌ فِي مَبَاحِثِ الْمُفْرَدِ. كُلُّ مَا يُتَصَوَّرُ إِنْ مَنَعَ مِنَ الشَّرِكَةِ بَيْنَ كَثِيرِينَ سُمِّيَ جُزْئِيًّا حَقِيقِيًّا، كَذَاتِ زَيْدٍ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَمْنَعْ سُمِّيَ كُلِّيًّا، كَمَفْهُومِ الْإِنْسَانِ، وَتُسَمَّى تِلْكَ الْكَثِيرُونَ أَفْرَادَهُ وَجُزْئِيَّاتِهِ الْإِضَافِيَّةَ، كَزَيْدٍ وَعَمْرٍو وَبَكْرٍ وَغَيْرِهِمْ.

When you relate a universal to its individuals, it is either the whole reality of the individuals, like man, and is called a species (nawʿ); or a part of their reality — then, if it is the whole of what is shared between the reality of those individuals and another quiddity, like animal, which is the whole of what is shared between man and the other animals, it is called a genus (jins), and if it is not so, it is called a differentia (faṣl), whether it is not shared at all, like rational, or shared but not the whole of what is shared, like sensing; or it is outside the reality of the individuals — if it belongs to one quiddity only, it is called a property (khāṣṣa), like laughing, and if not, a common accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm), like walking.

وَإِذَا نَسَبْتَ الْكُلِّيَّ إِلَى أَفْرَادِهِ فَإِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ عَيْنَ حَقِيقَتِهَا، كَالْإِنْسَانِ، وَيُسَمَّى نَوْعًا، أَوْ جُزْءَ حَقِيقَتِهَا، فَإِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ حَقِيقَةِ تِلْكَ الْأَفْرَادِ وَمَاهِيَّةٍ أُخْرَى، كَالْحَيَوَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ تَمَامُ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَسَائِرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ، سُمِّيَ جِنْسًا، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ كَذٰلِكَ سُمِّيَ فَصْلًا، سَوَاءٌ لَمْ يَكُنْ مُشْتَرَكًا كَالنَّاطِقِ، أَوْ كَانَ مُشْتَرَكًا لٰكِنْ لَيْسَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ كَالْحَسَّاسِ؛ أَوْ يَكُونَ خَارِجًا عَنْ حَقِيقَةِ الْأَفْرَادِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ مُخْتَصًّا بِمَاهِيَّةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ سُمِّيَ خَاصَّةً، كَالضَّاحِكِ، وَإِلَّا سُمِّيَ عَرَضًا عَامًّا، كَالْمَاشِي.

A genus that is the whole of what is shared with respect to everything that shares with the thing is called a near genus (jins qarīb), like animal; and one that is the whole of what is shared only with respect to some of what shares with it is called a far genus (jins baʿīd), like substance, which is shared by man, the immaterial beings, the animals, the plants and the minerals, but is the whole of what is shared only with respect to the immaterial beings. And the ranks of farness differ.

وَالْجِنْسُ إِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى جَمِيعِ الْمُشَارِكَاتِ سُمِّيَ جِنْسًا قَرِيبًا، كَالْحَيَوَانِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى بَعْضِ الْمُشَارِكَاتِ فَقَطْ سُمِّيَ جِنْسًا بَعِيدًا، كَالْجَوْهَرِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْمُجَرَّدَاتِ وَالْحَيَوَانَاتِ وَالنَّبَاتَاتِ وَالْجَمَادَاتِ، وَلَيْسَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ إِلَّا بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْمُجَرَّدَاتِ. وَمَرَاتِبُ الْبُعْدِ مُخْتَلِفَةٌ.

Whenever you join the near genus to the near differentia, it is called a complete definition (ḥadd tāmm), like “rational animal” for man; if you join the far genus to the near differentia, it is called an incomplete definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ), like “rational body” for man; whenever you join the near genus to a property, it is called a complete description (rasm tāmm), like “laughing animal” for man; and if you join the far genus to a property, it is called an incomplete description (rasm nāqiṣ), like “laughing body” for man; and likewise, if you join a common accident to a property, it is called an incomplete description, like “laughing existent” for man.

