al-Kubrā al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī

Know that man has a perceiving faculty in which the forms of things are imprinted, as in a mirror; but in a mirror only the forms of sensible things come about, while in the human perceiving faculty the forms of both sensible and intelligible things come about. The sensible is what is perceived by one of the five senses, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch; the intelligible is what is not perceived by them. Every form that comes about in the human perceiving faculty, which is called the mind, is either a conception or an assent: if the form that comes about is the form of a relation of one thing to another, affirmatively, as when you say “Zayd is a writer”, or negatively, as when you say “Zayd is not a writer”, that form is called assent; and if the form that comes about is other than the form of such a relation, it is called conception. So knowledge, which is perception, is confined to conception and assent.

اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ لِلْإِنْسَانِ قُوَّةً مُدْرِكَةً تَنْتَقِشُ فِيهَا صُوَرُ الْأَشْيَاءِ كَمَا تَنْتَقِشُ فِي الْمِرْآةِ، غَيْرَ أَنَّ الْمِرْآةَ لَا يَحْصُلُ فِيهَا إِلَّا صُوَرُ الْمَحْسُوسَاتِ، وَأَمَّا الْقُوَّةُ الْمُدْرِكَةُ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةُ فَتَحْصُلُ فِيهَا صُوَرُ الْمَحْسُوسَاتِ وَالْمَعْقُولَاتِ جَمِيعًا. وَالْمَحْسُوسُ مَا يُدْرَكُ بِإِحْدَى الْحَوَاسِّ الْخَمْسِ، وَهِيَ الْبَاصِرَةُ وَالسَّامِعَةُ وَالشَّامَّةُ وَالذَّائِقَةُ وَاللَّامِسَةُ، وَالْمَعْقُولُ مَا لَا يُدْرَكُ بِهَا. وَكُلُّ صُورَةٍ تَحْصُلُ فِي الْقُوَّةِ الْمُدْرِكَةِ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةِ الَّتِي تُسَمَّى الذِّهْنَ فَهِيَ إِمَّا تَصَوُّرٌ وَإِمَّا تَصْدِيقٌ؛ لِأَنَّ تِلْكَ الصُّورَةَ الْحَاصِلَةَ إِنْ كَانَتْ صُورَةَ نِسْبَةِ شَيْءٍ إِلَى شَيْءٍ بِالْإِيجَابِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ، أَوْ بِالسَّلْبِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ، سُمِّيَتْ تَصْدِيقًا، وَإِنْ كَانَتْ غَيْرَ صُورَةِ تِلْكَ النِّسْبَةِ سُمِّيَتْ تَصَوُّرًا. فَالْعِلْمُ، وَهُوَ الْإِدْرَاكُ، مُنْحَصِرٌ فِي التَّصَوُّرِ وَالتَّصْدِيقِ.

Section. From this it is known that the relation of one thing to another, whether affirmative or negative, is of three kinds: first, predicative, as has been seen; second, connective, as when you say “if the sun has risen, it is day”, or “it is not so that if the sun has risen, it is night”; third, disjunctive, as when you say “this number is either even or odd”, or “it is not so that this individual is either a man or an animal”. So the perception of a predicative, connective or disjunctive relation, affirmative or negative, is assent, which is also called judgement, and the perception of anything besides these is conception.

فَصْلٌ. وَيُعْلَمُ مِنْ هٰذَا أَنَّ نِسْبَةَ الشَّيْءِ إِلَى الشَّيْءِ، إِيجَابًا كَانَتْ أَوْ سَلْبًا، عَلَى ثَلَاثَةِ أَوْجُهٍ: أَحَدُهَا الْحَمْلِيَّةُ كَمَا عُلِمَ، وَالثَّانِي الِاتِّصَالِيَّةُ، كَقَوْلِكَ: إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُودٌ، أَوْ قَوْلِكَ: لَيْسَ إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَاللَّيْلُ مَوْجُودٌ، وَالثَّالِثُ الِانْفِصَالِيَّةُ، كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ وَإِمَّا فَرْدٌ، أَوْ قَوْلِكَ: لَيْسَ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ هٰذَا الشَّخْصُ إِنْسَانًا أَوْ حَيَوَانًا. فَإِدْرَاكُ النِّسْبَةِ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَالِاتِّصَالِيَّةِ وَالِانْفِصَالِيَّةِ إِيجَابًا أَوْ سَلْبًا تَصْدِيقٌ، وَيُسَمَّى حُكْمًا أَيْضًا، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَا سِوَاهَا تَصَوُّرٌ.

Since assent is the perception of the relation of one thing to another, affirmatively or negatively, it cannot do without three conceptions: first, the conception of what something is related to, which is called the subject judged; second, the conception of what is related, which is called the predicate judged; third, the conception of the relation between them, which is called the judgemental relation. For instance, in assenting that Zayd is standing, one cannot do without the conception of Zayd, who is the subject judged, the conception of standing, which is the predicate judged, and the conception of the relation between Zayd and standing, which is the judgemental relation, so that after that the perception of that relation, affirmatively or negatively, may come about. So assent depends on the conception of the subject, the conception of the predicate and the conception of the judgemental relation; but according to the careful scholars none of these three conceptions is a part of the assent.

وَلَمَّا كَانَ التَّصْدِيقُ إِدْرَاكَ نِسْبَةِ شَيْءٍ إِلَى شَيْءٍ إِيجَابًا أَوْ سَلْبًا، لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ بُدٌّ مِنْ تَصَوُّرَاتٍ ثَلَاثَةٍ: أَحَدُهَا تَصَوُّرُ الْمَنْسُوبِ إِلَيْهِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومَ عَلَيْهِ، وَالثَّانِي تَصَوُّرُ الْمَنْسُوبِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومَ بِهِ، وَالثَّالِثُ تَصَوُّرُ النِّسْبَةِ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَتُسَمَّى النِّسْبَةَ الْحُكْمِيَّةَ. فَفِي التَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ زَيْدًا قَائِمٌ لَا بُدَّ مِنْ تَصَوُّرِ زَيْدٍ وَهُوَ الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ، وَمِنْ تَصَوُّرِ الْقَائِمِ وَهُوَ الْمَحْكُومُ بِهِ، وَمِنْ تَصَوُّرِ النِّسْبَةِ بَيْنَ زَيْدٍ وَالْقَائِمِ وَهِيَ النِّسْبَةُ الْحُكْمِيَّةُ، حَتَّى يَحْصُلَ بَعْدَ ذٰلِكَ إِدْرَاكُ تِلْكَ النِّسْبَةِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْإِيجَابِ أَوِ السَّلْبِ. فَالتَّصْدِيقُ مَوْقُوفٌ عَلَى تَصَوُّرِ الْمَحْكُومِ عَلَيْهِ وَتَصَوُّرِ الْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ وَتَصَوُّرِ النِّسْبَةِ الْحُكْمِيَّةِ، وَلٰكِنْ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مِنْ هٰذِهِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ الثَّلَاثَةِ جُزْءًا مِنَ التَّصْدِيقِ عِنْدَ الْمُحَقِّقِينَ.

Section. Know that conception is of two kinds: one that needs no reflection or thought to be had, such as the conception of heat and cold, black and white and the like, and this kind is called necessary conception; and one that needs reflection and thought to be had, such as the conception of the spirit, the angel, the jinn and the like, and this kind is called theoretical conception. Likewise assent is of two kinds: necessary assent, which needs no reflection or thought, such as the assent that the sun is bright and fire is hot; and theoretical assent, which needs reflection and thought, such as the assent that the maker of the world exists and that the world came to be, and so on. Section. Theoretical conception is gained from necessary conceptions, and theoretical assent from necessary assents, by way of reflection and thought, which is arranging conceptions or assents one has in a way that leads to an unknown conception or assent one did not have: as when you join the conception of animal to the conception of rational and say “rational animal”, and from this the conception of man, which one did not have, comes about; and as when you join the assent that the world changes to the assent that whatever changes came to be, and say “the world changes, and whatever changes came to be”, and from this the assent that the world came to be comes about.

فَصْلٌ. اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ التَّصَوُّرَ قِسْمَانِ: أَحَدُهُمَا مَا لَا يُحْتَاجُ فِي حُصُولِهِ إِلَى نَظَرٍ وَفِكْرٍ، كَتَصَوُّرِ الْحَرَارَةِ وَالْبُرُودَةِ وَالسَّوَادِ وَالْبَيَاضِ وَنَحْوِهَا، وَيُسَمَّى التَّصَوُّرَ الضَّرُورِيَّ، وَالثَّانِي مَا يُحْتَاجُ فِي حُصُولِهِ إِلَى نَظَرٍ وَفِكْرٍ، كَتَصَوُّرِ الرُّوحِ وَالْمَلَكِ وَالْجِنِّ وَنَحْوِهَا، وَيُسَمَّى التَّصَوُّرَ النَّظَرِيَّ. وَكَذٰلِكَ التَّصْدِيقُ قِسْمَانِ: تَصْدِيقٌ ضَرُورِيٌّ لَا يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى نَظَرٍ وَفِكْرٍ، كَالتَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ الشَّمْسَ مُضِيئَةٌ وَأَنَّ النَّارَ حَارَّةٌ، وَتَصْدِيقٌ نَظَرِيٌّ يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى نَظَرٍ وَفِكْرٍ، كَالتَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ صَانِعَ الْعَالَمِ مَوْجُودٌ وَأَنَّ الْعَالَمَ حَادِثٌ وَنَحْوِ ذٰلِكَ. فَصْلٌ. وَيُكْتَسَبُ التَّصَوُّرُ النَّظَرِيُّ مِنَ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ الضَّرُورِيَّةِ، وَالتَّصْدِيقُ النَّظَرِيُّ مِنَ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ الضَّرُورِيَّةِ، بِطَرِيقِ النَّظَرِ وَالْفِكْرِ، وَهُوَ تَرْتِيبُ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ أَوِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ الْحَاصِلَةِ عَلَى وَجْهٍ يُؤَدِّي إِلَى مَجْهُولٍ تَصَوُّرِيٍّ أَوْ تَصْدِيقِيٍّ لَمْ يَكُنْ حَاصِلًا: كَمَا إِذَا ضَمَمْتَ تَصَوُّرَ الْحَيَوَانِ إِلَى تَصَوُّرِ النَّاطِقِ فَقُلْتَ: حَيَوَانٌ نَاطِقٌ، فَيَحْصُلُ مِنْ ذٰلِكَ تَصَوُّرُ الْإِنْسَانِ الَّذِي لَمْ يَكُنْ حَاصِلًا، وَكَمَا إِذَا ضَمَمْتَ التَّصْدِيقَ بِأَنَّ الْعَالَمَ مُتَغَيِّرٌ إِلَى التَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ كُلَّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حَادِثٌ فَقُلْتَ: الْعَالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حَادِثٌ، فَيَحْصُلُ مِنْ ذٰلِكَ التَّصْدِيقُ بِأَنَّ الْعَالَمَ حَادِثٌ.

Section. Man is set apart from the other animals in that he can gain the unknown from the known by way of reflection, unlike the other animals; so everyone must know the way of reflection, and what makes it sound or unsound, so that when they wish to gain an unknown conception or assent from known conceptions or assents they can do so correctly — except those whom God supports with holy souls, who need no reflection to know things. Section. Know that in the usage of the scholars of this art the ordered conceptions that lead to another conception are called a definer and an explanatory phrase, and the ordered assents that lead to another assent are called a proof and an argument. So the aim of this art is to know the definer and the proof. There is no doubt that the definer and the proof are in truth meanings, not words: the definer of man, for instance, is the meaning of “rational animal”, not its wording, and the proof that the world came to be is the meaning of the propositions mentioned, not their wording. So the master of this art has no need of words in themselves; but since understanding and conveying meanings goes by words, he must look into the states of words with respect to their signifying meanings.

فَصْلٌ. وَيَمْتَازُ الْإِنْسَانُ عَنْ سَائِرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ بِأَنَّهُ يَقْدِرُ عَلَى اكْتِسَابِ الْمَجْهُولَاتِ مِنَ الْمَعْلُومَاتِ بِطَرِيقِ النَّظَرِ، بِخِلَافِ سَائِرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ، فَلَزِمَ كُلَّ أَحَدٍ أَنْ يَعْرِفَ طَرِيقَ النَّظَرِ وَصِحَّتَهُ وَفَسَادَهُ، لِيَقْدِرَ إِذَا أَرَادَ اكْتِسَابَ مَجْهُولٍ تَصَوُّرِيٍّ أَوْ تَصْدِيقِيٍّ مِنَ الْمَعْلُومَاتِ التَّصَوُّرِيَّةِ أَوِ التَّصْدِيقِيَّةِ أَنْ يَكْتَسِبَهُ عَلَى وَجْهِ الصَّوَابِ، إِلَّا الَّذِينَ أَيَّدَهُمُ اللّٰهُ بِالنُّفُوسِ الْقُدْسِيَّةِ فَإِنَّهُمْ لَا يَحْتَاجُونَ فِي مَعْرِفَةِ الْأَشْيَاءِ إِلَى النَّظَرِ. فَصْلٌ. اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ الْمُرَتَّبَةَ الْمُوصِلَةَ إِلَى تَصَوُّرٍ آخَرَ تُسَمَّى فِي عُرْفِ عُلَمَاءِ هٰذَا الْفَنِّ مُعَرِّفًا وَقَوْلًا شَارِحًا، وَالتَّصْدِيقَاتِ الْمُرَتَّبَةَ الْمُوصِلَةَ إِلَى تَصْدِيقٍ آخَرَ تُسَمَّى حُجَّةً وَدَلِيلًا. فَالْمَقْصُودُ فِي هٰذَا الْفَنِّ مَعْرِفَةُ الْمُعَرِّفِ وَالْحُجَّةِ. وَلَا شَكَّ أَنَّ الْمُعَرِّفَ وَالْحُجَّةَ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ مَعَانٍ لَا أَلْفَاظٌ، فَمُعَرِّفُ الْإِنْسَانِ مَثَلًا مَعْنَى الْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ لَا لَفْظُهُ، وَحُجَّةُ حُدُوثِ الْعَالَمِ مَعَانِي الْقَضَايَا الْمَذْكُورَةِ لَا أَلْفَاظُهَا. فَصَاحِبُ هٰذَا الْفَنِّ لَا يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى الْأَلْفَاظِ بِالذَّاتِ، وَلٰكِنْ لَمَّا كَانَ التَّفَهُّمُ وَالتَّفْهِيمُ لِلْمَعَانِي بِالْأَلْفَاظِ وَجَبَ عَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَنْظُرَ فِي أَحْوَالِ الْأَلْفَاظِ مِنْ حَيْثُ دَلَالَتُهَا عَلَى الْمَعَانِي.

Section. Signification is a thing's being such that knowing it brings with it the knowledge of another thing; the first is called the signifier and the second the signified. Assignment is the fixing of one thing for another in such a way that from knowing the first, knowledge of the second comes about; so knowledge of the assignment is one of the causes of signification. Signification, by induction, is of three kinds. First, conventional signification, in which assignment has a share: it is found in words, as the word “Zayd” signifies his person, and outside words, as lines of writing, knots, gestures and signposts signify the meanings understood from them. Second, rational signification, which goes by what the intellect requires: this too is found in words, as the word “deiz” heard from behind a wall signifies that someone is there saying it, and outside words, as the made thing signifies its maker. Third, natural signification, which goes by what nature requires: it is found in words, as “aḥ, aḥ” signifies pain in the chest, and outside words, as redness signifies shame and paleness fear.

فَصْلٌ. الدَّلَالَةُ كَوْنُ الشَّيْءِ بِحَيْثُ يَلْزَمُ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ بِهِ الْعِلْمُ بِشَيْءٍ آخَرَ، وَيُسَمَّى الْأَوَّلُ دَالًّا وَالثَّانِي مَدْلُولًا. وَالْوَضْعُ تَخْصِيصُ شَيْءٍ بِشَيْءٍ بِحَيْثُ يَحْصُلُ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ بِالْأَوَّلِ الْعِلْمُ بِالثَّانِي، فَالْعِلْمُ بِالْوَضْعِ سَبَبٌ مِنْ أَسْبَابِ الدَّلَالَةِ. وَالدَّلَالَةُ بِحُكْمِ الِاسْتِقْرَاءِ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الدَّلَالَةُ الْوَضْعِيَّةُ الَّتِي لِلْوَضْعِ فِيهَا مَدْخَلٌ، وَتَكُونُ فِي الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ لَفْظِ زَيْدٍ عَلَى ذَاتِهِ، وَفِي غَيْرِ الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ الْخُطُوطِ وَالْعُقُودِ وَالْإِشَارَاتِ وَالنُّصُبِ عَلَى الْمَعَانِي الْمَفْهُومَةِ مِنْهَا. وَالثَّانِي الدَّلَالَةُ الْعَقْلِيَّةُ الَّتِي تَكُونُ بِمُقْتَضَى الْعَقْلِ، وَهِيَ أَيْضًا تَكُونُ فِي الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ لَفْظِ «دَيْز» الْمَسْمُوعِ مِنْ وَرَاءِ الْجِدَارِ عَلَى وُجُودِ اللَّافِظِ، وَفِي غَيْرِ الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ الْمَصْنُوعِ عَلَى الصَّانِعِ. وَالثَّالِثُ الدَّلَالَةُ الطَّبْعِيَّةُ الَّتِي تَكُونُ بِمُقْتَضَى الطَّبْعِ، وَتُوجَدُ فِي الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ «أُحْ أُحْ» عَلَى وَجَعِ الصَّدْرِ، وَفِي غَيْرِ الْأَلْفَاظِ كَدَلَالَةِ الْحُمْرَةِ عَلَى الْخَجَلِ وَالصُّفْرَةِ عَلَى الْوَجَلِ.

Section. The signification that counts is verbal conventional signification, because conveying and receiving meanings customarily goes this way. It is confined to correspondence, inclusion and implication. Correspondence is a word's signifying the whole of the meaning assigned to it, insofar as it is the whole of that meaning, as the word “man” signifies the meaning “rational animal”; inclusion is a word's signifying a part of the meaning assigned to it, insofar as it is a part of it, as the word “man” signifies the meaning “animal” alone or “rational” alone; and implication is a word's signifying a meaning outside what it was assigned to but bound to it, insofar as it is bound to it, as the word “man” signifies being able to learn and to write. Section. It is not hidden that a word signifies the whole of what it was assigned to by the assignment alone, and a part of it because the whole cannot be understood without the part; but its signifying something outside its assigned meaning requires that this outside thing be bound to the assigned meaning in the mind, that is, that it be such that whenever the assigned meaning comes about in the mind, it comes about too. Otherwise the word would not signify it universally and always, and for the masters of this art it is universal and constant signification that counts; but for the scholars of legal theory and rhetoric signification in some cases is enough, so for them rational binding is not a condition: some binding suffices.

فَصْلٌ. الْمُعْتَبَرُ مِنَ الدَّلَالَاتِ هُوَ الدَّلَالَةُ اللَّفْظِيَّةُ الْوَضْعِيَّةُ، لِأَنَّ الْإِفَادَةَ وَالِاسْتِفَادَةَ لِلْمَعَانِي جَرَتِ الْعَادَةُ بِهَا عَلَى هٰذَا الطَّرِيقِ. وَهِيَ مُنْحَصِرَةٌ فِي الْمُطَابَقَةِ وَالتَّضَمُّنِ وَالِالْتِزَامِ: فَالْمُطَابَقَةُ دَلَالَةُ اللَّفْظِ عَلَى تَمَامِ مَا وُضِعَ لَهُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ تَمَامُهُ، كَدَلَالَةِ لَفْظِ الْإِنْسَانِ عَلَى مَعْنَى الْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ، وَالتَّضَمُّنُ دَلَالَتُهُ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَا وُضِعَ لَهُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ جُزْؤُهُ، كَدَلَالَةِ لَفْظِ الْإِنْسَانِ عَلَى الْحَيَوَانِ وَحْدَهُ أَوِ النَّاطِقِ وَحْدَهُ، وَالِالْتِزَامُ دَلَالَتُهُ عَلَى مَعْنًى خَارِجٍ عَمَّا وُضِعَ لَهُ لَازِمٍ لَهُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ لَازِمُهُ، كَدَلَالَةِ لَفْظِ الْإِنْسَانِ عَلَى قَابِلِ الْعِلْمِ وَصَنْعَةِ الْكِتَابَةِ. فَصْلٌ. لَا يَخْفَى أَنَّ اللَّفْظَ يَدُلُّ عَلَى تَمَامِ مَا وُضِعَ لَهُ بِمُجَرَّدِ الْوَضْعِ، وَعَلَى جُزْئِهِ لِأَنَّ فَهْمَ الْكُلِّ لَا يُمْكِنُ بِدُونِ فَهْمِ الْجُزْءِ، وَأَمَّا دَلَالَتُهُ عَلَى الْخَارِجِ عَنْ مَعْنَاهُ الْمَوْضُوعِ لَهُ فَتَحْتَاجُ إِلَى أَنْ يَكُونَ ذٰلِكَ الْخَارِجُ لَازِمًا لِلْمَعْنَى الْمَوْضُوعِ لَهُ فِي الذِّهْنِ، أَيْ بِحَيْثُ مَتَى حَصَلَ الْمَوْضُوعُ لَهُ فِي الذِّهْنِ حَصَلَ ذٰلِكَ الْخَارِجُ أَيْضًا، وَإِلَّا لَمْ تَكُنْ لِلَّفْظِ عَلَيْهِ دَلَالَةٌ كُلِّيَّةٌ دَائِمَةٌ، وَالْمُعْتَبَرُ عِنْدَ أَصْحَابِ هٰذَا الْفَنِّ الدَّلَالَةُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ الدَّائِمَةُ، وَأَمَّا عِنْدَ عُلَمَاءِ الْأُصُولِ وَالْبَيَانِ فَتَكْفِي الدَّلَالَةُ فِي الْجُمْلَةِ، فَلَا يُشْتَرَطُ عِنْدَهُمُ اللُّزُومُ الْعَقْلِيُّ، بَلْ يَكْفِي اللُّزُومُ فِي الْجُمْلَةِ.