وَإِذَا جَمَعْتَ الْجِنْسَ الْقَرِيبَ مَعَ الْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيبِ سُمِّيَ حَدًّا تَامًّا، كَالْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ، وَإِنْ جَمَعْتَ الْجِنْسَ الْبَعِيدَ مَعَ الْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيبِ سُمِّيَ حَدًّا نَاقِصًا، كَالْجِسْمِ النَّاطِقِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ، وَإِذَا جَمَعْتَ الْجِنْسَ الْقَرِيبَ مَعَ الْخَاصَّةِ سُمِّيَ رَسْمًا تَامًّا، كَالْحَيَوَانِ الضَّاحِكِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ، وَإِنْ جَمَعْتَ الْجِنْسَ الْبَعِيدَ مَعَ الْخَاصَّةِ سُمِّيَ رَسْمًا نَاقِصًا، كَالْجِسْمِ الضَّاحِكِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ، وَكَذٰلِكَ إِنْ جَمَعْتَ الْعَرَضَ الْعَامَّ مَعَ الْخَاصَّةِ سُمِّيَ رَسْمًا نَاقِصًا، كَالْمَوْجُودِ الضَّاحِكِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ.

Know that genus, differentia and definition are mostly used of realities that exist outside the mind, but they are used of conventional concepts too, such as the terms of the grammarians: word, noun, verb, particle, declinable and indeclinable. And among the scholars of Arabic, “ḥadd” means a definer, and all its kinds are included in it.

وَاعْلَمْ أَنَّ الْجِنْسَ وَالْفَصْلَ وَالْحَدَّ يُسْتَعْمَلُ أَكْثَرُهَا فِي الْحَقَائِقِ الْمَوْجُودَةِ فِي الْخَارِجِ، وَتُسْتَعْمَلُ أَيْضًا فِي الْمَفْهُومَاتِ الِاعْتِبَارِيَّةِ كَاصْطِلَاحَاتِ النُّحَاةِ، مِثْلِ الْكَلِمَةِ وَالِاسْمِ وَالْفِعْلِ وَالْحَرْفِ وَالْمُعْرَبِ وَالْمَبْنِيِّ. وَالْحَدُّ عِنْدَ أَهْلِ الْعَرَبِيَّةِ بِمَعْنَى الْمُعَرِّفِ، وَأَقْسَامُهُ كُلُّهَا دَاخِلَةٌ فِيهِ.

Section on proof. Know that an assent is called a proposition (qaḍiyya), and a proposition is of three kinds. The first is the categorical (ḥamliyya), made of two single terms, like “man is a writer”, which is called affirmative, and “man is not a writer”, which is called negative; in a categorical, what is judged is called the subject (mawḍūʿ) and what is judged of it the predicate (maḥmūl). The second is the connective conditional (sharṭiyya muttaṣila), made of two propositions between which a connection is judged, like “whenever the sun is up, it is day”, which is called affirmative; or the connection is denied, like “never: if the sun is up, it is night”, which is called negative.

فَصْلٌ فِي مَبَاحِثِ الْحُجَّةِ وَالدَّلِيلِ. اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ التَّصْدِيقَ يُسَمَّى قَضِيَّةً، وَالْقَضِيَّةُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الْحَمْلِيَّةُ، وَهِيَ الْمُرَكَّبَةُ مِنْ مُفْرَدَيْنِ، مِثْلُ: الْإِنْسَانُ كَاتِبٌ، وَتُسَمَّى مُوجَبَةً، وَالْإِنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ، وَتُسَمَّى سَالِبَةً، وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْحَمْلِيَّةِ مَوْضُوعًا، وَالْمَحْكُومُ بِهِ مَحْمُولًا. وَالثَّانِي الشَّرْطِيَّةُ الْمُتَّصِلَةُ، وَهِيَ الْمُرَكَّبَةُ مِنْ قَضِيَّتَيْنِ حُكِمَ بَيْنَهُمَا بِالِاتِّصَالِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلَّمَا كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً كَانَ النَّهَارُ مَوْجُودًا، وَتُسَمَّى مُوجَبَةً، أَوْ حُكِمَ بِسَلْبِ الِاتِّصَالِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: لَيْسَ الْبَتَّةَ إِذَا كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً كَانَ اللَّيْلُ مَوْجُودًا، وَتُسَمَّى سَالِبَةً.