Section. Whenever the assigned meaning is simple and has nothing bound to it in the mind, there is correspondence without inclusion or implication; but inclusion and implication cannot come about without correspondence. If the assigned meaning is simple and has something bound to it in the mind, there is implication without inclusion; and if the assigned meaning of the word is composite and has nothing bound to it in the mind, there is inclusion without implication.

فَصْلٌ. مَتَى كَانَ الْمَوْضُوعُ لَهُ بَسِيطًا وَلَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ لَازِمٌ ذِهْنِيٌّ وُجِدَتِ الْمُطَابَقَةُ بِدُونِ التَّضَمُّنِ وَالِالْتِزَامِ، وَأَمَّا التَّضَمُّنُ وَالِالْتِزَامُ فَلَا يُتَصَوَّرَانِ بِدُونِ الْمُطَابَقَةِ. وَإِنْ كَانَ الْمَوْضُوعُ لَهُ بَسِيطًا وَلَهُ لَازِمٌ ذِهْنِيٌّ وُجِدَ الِالْتِزَامُ بِدُونِ التَّضَمُّنِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ الْمَوْضُوعُ لَهُ مُرَكَّبًا وَلَيْسَ لَهُ لَازِمٌ ذِهْنِيٌّ وُجِدَ التَّضَمُّنُ بِدُونِ الِالْتِزَامِ.

Section. When a word is used for what it was assigned to, it is called literal; when it is used for a part of what it was assigned to, or for something outside it, it is called figurative, and here a contextual sign is needed. Section. When a word has one assigned meaning it is called single in meaning; if more, it is called equivocal, and for each meaning it needs a contextual sign, like the word “ʿayn”. If two words are assigned to one meaning, they are called synonyms, like “insān” and “bashar” (man); and if each has another assigned meaning, they are called distinct, like “man” and “horse”.

فَصْلٌ. اللَّفْظُ إِذَا اسْتُعْمِلَ فِيمَا وُضِعَ لَهُ سُمِّيَ حَقِيقَةً، وَإِذَا اسْتُعْمِلَ فِي جُزْءِ مَا وُضِعَ لَهُ أَوْ فِي الْخَارِجِ عَنْهُ سُمِّيَ مَجَازًا، وَهُنَا يُحْتَاجُ إِلَى الْقَرِينَةِ. فَصْلٌ. اللَّفْظُ إِنْ كَانَ لَهُ مَوْضُوعٌ لَهُ وَاحِدٌ سُمِّيَ مُفْرَدًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ أَكْثَرَ سُمِّيَ مُشْتَرَكًا، وَيَحْتَاجُ فِي كُلِّ مَعْنًى إِلَى قَرِينَةٍ، كَلَفْظِ الْعَيْنِ. وَإِنْ وُضِعَ لَفْظَانِ لِمَعْنًى وَاحِدٍ سُمِّيَا مُتَرَادِفَيْنِ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَالْبَشَرِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ لِكُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا مَوْضُوعٌ لَهُ آخَرُ سُمِّيَا مُتَبَايِنَيْنِ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَالْفَرَسِ.

Section. A word that signifies a meaning by correspondence is of two kinds, single and composite. A composite is one a part of whose wording signifies a part of its intended meaning, the signification being intended, like “rāmī al-ḥijāra” (thrower of stones); and a single is what is not so. This is of four kinds: one that has no part, like the hamza of a question; one that has a part, but the part does not signify any part of the meaning at all, like “Zayd”; one that has a part that signifies a meaning, but not a part of the intended meaning, like “ʿAbd Allāh” as a proper name; and one that has a part that signifies a part of the intended meaning, but the signification is not intended, like “rational animal” when it is the name of a particular man. Section. The single is of three kinds: noun, word and particle. For if the meaning of a single word is incomplete, that is, not fit to be the subject or the predicate of a judgement, it is called in this art a particle (adāt), and in grammar ḥarf; and if its meaning is complete, it is either fit to be the subject of a judgement or not: if not, it is called a word (kalima), and in grammar a verb; and if it is, it is called a noun.

فَصْلٌ. اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُّ عَلَى الْمَعْنَى بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ قِسْمَانِ: مُفْرَدٌ وَمُرَكَّبٌ. فَالْمُرَكَّبُ مَا يَدُلُّ جُزْءُ لَفْظِهِ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَعْنَاهُ الْمَقْصُودِ دَلَالَةً مَقْصُودَةً، كَرَامِي الْحِجَارَةِ، وَالْمُفْرَدُ مَا لَيْسَ كَذٰلِكَ، وَهُوَ أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ مَا لَا جُزْءَ لَهُ، كَهَمْزَةِ الِاسْتِفْهَامِ، وَالثَّانِي مَا لَهُ جُزْءٌ لَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى جُزْءِ الْمَعْنَى أَصْلًا، كَزَيْدٍ، وَالثَّالِثُ مَا لَهُ جُزْءٌ يَدُلُّ عَلَى مَعْنًى لٰكِنْ لَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى جُزْءِ الْمَعْنَى الْمَقْصُودِ، كَعَبْدِ اللّٰهِ عَلَمًا، وَالرَّابِعُ مَا لَهُ جُزْءٌ يَدُلُّ عَلَى جُزْءِ الْمَعْنَى الْمَقْصُودِ لٰكِنْ لَيْسَتِ الدَّلَالَةُ مَقْصُودَةً، كَالْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ إِذَا جُعِلَ عَلَمًا لِشَخْصٍ مِنَ النَّاسِ. فَصْلٌ. الْمُفْرَدُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: اسْمٌ وَكَلِمَةٌ وَأَدَاةٌ؛ لِأَنَّ مَعْنَى اللَّفْظِ الْمُفْرَدِ إِنْ كَانَ غَيْرَ تَامٍّ، أَيْ لَا يَصْلُحُ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَحْكُومًا عَلَيْهِ وَلَا مَحْكُومًا بِهِ، سُمِّيَ فِي هٰذَا الْفَنِّ أَدَاةً، وَفِي النَّحْوِ حَرْفًا، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَعْنَاهُ تَامًّا فَلَا يَخْلُو إِمَّا أَنْ يَصْلُحَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَحْكُومًا عَلَيْهِ أَوْ لَا: فَإِنْ لَمْ يَصْلُحْ سُمِّيَ كَلِمَةً، وَفِي النَّحْوِ فِعْلًا، وَإِنْ صَلَحَ سُمِّيَ اسْمًا.

Section. The composite word is of two kinds, complete and incomplete. Complete is one after which silence is sound: when the speaker stops there, the hearer is left waiting for nothing, that is, not waiting as one waits when there is a subject without a predicate or a predicate without a subject. If a complete composite can in itself be true or false, it is called a report and a proposition, and this is the mainstay in the study of assents; if it cannot, it is called a performative, whether it signifies a request in itself, like command, prohibition and question, or does not, like wishing, hoping, wonder, calling and the like; and this kind, the performative, is what counts in conversation. Incomplete is one after which silence is not sound. It divides into the restrictive composition, in which the second part restricts the first, whether by annexation, like “Zayd's servant”, or by description, like “rational animal”, and this is the mainstay in the study of conceptions; and the non-restrictive composition, like “in the house” and “fifteen”. Section. The perception of the meanings of single words, of incomplete composites, of complete performative composites, of imagined composites and of doubted composites — all of these are conceptions; and the perception of the meaning of a report or proposition is assent. These are the discussions of words, as suits this place. And since assent depends on conception, we have put the account of conceptions before the account of assents.

فَصْلٌ. اللَّفْظُ الْمُرَكَّبُ قِسْمَانِ: تَامٌّ وَغَيْرُ تَامٍّ. فَالتَّامُّ مَا يَصِحُّ السُّكُوتُ عَلَيْهِ، أَيْ إِذَا سَكَتَ عَلَيْهِ الْمُتَكَلِّمُ لَمْ يَبْقَ لِلْمُخَاطَبِ انْتِظَارٌ، أَعْنِي الِانْتِظَارَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ مَعَ مَحْكُومٍ عَلَيْهِ بِلَا مَحْكُومٍ بِهِ أَوْ مَعَ مَحْكُومٍ بِهِ بِلَا مَحْكُومٍ عَلَيْهِ. وَالْمُرَكَّبُ التَّامُّ إِنِ احْتَمَلَ الصِّدْقَ وَالْكَذِبَ فِي نَفْسِهِ سُمِّيَ خَبَرًا وَقَضِيَّةً، وَهُوَ الْعُمْدَةُ فِي بَابِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَحْتَمِلْ سُمِّيَ إِنْشَاءً، سَوَاءٌ دَلَّ عَلَى الطَّلَبِ بِالذَّاتِ كَالْأَمْرِ وَالنَّهْيِ وَالِاسْتِفْهَامِ، أَوْ لَمْ يَدُلَّ كَالتَّمَنِّي وَالتَّرَجِّي وَالتَّعَجُّبِ وَالنِّدَاءِ وَنَحْوِهَا، وَهٰذَا الْقِسْمُ، أَعْنِي الْإِنْشَاءَ، مُعْتَبَرٌ فِي الْمُحَاوَرَاتِ. وَغَيْرُ التَّامِّ مَا لَا يَصِحُّ السُّكُوتُ عَلَيْهِ، وَيَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى التَّرْكِيبِ التَّقْيِيدِيِّ الَّذِي يَكُونُ الْجُزْءُ الثَّانِي فِيهِ قَيْدًا لِلْأَوَّلِ، إِمَّا بِالْإِضَافَةِ كَغُلَامِ زَيْدٍ، وَإِمَّا بِالْوَصْفِ كَالْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ، وَهُوَ الْعُمْدَةُ فِي بَابِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ، وَإِلَى التَّرْكِيبِ غَيْرِ التَّقْيِيدِيِّ كَفِي الدَّارِ وَخَمْسَةَ عَشَرَ. فَصْلٌ. إِدْرَاكُ مَعَانِي الْأَلْفَاظِ الْمُفْرَدَةِ، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَعَانِي الْمُرَكَّبَاتِ غَيْرِ التَّامَّةِ، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَعَانِي الْمُرَكَّبَاتِ التَّامَّةِ الْإِنْشَائِيَّةِ، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَعَانِي الْمُرَكَّبَاتِ الْمَوْهُومَةِ، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَعَانِي الْمُرَكَّبَاتِ الْمَشْكُوكَةِ، كُلُّ ذٰلِكَ تَصَوُّرَاتٌ، وَإِدْرَاكُ مَعْنَى الْخَبَرِ وَالْقَضِيَّةِ تَصْدِيقٌ. هٰذِهِ مَبَاحِثُ الْأَلْفَاظِ عَلَى مَا يُنَاسِبُ هٰذَا الْمَقَامَ. وَلَمَّا كَانَ التَّصْدِيقُ مَوْقُوفًا عَلَى التَّصَوُّرِ قَدَّمْنَا بَيَانَ أَحْوَالِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ عَلَى بَيَانِ أَحْوَالِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ.

Section. Whatever is conceived in the mind, if its very conception prevents its being shared by many, is called a real particular, like Zayd; and if its very conception does not prevent its being shared by many, it is called a universal, like man, and each of those many is called an individual of that universal and its relative particular. A relative particular may be a real particular, like Zayd with respect to man, or it may be a universal in itself but a relative particular of another universal, like man with respect to animal.

فَصْلٌ. كُلُّ مَا يُتَصَوَّرُ فِي الذِّهْنِ فَإِنْ كَانَ نَفْسُ تَصَوُّرِهِ مَانِعًا مِنْ وُقُوعِ الشَّرِكَةِ فِيهِ بَيْنَ كَثِيرِينَ سُمِّيَ جُزْئِيًّا حَقِيقِيًّا، كَزَيْدٍ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ نَفْسُ تَصَوُّرِهِ مَانِعًا مِنْ ذٰلِكَ سُمِّيَ كُلِّيًّا، كَالْإِنْسَانِ، وَيُسَمَّى كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ تِلْكَ الْكَثِيرِينَ أَفْرَادًا لِذٰلِكَ الْكُلِّيِّ وَجُزْئِيًّا إِضَافِيًّا لَهُ. وَالْجُزْئِيُّ الْإِضَافِيُّ قَدْ يَكُونُ جُزْئِيًّا حَقِيقِيًّا كَزَيْدٍ بِالْقِيَاسِ إِلَى الْإِنْسَانِ، وَقَدْ يَكُونُ كُلِّيًّا فِي نَفْسِهِ جُزْئِيًّا إِضَافِيًّا لِكُلِّيٍّ آخَرَ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ بِالْقِيَاسِ إِلَى الْحَيَوَانِ.

Section. When we compare a universal with the reality of its individuals, it is either the whole reality of its individuals, or a part of it, or outside it. The one that is the whole reality of its individuals is called a real species, like man, which is the whole quiddity of Zayd, ʿAmr, Bakr and Khālid, who are not set apart from one another except by particular individuating accidents that have no share in the reality and quiddity of man. Since the real species is the whole quiddity of its individuals, its individuals agree in reality, so whenever one or several of them is asked about with “what is it?”, that species is given in answer; so the species is a universal said of things that agree in reality in answer to “what is it?”: when one says “what are Zayd, ʿAmr and Bakr?”, the answer is “man”. The one that is a part of the reality of its individuals is called essential, and it is confined to genus and differentia, for that part of the reality of its individuals, if it is the whole of what is shared between this reality and another, is called a genus — and by “the whole of what is shared” is meant that no shared part between the two realities lies outside it, like animal, which is the whole of what is shared between the reality of man and the reality of horse, since man and horse share many essentials, such as substance, being receptive of the three dimensions, growing, sensing and moving by will, and “animal” stands for this whole. And since the genus is the whole of what is shared between things of different realities, whenever those things are asked about with “what are they?”, the genus is given in answer: asked about man and horse with “what are they?”, the answer is “animal”, because the question then is about the whole shared reality, which is animal; whereas if man alone is asked about with “what is it?”, the question is about his whole proper reality, and “animal” cannot be given in answer — the answer must be “rational animal”. From this it is known that the genus is a universal said of things of different realities in answer to “what is it?”.

فَصْلٌ. الْكُلِّيُّ إِذَا قِيسَ إِلَى حَقِيقَةِ أَفْرَادِهِ فَإِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ تَمَامَ حَقِيقَةِ أَفْرَادِهِ، أَوْ جُزْءًا مِنْهَا، أَوْ خَارِجًا عَنْهَا. فَالَّذِي هُوَ تَمَامُ حَقِيقَةِ أَفْرَادِهِ يُسَمَّى نَوْعًا حَقِيقِيًّا، كَالْإِنْسَانِ فَإِنَّهُ تَمَامُ مَاهِيَّةِ زَيْدٍ وَعَمْرٍو وَبَكْرٍ وَخَالِدٍ، وَلَا امْتِيَازَ لَهُمْ بَعْضِهِمْ عَنْ بَعْضٍ إِلَّا بِالْعَوَارِضِ الْمُشَخِّصَةِ الْمُعَيَّنَةِ الَّتِي لَا مَدْخَلَ لَهَا فِي حَقِيقَةِ الْإِنْسَانِ وَمَاهِيَّتِهِ. وَلَمَّا كَانَ النَّوْعُ الْحَقِيقِيُّ تَمَامَ مَاهِيَّةِ أَفْرَادِهِ كَانَتْ أَفْرَادُهُ مُتَّفِقَةَ الْحَقِيقَةِ، فَإِذَا سُئِلَ عَنْ فَرْدٍ مِنْهُ أَوْ أَفْرَادٍ بِمَا هُوَ قِيلَ ذٰلِكَ النَّوْعُ فِي الْجَوَابِ، فَالنَّوْعُ كُلِّيٌّ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيرِينَ مُتَّفِقِينَ بِالْحَقِيقَةِ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ، فَإِذَا قِيلَ: مَا زَيْدٌ وَعَمْرٌو وَبَكْرٌ؟ كَانَ الْجَوَابُ: الْإِنْسَانُ. وَالَّذِي هُوَ جُزْءُ حَقِيقَةِ أَفْرَادِهِ يُسَمَّى ذَاتِيًّا، وَهُوَ مُنْحَصِرٌ فِي الْجِنْسِ وَالْفَصْلِ؛ لِأَنَّ ذٰلِكَ الْجُزْءَ إِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ هٰذِهِ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَحَقِيقَةٍ أُخْرَى سُمِّيَ جِنْسًا، وَالْمُرَادُ بِتَمَامِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ أَلَّا يَكُونَ بَيْنَ الْحَقِيقَتَيْنِ جُزْءٌ مُشْتَرَكٌ خَارِجٌ عَنْهُ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ فَإِنَّهُ تَمَامُ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ حَقِيقَةِ الْإِنْسَانِ وَحَقِيقَةِ الْفَرَسِ، لِأَنَّهُمَا يَشْتَرِكَانِ فِي ذَاتِيَّاتٍ كَثِيرَةٍ كَالْجَوْهَرِ وَالْقَابِلِ لِلْأَبْعَادِ الثَّلَاثَةِ وَالنَّامِي وَالْحَسَّاسِ وَالْمُتَحَرِّكِ بِالْإِرَادَةِ، وَالْحَيَوَانُ عِبَارَةٌ عَنْ مَجْمُوعِ ذٰلِكَ. وَلَمَّا كَانَ الْجِنْسُ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ أُمُورٍ مُخْتَلِفَةِ الْحَقَائِقِ، فَإِذَا سُئِلَ عَنْ تِلْكَ الْأُمُورِ بِمَا هِيَ قِيلَ الْجِنْسُ فِي الْجَوَابِ، فَإِذَا سُئِلَ عَنِ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْفَرَسِ بِمَا هُمَا كَانَ الْجَوَابُ: الْحَيَوَانُ، لِأَنَّ السُّؤَالَ حِينَئِذٍ عَنْ تَمَامِ الْحَقِيقَةِ الْمُشْتَرَكَةِ وَهُوَ الْحَيَوَانُ، وَإِذَا سُئِلَ عَنِ الْإِنْسَانِ وَحْدَهُ بِمَا هُوَ كَانَ السُّؤَالُ عَنْ تَمَامِ حَقِيقَتِهِ الْمُخْتَصَّةِ بِهِ، فَلَا يَصِحُّ أَنْ يُقَالَ فِي الْجَوَابِ: الْحَيَوَانُ، بَلْ يُقَالُ: الْحَيَوَانُ النَّاطِقُ. فَعُلِمَ مِنْ هٰذَا أَنَّ الْجِنْسَ كُلِّيٌّ مَقُولٌ عَلَى أُمُورٍ مُخْتَلِفَةِ الْحَقَائِقِ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ.

A single reality may have several genera, some above others: like animal, which is the genus of man; above it is growing body, above growing body is body as such, and above body as such is substance. The genus given in answer for everything that shares with the thing in that genus is called the near genus, like animal: whatever shares animality with man, if you put it together with man in the question, the answer is “animal”. The genus that is not given in answer for everything that shares with the thing is called a far genus, like growing body, which is shared by man, the animals and the plants: it is said in answer to the question about man together with the plants, but not in answer to the question about man together with the other animals. Every genus whose answer for all that share with the thing comes at the second step is far by one rank, like growing body; if it comes at the third step it is far by two ranks, like body as such; and so on. The farthest of genera is called the highest genus, like substance in this example; the nearest of genera is called the lowest genus, like animal in this example; and what lies between the highest and the lowest is called an intermediate genus, like growing body and body as such in this example. This is the account of the part that is the whole of what is shared.

وَقَدْ تَكُونُ لِحَقِيقَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ أَجْنَاسٌ مُتَعَدِّدَةٌ بَعْضُهَا فَوْقَ بَعْضٍ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ فَإِنَّهُ جِنْسُ الْإِنْسَانِ، وَفَوْقَهُ الْجِسْمُ النَّامِي، وَفَوْقَ الْجِسْمِ النَّامِي الْجِسْمُ الْمُطْلَقُ، وَفَوْقَ الْجِسْمِ الْمُطْلَقِ الْجَوْهَرُ. فَالْجِنْسُ الَّذِي يَقَعُ فِي الْجَوَابِ عَنْ جَمِيعِ الْمُشَارِكَاتِ فِيهِ يُسَمَّى جِنْسًا قَرِيبًا، كَالْحَيَوَانِ، فَإِنَّ كُلَّ مَا يُشَارِكُ الْإِنْسَانَ فِي الْحَيَوَانِيَّةِ إِذَا جُمِعَ مَعَهُ فِي السُّؤَالِ كَانَ الْجَوَابُ الْحَيَوَانَ، وَالْجِنْسُ الَّذِي لَا يَقَعُ فِي الْجَوَابِ عَنْ جَمِيعِ الْمُشَارِكَاتِ يُسَمَّى جِنْسًا بَعِيدًا، كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْحَيَوَانَاتِ وَالنَّبَاتَاتِ، فَإِنَّهُ يُقَالُ فِي جَوَابِ السُّؤَالِ عَنِ الْإِنْسَانِ مَعَ النَّبَاتَاتِ، وَلَا يُقَالُ فِي جَوَابِ السُّؤَالِ عَنْهُ مَعَ سَائِرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ. وَكُلُّ جِنْسٍ كَانَ الْجَوَابُ بِهِ عَنْ جَمِيعِ الْمُشَارِكَاتِ فِي مَرْتَبَتَيْنِ فَهُوَ بَعِيدٌ بِمَرْتَبَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي، وَإِنْ كَانَ فِي ثَلَاثِ مَرَاتِبَ فَهُوَ بَعِيدٌ بِمَرْتَبَتَيْنِ كَالْجِسْمِ الْمُطْلَقِ، وَعَلَى هٰذَا الْقِيَاسُ. وَأَبْعَدُ الْأَجْنَاسِ يُسَمَّى الْجِنْسَ الْعَالِيَ كَالْجَوْهَرِ فِي الْمِثَالِ الْمَذْكُورِ، وَأَقْرَبُهَا يُسَمَّى الْجِنْسَ السَّافِلَ كَالْحَيَوَانِ فِيهِ، وَمَا بَيْنَ الْعَالِي وَالسَّافِلِ يُسَمَّى الْجِنْسَ الْمُتَوَسِّطَ كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي وَالْجِسْمِ الْمُطْلَقِ فِيهِ. هٰذَا بَيَانُ الْجُزْءِ الَّذِي هُوَ تَمَامُ الْمُشْتَرَكِ.