The third is the disjunctive conditional (sharṭiyya munfaṣila), made of two propositions between which a separation is judged, or the separation denied. The disjunctive is of three kinds. First, the real (ḥaqīqiyya), in which separation is judged in truth and in falsehood both, like “this number is either even or odd”, which is called the affirmative real disjunctive; or that separation is denied, like “never: this number is either even or divisible into two equal halves”, which is called the negative real disjunctive. Second, the one that excludes being together (māniʿat al-jamʿ), in which separation is judged in truth only, or denied, like “this thing is either a tree or a stone”, and “never: this thing is either not a tree or not a stone”. Third, the one that excludes being absent (māniʿat al-khuluww), in which separation is judged in falsehood only, or denied, like “this thing is either not a stone or not a tree”, and “never: this thing is either a stone or a tree”.

وَالثَّالِثُ الشَّرْطِيَّةُ الْمُنْفَصِلَةُ، وَهِيَ الْمُرَكَّبَةُ مِنْ قَضِيَّتَيْنِ حُكِمَ بَيْنَهُمَا بِالِانْفِصَالِ أَوْ بِسَلْبِهِ، وَهِيَ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الْحَقِيقِيَّةُ الَّتِي حُكِمَ فِيهَا بِالِانْفِصَالِ فِي الصِّدْقِ وَالْكَذِبِ مَعًا، كَقَوْلِنَا: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ أَوْ فَرْدٌ، وَتُسَمَّى مُوجَبَةً حَقِيقِيَّةً، أَوْ حُكِمَ فِيهَا بِسَلْبِ هٰذَا الِانْفِصَالِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: لَيْسَ الْبَتَّةَ هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجًا أَوْ مُنْقَسِمًا بِمُتَسَاوِيَيْنِ، وَتُسَمَّى سَالِبَةً حَقِيقِيَّةً. وَالثَّانِي مَانِعَةُ الْجَمْعِ الَّتِي حُكِمَ فِيهَا بِالِانْفِصَالِ فِي الصِّدْقِ فَقَطْ أَوْ بِسَلْبِهِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا شَجَرٌ أَوْ حَجَرٌ، وَلَيْسَ الْبَتَّةَ هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا لَا شَجَرٌ أَوْ لَا حَجَرٌ. وَالثَّالِثُ مَانِعَةُ الْخُلُوِّ الَّتِي حُكِمَ فِيهَا بِالِانْفِصَالِ فِي الْكَذِبِ فَقَطْ أَوْ بِسَلْبِهِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا لَا حَجَرٌ أَوْ لَا شَجَرٌ، وَلَيْسَ الْبَتَّةَ هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا حَجَرٌ أَوْ شَجَرٌ.

When a proof is made of categoricals alone, it is called a conjunctive syllogism (qiyās iqtirānī), and four figures arise in it. The explanation is this: when in a categorical proposition the relation of the predicate to the subject is unknown, there is need of a middle term that has a relation to each of the subject and the predicate of the proposition sought, so that through knowing these two relations the relation of the predicate to the subject, which is what is sought, becomes known. For instance, when the relation of C, the predicate, to B, the subject, is unknown, A becomes the middle. So there are three parts here: first, the subject of the proposition sought; second, its predicate; third, the middle. If the middle is the predicate of the subject sought and the subject of the predicate sought, it is called the first figure: every B is A, and every A is C, so every B is C. If it is the reverse, it is called the fourth figure, and it is far from nature: every A is B, and every C is A, so some B is C. If the middle is the predicate of both, it is called the second figure: every B is A, and no C is A, so no B is C. And if it is the subject of both, it is called the third figure: every A is B, and every A is C, so some B is C.