If that part of the reality of the individuals is not the whole of what is shared, it is called a differentia, because it sets the reality of the individuals apart from others with a substantial distinction: whether that part is not shared at all, like rational, which belongs only to the reality of the individuals of man and so sets this reality apart from all quiddities — and this is called the near differentia — or is shared but not the whole of what is shared, so that by it the reality is set apart from some quiddities only, like sensing — and this is called a far differentia. In short, the differentia is an essential, substantial distinguisher, so it is a universal given in answer to “which thing is it in its substance?”. Section. Know that species has another meaning, which is called the relative species: a quiddity of which, together with another quiddity, a genus is said in answer to “what is it?”, like man, of which and of horse “animal” is said in answer to “what is it?”. A relative species may be a real species, as we have said, or not, like animal, which is a relative species under growing body, and growing body under body, and body under substance.

وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ ذٰلِكَ الْجُزْءُ مِنْ حَقِيقَةِ الْأَفْرَادِ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ سُمِّيَ فَصْلًا، لِأَنَّهُ يُمَيِّزُ حَقِيقَةَ الْأَفْرَادِ عَنْ غَيْرِهَا تَمْيِيزًا جَوْهَرِيًّا، سَوَاءٌ لَمْ يَكُنْ ذٰلِكَ الْجُزْءُ مُشْتَرَكًا أَصْلًا كَالنَّاطِقِ الْمُخْتَصِّ بِحَقِيقَةِ أَفْرَادِ الْإِنْسَانِ، فَيُمَيِّزُ هٰذِهِ الْحَقِيقَةَ عَنْ جَمِيعِ الْمَاهِيَّاتِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْفَصْلَ الْقَرِيبَ، أَوْ كَانَ مُشْتَرَكًا لٰكِنْ لَيْسَ تَمَامَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ، فَيَتَمَيَّزُ بِهِ الْحَقِيقَةُ عَنْ بَعْضِ الْمَاهِيَّاتِ، كَالْحَسَّاسِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْفَصْلَ الْبَعِيدَ. وَبِالْجُمْلَةِ فَالْفَصْلُ مُمَيِّزٌ ذَاتِيٌّ جَوْهَرِيٌّ، فَهُوَ كُلِّيٌّ يَقَعُ فِي جَوَابِ: أَيُّ شَيْءٍ هُوَ فِي جَوْهَرِهِ؟ فَصْلٌ. اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ لِلنَّوْعِ مَعْنًى آخَرَ يُسَمَّى النَّوْعَ الْإِضَافِيَّ، وَهُوَ مَاهِيَّةٌ يُقَالُ عَلَيْهَا وَعَلَى غَيْرِهَا الْجِنْسُ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ فَإِنَّهُ يُقَالُ عَلَيْهِ وَعَلَى الْفَرَسِ الْحَيَوَانُ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ. وَالنَّوْعُ الْإِضَافِيُّ قَدْ يَكُونُ نَوْعًا حَقِيقِيًّا كَمَا قُلْنَا، وَقَدْ لَا يَكُونُ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ فَإِنَّهُ نَوْعٌ إِضَافِيٌّ لِلْجِسْمِ النَّامِي، وَالْجِسْمُ النَّامِي نَوْعٌ إِضَافِيٌّ لِلْجِسْمِ، وَالْجِسْمُ نَوْعٌ إِضَافِيٌّ لِلْجَوْهَرِ.

As for the universal that is outside the reality of the individuals: if it belongs to one reality only, it is called a property, and it sets the reality apart from others with an accidental distinction, so it is a universal said in answer to “which thing is it in its accident?”, like laughing with respect to man; and if it is shared by two realities or more, it is called a common accident, like walking, which is shared by man and the animals. So the universals are confined to five: species, genus, differentia, property and common accident. Section. The definer is of four kinds. First, the complete definition, made of the near genus and the near differentia, like “rational animal” in defining man. Second, the incomplete definition, made of a far genus and the near differentia, like “rational growing body”, “rational body” or “rational substance” in defining man. Third, the complete description, made of the near genus and a property, like “laughing animal” in defining man. Fourth, the incomplete description, made of a far genus and a property, like “laughing growing body”, “laughing body” or “laughing substance” in defining man; an incomplete description may also be made of a common accident and a property, like “laughing existent”, or of accidents alone that together belong to one reality only, like “walking on two feet, broad-nailed, bare-skinned, upright, laughing by nature” in defining man. And among the scholars of legal theory and of Arabic the definer, with all its kinds, is called ḥadd.

وَأَمَّا الْكُلِّيُّ الْخَارِجُ عَنْ حَقِيقَةِ الْأَفْرَادِ فَإِنْ كَانَ مُخْتَصًّا بِحَقِيقَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ سُمِّيَ خَاصَّةً، وَهِيَ تُمَيِّزُ الْحَقِيقَةَ عَنْ غَيْرِهَا تَمْيِيزًا عَرَضِيًّا، فَهِيَ كُلِّيٌّ يُقَالُ فِي جَوَابِ: أَيُّ شَيْءٍ هُوَ فِي عَرَضِهِ؟ كَالضَّاحِكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْإِنْسَانِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مُشْتَرَكًا بَيْنَ حَقِيقَتَيْنِ أَوْ أَكْثَرَ سُمِّيَ عَرَضًا عَامًّا، كَالْمَاشِي الْمُشْتَرَكِ بَيْنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْحَيَوَانَاتِ. فَانْحَصَرَتِ الْكُلِّيَّاتُ فِي خَمْسٍ: النَّوْعِ وَالْجِنْسِ وَالْفَصْلِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ وَالْعَرَضِ الْعَامِّ. فَصْلٌ. الْمُعَرِّفُ أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الْحَدُّ التَّامُّ، وَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيبِ وَالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيبِ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ فِي تَعْرِيفِ الْإِنْسَانِ. وَالثَّانِي الْحَدُّ النَّاقِصُ، وَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيدِ وَالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيبِ، كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي النَّاطِقِ أَوِ الْجِسْمِ النَّاطِقِ أَوِ الْجَوْهَرِ النَّاطِقِ فِي تَعْرِيفِهِ. وَالثَّالِثُ الرَّسْمُ التَّامُّ، وَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيبِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ الضَّاحِكِ فِي تَعْرِيفِهِ. وَالرَّابِعُ الرَّسْمُ النَّاقِصُ، وَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيدِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ، كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي الضَّاحِكِ أَوِ الْجِسْمِ الضَّاحِكِ أَوِ الْجَوْهَرِ الضَّاحِكِ فِي تَعْرِيفِهِ، وَقَدْ يَتَرَكَّبُ الرَّسْمُ النَّاقِصُ مِنَ الْعَرَضِ الْعَامِّ وَالْخَاصَّةِ كَالْمَوْجُودِ الضَّاحِكِ، وَقَدْ يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنْ عَرَضِيَّاتٍ فَقَطْ تَخْتَصُّ جُمْلَتُهَا بِحَقِيقَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ، كَقَوْلِنَا فِي تَعْرِيفِ الْإِنْسَانِ: مَاشٍ عَلَى قَدَمَيْهِ، عَرِيضُ الْأَظْفَارِ، بَادِي الْبَشَرَةِ، مُسْتَقِيمُ الْقَامَةِ، ضَحَّاكٌ بِالطَّبْعِ. وَعِنْدَ أَهْلِ الْأُصُولِ وَالْعَرَبِيَّةِ يُسَمَّى الْمُعَرِّفُ بِجَمِيعِ أَقْسَامِهِ حَدًّا.

Section. In definitions it is not allowed to use figurative or equivocal words, except when there is a clear contextual sign. Section. Know that knowing the realities of existing things, such as man, horse and the like, and telling apart the genera and differentiae of those realities, and their common accidents and properties, is extremely difficult; while knowing conventional concepts, and telling apart their genera and common accidents, and their differentiae and properties, is easy, like the concepts of word, noun, verb, particle, declinable, indeclinable and the like.

فَصْلٌ. لَا يَجُوزُ فِي التَّعْرِيفَاتِ اسْتِعْمَالُ الْأَلْفَاظِ الْمَجَازِيَّةِ وَالْمُشْتَرَكَةِ إِلَّا إِذَا كَانَتْ هُنَاكَ قَرِينَةٌ وَاضِحَةٌ. فَصْلٌ. اِعْلَمْ أَنَّ مَعْرِفَةَ حَقَائِقِ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَالْفَرَسِ وَنَحْوِهِمَا، وَالتَّمْيِيزَ بَيْنَ أَجْنَاسِ تِلْكَ الْحَقَائِقِ وَفُصُولِهَا، وَبَيْنَ أَعْرَاضِهَا الْعَامَّةِ وَخَوَاصِّهَا، فِي غَايَةِ الْإِشْكَالِ، وَأَمَّا مَعْرِفَةُ الْمَفْهُومَاتِ الِاصْطِلَاحِيَّةِ وَالتَّمْيِيزُ بَيْنَ أَجْنَاسِهَا وَأَعْرَاضِهَا الْعَامَّةِ، وَبَيْنَ فُصُولِهَا وَخَوَاصِّهَا، فَسَهْلٌ، كَمَفْهُومِ الْكَلِمَةِ وَالِاسْمِ وَالْفِعْلِ وَالْحَرْفِ وَالْمُعْرَبِ وَالْمَبْنِيِّ وَنَحْوِ ذٰلِكَ.

Section. Having finished the discussions of conceptions, we have begun on assents. Just as in gaining theoretical conceptions we needed two things — the account of what leads to another conception, which is the explanatory phrase with its kinds, the four definers, and the account of the five universals of which the explanatory phrase is made — so in gaining theoretical assents we need two things: the account of what leads to another assent, which is the proof with its kinds, and the account of the propositions of which the proof is made; and the account of propositions must come before that of the proof. So we say: a proposition is a statement whose speaker can rightly be called truthful or a liar. In meaning, a proposition is made of four things: the subject judged, the predicate judged, the judgemental relation, and the judgement, affirmative or negative. The difference between the judgemental relation and the judgement shows in doubt: there the judgemental relation is present and the judgement is not, for in it there is doubt and no judgement. A proposition is of three kinds — categorical, connective conditional and disjunctive conditional — for if the subject and predicate of a proposition are single words, or count as single, it is called categorical, whether affirmative, like “Zayd is standing”, or negative, like “Zayd is not standing”; and if they are not single and do not count as single, it is called conditional. Then, if the judgement is of connection, it is called a connective conditional, whether affirmative, as when you say “if the sun has risen, day exists”, or negative, as when you say “it is not so that if the sun has risen, night exists”; and if the judgement is of separation, it is called a disjunctive conditional, whether affirmative, as when you say “this number is either even or odd”, or negative, as when you say “it is not so that this number is either even or divisible into two equal halves”. Applying the names categorical, connective and disjunctive to the affirmatives is plain, and to the negatives because they resemble the affirmatives in their parts. Section. In a categorical proposition the subject judged is called the subject and the predicate judged the predicate, and the word that signifies the judgemental relation and the judgement together is called the copula, like the word “huwa” in “Zayd huwa qāʾim”, the word “ast” in “Zayd qāʾim ast”, and the kasra in “Zayd-i dabīr”; in short, whatever signifies the link between subject and predicate is called the copula. In a conditional proposition the subject judged is called the antecedent and the predicate judged the consequent.

فَصْلٌ. وَلَمَّا فَرَغْنَا مِنْ مَبَاحِثِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ شَرَعْنَا فِي التَّصْدِيقَاتِ. فَكَمَا احْتَجْنَا فِي تَحْصِيلِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ النَّظَرِيَّةِ إِلَى أَمْرَيْنِ: بَيَانِ الْمُوصِلِ إِلَى تَصَوُّرٍ آخَرَ، وَهُوَ الْقَوْلُ الشَّارِحُ بِأَقْسَامِهِ، أَعْنِي الْمُعَرِّفَاتِ الْأَرْبَعَةَ، وَبَيَانِ الْكُلِّيَّاتِ الْخَمْسِ الَّتِي يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنْهَا الْقَوْلُ الشَّارِحُ، كَذٰلِكَ نَحْتَاجُ فِي تَحْصِيلِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ النَّظَرِيَّةِ إِلَى أَمْرَيْنِ: بَيَانِ الْمُوصِلِ إِلَى تَصْدِيقٍ آخَرَ، وَهُوَ الْحُجَّةُ بِأَقْسَامِهَا، وَبَيَانِ الْقَضَايَا الَّتِي تَتَرَكَّبُ مِنْهَا الْحُجَّةُ، وَلَا بُدَّ مِنْ تَقْدِيمِ مَبَاحِثِ الْقَضَايَا عَلَى مَبَاحِثِ الْحُجَّةِ. فَنَقُولُ: الْقَضِيَّةُ قَوْلٌ يَصِحُّ أَنْ يُقَالَ لِقَائِلِهِ إِنَّهُ صَادِقٌ فِيهِ أَوْ كَاذِبٌ. وَهِيَ بِحَسَبِ الْمَعْنَى مُرَكَّبَةٌ مِنْ أَرْبَعَةِ أَشْيَاءَ: الْمَحْكُومِ عَلَيْهِ، وَالْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ، وَالنِّسْبَةِ الْحُكْمِيَّةِ، وَالْحُكْمِ إِيجَابًا أَوْ سَلْبًا. وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ النِّسْبَةِ الْحُكْمِيَّةِ وَالْحُكْمِ يَظْهَرُ فِي صُورَةِ الشَّكِّ، فَإِنَّ النِّسْبَةَ الْحُكْمِيَّةَ مَوْجُودَةٌ فِيهَا وَالْحُكْمَ لَيْسَ بِمَوْجُودٍ، إِذْ فِيهَا شَكٌّ وَلَا حُكْمَ. وَالْقَضِيَّةُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: حَمْلِيَّةٌ وَشَرْطِيَّةٌ مُتَّصِلَةٌ وَشَرْطِيَّةٌ مُنْفَصِلَةٌ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمَحْكُومَ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمَحْكُومَ بِهِ إِنْ كَانَا مُفْرَدَيْنِ أَوْ فِي حُكْمِ الْمُفْرَدَيْنِ سُمِّيَتِ الْقَضِيَّةُ حَمْلِيَّةً، مُوجَبَةً كَانَتْ كَقَوْلِنَا: زَيْدٌ قَائِمٌ، أَوْ سَالِبَةً كَقَوْلِنَا: زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِقَائِمٍ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُونَا مُفْرَدَيْنِ وَلَا فِي حُكْمِهِمَا سُمِّيَتْ شَرْطِيَّةً؛ فَإِنْ كَانَ الْحُكْمُ فِيهَا بِالِاتِّصَالِ سُمِّيَتْ شَرْطِيَّةً مُتَّصِلَةً، مُوجَبَةً كَقَوْلِكَ: إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَالنَّهَارُ مَوْجُودٌ، أَوْ سَالِبَةً كَقَوْلِكَ: لَيْسَ إِنْ كَانَتِ الشَّمْسُ طَالِعَةً فَاللَّيْلُ مَوْجُودٌ، وَإِنْ كَانَ الْحُكْمُ بِالِانْفِصَالِ سُمِّيَتْ شَرْطِيَّةً مُنْفَصِلَةً، مُوجَبَةً كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ أَوْ فَرْدٌ، أَوْ سَالِبَةً كَقَوْلِكَ: لَيْسَ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ زَوْجًا أَوْ مُنْقَسِمًا بِمُتَسَاوِيَيْنِ. وَإِطْلَاقُ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَالْمُتَّصِلَةِ وَالْمُنْفَصِلَةِ عَلَى الْمُوجَبَاتِ ظَاهِرٌ، وَعَلَى السَّوَالِبِ لِمُنَاسَبَتِهَا لِلْمُوجَبَاتِ فِي الْأَطْرَافِ. فَصْلٌ. يُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْقَضِيَّةِ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ مَوْضُوعًا، وَالْمَحْكُومُ بِهِ مَحْمُولًا، وَاللَّفْظُ الدَّالُّ عَلَى النِّسْبَةِ الْحُكْمِيَّةِ وَالْحُكْمِ مَعًا رَابِطَةً، كَلَفْظِ «هُوَ» فِي: زَيْدٌ هُوَ قَائِمٌ، وَلَفْظِ «اَسْت» فِي الْفَارِسِيَّةِ، وَحَرَكَةِ الْكَسْرَةِ فِي «زَيدِ دَبِير»، وَبِالْجُمْلَةِ كُلُّ مَا دَلَّ عَلَى الرَّبْطِ بَيْنَ الْمَوْضُوعِ وَالْمَحْمُولِ يُسَمَّى رَابِطَةً. وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ فِي الشَّرْطِيَّةِ مُقَدَّمًا، وَالْمَحْكُومُ بِهِ تَالِيًا.

Section. If the subject of a categorical proposition is a real particular, the proposition is called personal, like “Zayd is a writer” and “Zayd is not a writer”. If it is a universal, then if the quantity of the individuals is not stated the proposition is called neglected, like “man is a writer” and “man is not a writer”; and if the quantity of the individuals is stated it is called quantified, and this is of four kinds: universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular negative. Section. Personal propositions do not count in the sciences, and the neglected proposition has the force of the particular quantified one; so the propositions that count in the philosophical sciences are the four quantified ones. Section. When the word of negation becomes part of the predicate of a proposition, the proposition is called metathetic, like “Zayd is a non-writer”; and when it does not become part of it, it is called plain, like “Zayd is not a writer”.

فَصْلٌ. الْمَوْضُوعُ فِي الْقَضِيَّةِ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ إِنْ كَانَ جُزْئِيًّا حَقِيقِيًّا سُمِّيَتِ الْقَضِيَّةُ شَخْصِيَّةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ، وَزَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ، وَإِنْ كَانَ كُلِّيًّا فَإِنْ لَمْ يُبَيَّنْ فِيهَا كَمِّيَّةُ الْأَفْرَادِ سُمِّيَتْ مُهْمَلَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: الْإِنْسَانُ كَاتِبٌ، وَالْإِنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ، وَإِنْ بُيِّنَتْ كَمِّيَّةُ الْأَفْرَادِ سُمِّيَتْ مَحْصُورَةً، وَهِيَ أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: مُوجَبَةٌ كُلِّيَّةٌ، وَسَالِبَةٌ كُلِّيَّةٌ، وَمُوجَبَةٌ جُزْئِيَّةٌ، وَسَالِبَةٌ جُزْئِيَّةٌ. فَصْلٌ. الْقَضَايَا الشَّخْصِيَّةُ غَيْرُ مُعْتَبَرَةٍ فِي الْعُلُومِ، وَالْمُهْمَلَةُ فِي قُوَّةِ الْمَحْصُورَةِ الْجُزْئِيَّةِ، فَالْقَضَايَا الْمُعْتَبَرَةُ فِي الْعُلُومِ الْحِكْمِيَّةِ هِيَ الْمَحْصُورَاتُ الْأَرْبَعُ. فَصْلٌ. حَرْفُ السَّلْبِ فِي الْقَضِيَّةِ إِذَا جُعِلَ جُزْءًا مِنَ الْمَحْمُولِ سُمِّيَتِ الْقَضِيَّةُ مَعْدُولَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: زَيْدٌ لَا كَاتِبٌ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يُجْعَلْ جُزْءًا مِنْهُ سُمِّيَتْ مُحَصَّلَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: زَيْدٌ لَيْسَ بِكَاتِبٍ.

Section. The relation of the predicate to the subject, affirmative or negative, may be necessary, that is, impossible to separate; then the proposition is called absolute necessary, like “every man is an animal by necessity” and “no man is a stone by necessity”. Or necessity may be removed from both sides; then it is called special possible, like “every man is a writer by special possibility” and “no man is a writer by special possibility” — the affirmative and the negative mean the same, namely that neither the writing of man nor its absence is necessary to him. Or it may be removed from one side, the side opposite to the judgement; then it is called general possible, like “every man is a writer by general possibility”, that is, the absence of writing from man is not necessary, and “no man is a writer by general possibility”, that is, writing is not necessary to man. It may be by perpetuity, that is, always, without regard to necessity; then it is called absolute perpetual, like “every sphere is moving, always”. And it may be in fact, that is, at some time; then it is called general absolute, like “every man is breathing, in fact”. Section. The conversion of a categorical proposition is making the predicate the subject and the subject the predicate in such a way that affirmation, negation and the truth of the original are kept. So the universal affirmative converts into a particular affirmative: whenever “every man is an animal” is true, “some animal is a man” is true. Likewise the particular affirmative converts into a particular affirmative: if “some animal is a man” is true, “some man is an animal” is true too, because subject and predicate have met in the subject's person; and since the predicate may be wider, the converse is not true as a universal. The universal negative converts like itself when it is necessary: whenever “no man is a stone, by necessity” is true, “no stone is a man, by necessity” is true. And the particular negative has no necessary converse, for “some animal is not a man” is true, but its converse, “some man is not an animal”, is not true.