وَالدَّلِيلُ إِذَا تَرَكَّبَ مِنَ الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ الصِّرْفَةِ سُمِّيَ قِيَاسًا اقْتِرَانِيًّا، وَتَنْعَقِدُ فِيهِ أَرْبَعَةُ أَشْكَالٍ. وَبَيَانُ ذٰلِكَ أَنَّ نِسْبَةَ الْمَحْمُولِ إِلَى الْمَوْضُوعِ فِي الْقَضِيَّةِ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ إِذَا كَانَتْ مَجْهُولَةً احْتِيجَ إِلَى مُتَوَسِّطٍ لَهُ نِسْبَةٌ إِلَى كُلٍّ مِنْ مَوْضُوعِ الْقَضِيَّةِ الْمَطْلُوبَةِ وَمَحْمُولِهَا، لِيُعْلَمَ بِمَعْرِفَةِ هَاتَيْنِ النِّسْبَتَيْنِ نِسْبَةُ الْمَحْمُولِ إِلَى الْمَوْضُوعِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْمَطْلُوبُ؛ مَثَلًا إِذَا كَانَتْ نِسْبَةُ ج، وَهُوَ الْمَحْمُولُ، إِلَى ب، وَهُوَ الْمَوْضُوعُ، مَجْهُولَةً صَارَ أ مُتَوَسِّطًا. فَهُنَا ثَلَاثَةُ أَجْزَاءٍ: مَوْضُوعُ الْقَضِيَّةِ الْمَطْلُوبَةِ، وَمَحْمُولُهَا، وَالْمُتَوَسِّطُ. فَإِنْ كَانَ الْمُتَوَسِّطُ مَحْمُولًا لِمَوْضُوعِ الْمَطْلُوبِ وَمَوْضُوعًا لِمَحْمُولِهِ سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الْأَوَّلَ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب أ، وَكُلُّ أ ج، فَكُلُّ ب ج، وَإِنْ كَانَ بِالْعَكْسِ سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الرَّابِعَ، وَهُوَ بَعِيدٌ عَنِ الطَّبْعِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ أ ب، وَكُلُّ ج أ، فَبَعْضُ ب ج، وَإِنْ كَانَ الْمُتَوَسِّطُ مَحْمُولًا لَهُمَا سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الثَّانِيَ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب أ، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ج أ، فَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ب ج، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْضُوعًا لَهُمَا سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الثَّالِثَ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ أ ب، وَكُلُّ أ ج، فَبَعْضُ ب ج.

And if a proof is made of a connective or a disjunctive, it is called an exceptive syllogism (qiyās istithnāʾī). An example with a connective: “whenever this thing is a man, it is an animal; but it is a man, so it is an animal; but it is not an animal, so it is not a man.” An example with a real disjunctive: “this number is either even or odd; but it is even, so it is not odd; but it is odd, so it is not even; but it is not even, so it is odd; but it is not odd, so it is even.” And God knows best. Here ends the Ṣughrā.

وَإِذَا تَرَكَّبَ الدَّلِيلُ مِنَ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ أَوِ الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ سُمِّيَ قِيَاسًا اسْتِثْنَائِيًّا. مِثَالُ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ: كُلَّمَا كَانَ هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِنْسَانًا كَانَ حَيَوَانًا، لٰكِنَّهُ إِنْسَانٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوَانٍ فَلَيْسَ بِإِنْسَانٍ. وَمِثَالُ الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ الْحَقِيقِيَّةِ: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ أَوْ فَرْدٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ زَوْجٌ فَلَيْسَ بِفَرْدٍ، لٰكِنَّهُ فَرْدٌ فَلَيْسَ بِزَوْجٍ، لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِزَوْجٍ فَهُوَ فَرْدٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِفَرْدٍ فَهُوَ زَوْجٌ. وَاللّٰهُ أَعْلَمُ. تَمَّتِ الرِّسَالَةُ الصُّغْرَى.