فَصْلٌ. نِسْبَةُ الْمَحْمُولِ إِلَى الْمَوْضُوعِ، إِيجَابًا كَانَتْ أَوْ سَلْبًا، قَدْ تَكُونُ ضَرُورِيَّةً، أَيْ مُسْتَحِيلَةَ الِانْفِكَاكِ، فَتُسَمَّى الْقَضِيَّةُ ضَرُورِيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيَوَانٌ بِالضَّرُورَةِ، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَجَرٍ بِالضَّرُورَةِ. وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْحُكْمُ بِسَلْبِ الضَّرُورَةِ عَنِ الطَّرَفَيْنِ، فَتُسَمَّى مُمْكِنَةً خَاصَّةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ كَاتِبٌ بِالْإِمْكَانِ الْخَاصِّ، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِكَاتِبٍ بِالْإِمْكَانِ الْخَاصِّ، وَمَعْنَى الْمُوجَبَةِ وَالسَّالِبَةِ وَاحِدٌ، وَهُوَ أَنَّ ثُبُوتَ الْكِتَابَةِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَسَلْبَهَا عَنْهُ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مِنْهُمَا ضَرُورِيًّا. وَقَدْ يَكُونُ بِسَلْبِهَا عَنْ طَرَفٍ وَاحِدٍ، وَهُوَ الطَّرَفُ الْمُخَالِفُ لِلْحُكْمِ، فَتُسَمَّى مُمْكِنَةً عَامَّةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ كَاتِبٌ بِالْإِمْكَانِ الْعَامِّ، أَيْ سَلْبُ الْكِتَابَةِ عَنْهُ لَيْسَ بِضَرُورِيٍّ، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِكَاتِبٍ بِالْإِمْكَانِ الْعَامِّ، أَيْ ثُبُوتُهَا لَهُ لَيْسَ بِضَرُورِيٍّ. وَقَدْ يَكُونُ بِالدَّوَامِ، أَيْ دَائِمًا مِنْ غَيْرِ اعْتِبَارِ الضَّرُورَةِ، فَتُسَمَّى دَائِمَةً مُطْلَقَةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ فَلَكٍ مُتَحَرِّكٌ دَائِمًا. وَقَدْ يَكُونُ بِالْفِعْلِ، أَيْ فِي الْجُمْلَةِ، فَتُسَمَّى مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ مُتَنَفِّسٌ بِالْفِعْلِ. فَصْلٌ. عَكْسُ الْقَضِيَّةِ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ أَنْ يُجْعَلَ الْمَحْمُولُ مَوْضُوعًا وَالْمَوْضُوعُ مَحْمُولًا عَلَى وَجْهٍ يُحْفَظُ فِيهِ الْإِيجَابُ وَالسَّلْبُ وَصِدْقُ الْأَصْلِ. فَالْمُوجَبَةُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ تَنْعَكِسُ مُوجَبَةً جُزْئِيَّةً، فَإِذَا صَدَقَ: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيَوَانٌ، صَدَقَ: بَعْضُ الْحَيَوَانِ إِنْسَانٌ، وَكَذٰلِكَ الْمُوجَبَةُ الْجُزْئِيَّةُ تَنْعَكِسُ مُوجَبَةً جُزْئِيَّةً، فَإِذَا صَدَقَ: بَعْضُ الْحَيَوَانِ إِنْسَانٌ، صَدَقَ: بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ حَيَوَانٌ، لِأَنَّ الْمَوْضُوعَ وَالْمَحْمُولَ قَدْ تَلَاقَيَا فِي ذَاتِ الْمَوْضُوعِ، وَلَمَّا جَازَ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمَحْمُولُ أَعَمَّ لَمْ يَصْدُقِ الْعَكْسُ كُلِّيًّا. وَالسَّالِبَةُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ تَنْعَكِسُ كَنَفْسِهَا إِذَا كَانَتْ ضَرُورِيَّةً، فَإِذَا صَدَقَ: لَا شَيْءَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَجَرٍ بِالضَّرُورَةِ، صَدَقَ: لَا شَيْءَ مِنَ الْحَجَرِ بِإِنْسَانٍ بِالضَّرُورَةِ. وَأَمَّا السَّالِبَةُ الْجُزْئِيَّةُ فَلَا يَلْزَمُهَا عَكْسٌ، لِأَنَّ قَوْلَنَا: لَيْسَ بَعْضُ الْحَيَوَانِ بِإِنْسَانٍ، صَادِقٌ، وَعَكْسُهُ: لَيْسَ بَعْضُ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَيَوَانٍ، غَيْرُ صَادِقٍ.

Section. The contradictory of a proposition is another proposition that differs from it in negation and affirmation, in universality and particularity, and in modality, in such a way that the truth of each in itself entails the falsehood of the other, and the falsehood of each in itself entails the truth of the other. So the contradictory of the universal affirmative is the particular negative, and the contradictory of the universal negative is the particular affirmative. Section. A connective conditional is necessary (luzūmiyya) if the connection, or its denial, is necessary, as has been seen; and coincidental (ittifāqiyya) if the connection, or its denial, is not necessary, as in “if man is rational, the donkey brays”. A disjunctive is real if the separation holds in being and not being, like “this number is either even or odd”, that is, the two are neither found together nor both absent; or it excludes being together if the separation holds in being only, as when you say “this thing is either a tree or a stone”, that is, the two are not found together, but both may be absent; or it excludes being absent if the separation holds in not being only, as when you say “Zayd is either in the sea or does not drown”, that is, the two are not both absent, but they may be found together. Section. Contradiction and conversion among conditionals are known by analogy with categoricals.

فَصْلٌ. نَقِيضُ الْقَضِيَّةِ قَضِيَّةٌ أُخْرَى تُخَالِفُهَا فِي السَّلْبِ وَالْإِيجَابِ وَفِي الْكُلِّيَّةِ وَالْجُزْئِيَّةِ وَفِي الْجِهَةِ، بِحَيْثُ يَسْتَلْزِمُ صِدْقُ كُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا لِذَاتِهِ كَذِبَ الْأُخْرَى، وَكَذِبُ كُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا لِذَاتِهِ صِدْقَ الْأُخْرَى. فَنَقِيضُ الْمُوجَبَةِ الْكُلِّيَّةِ السَّالِبَةُ الْجُزْئِيَّةُ، وَنَقِيضُ السَّالِبَةِ الْكُلِّيَّةِ الْمُوجَبَةُ الْجُزْئِيَّةُ. فَصْلٌ. الشَّرْطِيَّةُ الْمُتَّصِلَةُ لُزُومِيَّةٌ إِنْ كَانَ الِاتِّصَالُ أَوْ سَلْبُهُ ضَرُورِيًّا كَمَا مَرَّ، وَاتِّفَاقِيَّةٌ إِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ الِاتِّصَالُ أَوْ سَلْبُهُ ضَرُورِيًّا، كَقَوْلِنَا: إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا فَالْحِمَارُ نَاهِقٌ. وَالْمُنْفَصِلَةُ إِمَّا حَقِيقِيَّةٌ إِنْ كَانَ الِانْفِصَالُ فِي الْوُجُودِ وَالْعَدَمِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ أَوْ فَرْدٌ، أَيْ لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ وَلَا يَرْتَفِعَانِ، وَإِمَّا مَانِعَةُ الْجَمْعِ إِنْ كَانَ الِانْفِصَالُ فِي الْوُجُودِ فَقَطْ، كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الشَّيْءُ إِمَّا شَجَرٌ أَوْ حَجَرٌ، أَيْ لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ وَلٰكِنْ قَدْ يَرْتَفِعَانِ، وَإِمَّا مَانِعَةُ الْخُلُوِّ إِنْ كَانَ الِانْفِصَالُ فِي الْعَدَمِ فَقَطْ، كَقَوْلِكَ: زَيْدٌ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ فِي الْبَحْرِ وَإِمَّا أَلَّا يَغْرَقَ، أَيْ لَا يَرْتَفِعَانِ وَلٰكِنْ قَدْ يَجْتَمِعَانِ. فَصْلٌ. وَيُعْلَمُ التَّنَاقُضُ وَالْعَكْسُ فِي الشَّرْطِيَّاتِ عَلَى قِيَاسِ الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ.

Proof is of three kinds. The first is the syllogism, which is arguing from the state of a universal to the state of a particular, as when you say “every man is an animal, and every animal is a body, so every man is a body”: you have argued from the state of animal, which is a universal, to the state of its particular, which is man. The second is induction, which is arguing from the state of particulars to the state of the universal, as when you say “each of man, birds and beasts moves the lower jaw in chewing, so every animal is thus”: you have argued from the state of the particulars of animal — man, beasts and birds — to the state of animal, which is their universal. The third is analogy, which is arguing from the state of one particular to the state of another, as when you say “nabīdh is forbidden because wine is forbidden, since both are particulars of what intoxicates”. Section. Induction and analogy give probable belief, and the syllogism gives certainty; so the mainstay in gaining assents is the syllogism, which is a statement composed of propositions from which another statement follows of itself, as when you say “the world changes, and whatever changes came to be”, from which it follows that the world came to be. The syllogism is of two kinds: conjunctive, in which neither the conclusion nor its contradictory is stated as such, as has been mentioned; and exceptive, in which the conclusion or its contradictory is stated as such, as when you say “if this is a man, it is an animal; but it is a man, so it is an animal”, or “but it is not an animal, so it is not a man”.

الْحُجَّةُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الْقِيَاسُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ الْكُلِّيِّ عَلَى حَالِ الْجُزْئِيِّ، كَقَوْلِكَ: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيَوَانٌ، وَكُلُّ حَيَوَانٍ جِسْمٌ، فَكُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ جِسْمٌ، فَقَدِ اسْتَدْلَلْتَ بِحَالِ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ كُلِّيٌّ عَلَى حَالِ جُزْئِيِّهِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْإِنْسَانُ. وَالثَّانِي الِاسْتِقْرَاءُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ الْجُزْئِيَّاتِ عَلَى حَالِ الْكُلِّيِّ، كَقَوْلِكَ: كُلٌّ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالطُّيُورِ وَالْبَهَائِمِ يُحَرِّكُ فَكَّهُ الْأَسْفَلَ عِنْدَ الْمَضْغِ، فَكُلُّ حَيَوَانٍ كَذٰلِكَ، فَقَدِ اسْتَدْلَلْتَ بِحَالِ جُزْئِيَّاتِ الْحَيَوَانِ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْبَهَائِمِ وَالطُّيُورِ عَلَى حَالِ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ كُلِّيُّهَا. وَالثَّالِثُ التَّمْثِيلُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ جُزْئِيٍّ عَلَى حَالِ جُزْئِيٍّ آخَرَ، كَقَوْلِكَ: النَّبِيذُ حَرَامٌ لِأَنَّ الْخَمْرَ حَرَامٌ، إِذْ كِلَاهُمَا جُزْئِيٌّ مِنْ جُزْئِيَّاتِ الْمُسْكِرِ. فَصْلٌ. الِاسْتِقْرَاءُ وَالتَّمْثِيلُ يُفِيدَانِ الظَّنَّ، وَالْقِيَاسُ يُفِيدُ الْيَقِينَ، فَالْعُمْدَةُ فِي تَحْصِيلِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ الْقِيَاسُ، وَهُوَ قَوْلٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ قَضَايَا يَلْزَمُ عَنْهُ لِذَاتِهِ قَوْلٌ آخَرُ، كَقَوْلِكَ: الْعَالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حَادِثٌ، فَيَلْزَمُ أَنَّ الْعَالَمَ حَادِثٌ. وَالْقِيَاسُ قِسْمَانِ: اقْتِرَانِيٌّ لَا تُذْكَرُ فِيهِ النَّتِيجَةُ وَلَا نَقِيضُهَا بِالْفِعْلِ كَمَا مَرَّ، وَاسْتِثْنَائِيٌّ تُذْكَرُ فِيهِ النَّتِيجَةُ أَوْ نَقِيضُهَا بِالْفِعْلِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: إِنْ كَانَ هٰذَا إِنْسَانًا فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ إِنْسَانٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، أَوْ: لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوَانٍ فَلَيْسَ بِإِنْسَانٍ.

Section. A conjunctive syllogism is either categorical, that is, made of categoricals alone, or not categorical; the first kind is the clearer, so we confine ourselves to it. It is of four kinds, because when the relation between subject and predicate is unknown, there is need of a middle that has a relation to both sides, so that through it the relation between the subject of what is sought and its predicate becomes known. This is called the middle term, just as the subject of what is sought is called the minor term and its predicate the major term. If the middle term is the predicate of the minor and the subject of the major, it is called the first figure; if the reverse, the fourth figure; if it is the predicate of both, the second figure; and if it is the subject of both, the third figure. Section. The condition for the first figure to produce a conclusion is that its minor premise, the proposition that contains the minor term, be affirmative, so that the individuals of the minor fall under the middle; and that its major premise, the proposition that contains the major term, be universal, so that the judgement passes from the middle to the minor with certainty. So the minor premise of the first figure is always affirmative and its major universal, and its productive moods are four: first, two universal affirmatives, concluding a universal affirmative; second, a particular affirmative minor with a universal affirmative major, concluding a particular affirmative; third, a universal affirmative minor with a universal negative major, concluding a universal negative; fourth, a particular affirmative minor with a universal negative major, concluding a particular negative. So the first figure produces all four quantified propositions.

فَصْلٌ. الْقِيَاسُ الِاقْتِرَانِيُّ إِمَّا حَمْلِيٌّ، أَيْ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنَ الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ الصِّرْفَةِ، وَإِمَّا غَيْرُ حَمْلِيٍّ، وَالْقِسْمُ الْأَوَّلُ أَظْهَرُ فَنَقْتَصِرُ عَلَيْهِ. وَهُوَ أَرْبَعَةُ أَنْوَاعٍ؛ لِأَنَّ النِّسْبَةَ بَيْنَ الْمَوْضُوعِ وَالْمَحْمُولِ إِذَا كَانَتْ مَجْهُولَةً احْتِيجَ إِلَى مُتَوَسِّطٍ لَهُ نِسْبَةٌ إِلَى كِلَا الطَّرَفَيْنِ، لِيُعْلَمَ بِوَاسِطَتِهِ النِّسْبَةُ بَيْنَ مَوْضُوعِ الْمَطْلُوبِ وَمَحْمُولِهِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْحَدَّ الْأَوْسَطَ، كَمَا يُسَمَّى مَوْضُوعُ الْمَطْلُوبِ أَصْغَرَ وَمَحْمُولُهُ أَكْبَرَ. فَالْحَدُّ الْأَوْسَطُ إِنْ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا لِلْأَصْغَرِ مَوْضُوعًا لِلْأَكْبَرِ سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الْأَوَّلَ، وَإِنْ كَانَ بِالْعَكْسِ سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الرَّابِعَ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا لَهُمَا سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الثَّانِيَ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْضُوعًا لَهُمَا سُمِّيَ الشَّكْلَ الثَّالِثَ. فَصْلٌ. شَرْطُ إِنْتَاجِ الشَّكْلِ الْأَوَّلِ أَنْ تَكُونَ صُغْرَاهُ، أَعْنِي الْقَضِيَّةَ الْمُشْتَمِلَةَ عَلَى الْأَصْغَرِ، مُوجَبَةً، لِتَنْدَرِجَ أَفْرَادُ الْأَصْغَرِ تَحْتَ الْأَوْسَطِ، وَأَنْ تَكُونَ كُبْرَاهُ، أَعْنِي الْقَضِيَّةَ الْمُشْتَمِلَةَ عَلَى الْأَكْبَرِ، كُلِّيَّةً، لِيَتَعَدَّى الْحُكْمُ مِنَ الْأَوْسَطِ إِلَى الْأَصْغَرِ يَقِينًا. فَصُغْرَى الشَّكْلِ الْأَوَّلِ مُوجَبَةٌ أَبَدًا وَكُبْرَاهُ كُلِّيَّةٌ، وَضُرُوبُهُ الْمُنْتِجَةُ أَرْبَعَةٌ: الْأَوَّلُ مِنْ مُوجَبَتَيْنِ كُلِّيَّتَيْنِ، وَالنَّتِيجَةُ مُوجَبَةٌ كُلِّيَّةٌ، وَالثَّانِي مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَمُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، وَالنَّتِيجَةُ مُوجَبَةٌ جُزْئِيَّةٌ، وَالثَّالِثُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، وَالنَّتِيجَةُ سَالِبَةٌ كُلِّيَّةٌ، وَالرَّابِعُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، وَالنَّتِيجَةُ سَالِبَةٌ جُزْئِيَّةٌ. فَالشَّكْلُ الْأَوَّلُ يُنْتِجُ الْمَحْصُورَاتِ الْأَرْبَعَ.

The condition of the second figure is that its two premises differ in affirmation and negation, one affirmative and the other negative, and that its major be universal. Its productive moods are also four. First, a universal affirmative minor and a universal negative major, as in “every C is B, and no A is B, so no C is A”. Second, the reverse of this, as in “no C is B, and every A is B, so no C is A”. Third, a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative major, as in “some C is B, and no A is B, so some C is not A”. Fourth, a particular negative minor and a universal affirmative major, as in “some C is not B, and every A is B, so some C is not A”. So the conclusion of the second figure is only negative, universal or particular. The condition of the third figure is that its minor be affirmative and one of its two premises universal. Its moods are six: three conclude a particular affirmative and three a particular negative. The three that conclude a particular affirmative: first, two universal affirmatives, as in “every B is C, and every B is A”; second, a particular affirmative minor and a universal affirmative major, as in “some B is C, and every B is A”; third, a universal affirmative minor and a particular affirmative major, as in “every B is C, and some B is A”; the conclusion of these three moods is “some C is A”. The three that conclude a particular negative: first, a universal affirmative minor and a universal negative major, as in “every B is C, and no B is A”; second, a particular affirmative minor and a universal negative major, as in “some B is C, and no B is A”; third, a universal affirmative minor and a particular negative major, as in “every B is C, and some B is not A”; the conclusion of these three moods is “some C is not A”. The fourth figure is far from nature, so we have left it out here.

وَشَرْطُ الشَّكْلِ الثَّانِي أَنْ تَخْتَلِفَ مُقَدِّمَتَاهُ فِي الْإِيجَابِ وَالسَّلْبِ، فَتَكُونَ إِحْدَاهُمَا مُوجَبَةً وَالْأُخْرَى سَالِبَةً، وَأَنْ تَكُونَ كُبْرَاهُ كُلِّيَّةً، وَضُرُوبُهُ الْمُنْتِجَةُ أَيْضًا أَرْبَعَةٌ: الْأَوَّلُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ج ب، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ أ ب، فَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ج أ. وَالثَّانِي عَكْسُهُ، كَقَوْلِنَا: لَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ج ب، وَكُلُّ أ ب، فَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ج أ. وَالثَّالِثُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: بَعْضُ ج ب، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ أ ب، فَبَعْضُ ج لَيْسَ أ. وَالرَّابِعُ مِنْ سَالِبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَمُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: بَعْضُ ج لَيْسَ ب، وَكُلُّ أ ب، فَبَعْضُ ج لَيْسَ أ. فَنَتِيجَةُ الشَّكْلِ الثَّانِي لَا تَكُونُ إِلَّا سَالِبَةً، إِمَّا كُلِّيَّةً وَإِمَّا جُزْئِيَّةً. وَشَرْطُ الشَّكْلِ الثَّالِثِ أَنْ تَكُونَ صُغْرَاهُ مُوجَبَةً، وَأَنْ تَكُونَ إِحْدَى مُقَدِّمَتَيْهِ كُلِّيَّةً، وَضُرُوبُهُ سِتَّةٌ: ثَلَاثَةٌ تُنْتِجُ الْإِيجَابَ الْجُزْئِيَّ، وَثَلَاثَةٌ تُنْتِجُ السَّلْبَ الْجُزْئِيَّ. فَالثَّلَاثَةُ الْمُنْتِجَةُ لِلْإِيجَابِ الْجُزْئِيِّ: الْأَوَّلُ مِنْ مُوجَبَتَيْنِ كُلِّيَّتَيْنِ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب ج، وَكُلُّ ب أ، وَالثَّانِي مِنْ صُغْرَى مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ وَكُبْرَى مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ، كَقَوْلِنَا: بَعْضُ ب ج، وَكُلُّ ب أ، وَالثَّالِثُ مِنْ صُغْرَى مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ وَكُبْرَى مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب ج، وَبَعْضُ ب أ، وَنَتِيجَةُ هٰذِهِ الضُّرُوبِ الثَّلَاثَةِ: بَعْضُ ج أ. وَالثَّلَاثَةُ الْمُنْتِجَةُ لِلسَّلْبِ الْجُزْئِيِّ: الْأَوَّلُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب ج، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ب أ، وَالثَّانِي مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: بَعْضُ ب ج، وَلَا شَيْءَ مِنْ ب أ، وَالثَّالِثُ مِنْ مُوجَبَةٍ كُلِّيَّةٍ صُغْرَى وَسَالِبَةٍ جُزْئِيَّةٍ كُبْرَى، كَقَوْلِنَا: كُلُّ ب ج، وَبَعْضُ ب لَيْسَ أ، وَنَتِيجَةُ هٰذِهِ الضُّرُوبِ الثَّلَاثَةِ: بَعْضُ ج لَيْسَ أ. وَأَمَّا الشَّكْلُ الرَّابِعُ فَبَعِيدٌ عَنِ الطَّبْعِ، فَأَسْقَطْنَاهُ هٰهُنَا.

The exceptive syllogism is of two kinds, connective and disjunctive. The connective is made of a necessary connective with the affirmation of the antecedent, and its conclusion is the affirmation of the consequent, as when you say “if this body is a man, it is an animal; but it is a man, so it is an animal”; or of a necessary connective with the denial of the consequent, and its conclusion is the denial of the antecedent, as when you say in the same example “but it is not an animal, so it is not a man”. The disjunctive is made of a real disjunctive with the affirmation of one of its two parts, whose conclusion is the denial of the other part, or with the denial of one of its two parts, whose conclusion is the affirmation of the other part; so it has four conclusions, as when you say “this number is either even or odd; but it is even, so it is not odd; but it is odd, so it is not even; but it is not even, so it is odd; but it is not odd, so it is even”. Or it is made of a disjunctive that excludes being together with the affirmation of one of its parts, whose conclusion is the denial of the other; so it has two conclusions, as when you say “this body is either a tree or a stone; but it is a tree, so it is not a stone; but it is a stone, so it is not a tree”. Or it is made of a disjunctive that excludes being absent with the denial of one of its parts, whose conclusion is the affirmation of the other; so it too has two conclusions, as when you say “this body is either not a stone or not a tree; but it is a stone, so it is not a tree; but it is a tree, so it is not a stone”. Here ends the Kubrā on the science of logic.

الْقِيَاسُ الِاسْتِثْنَائِيُّ قِسْمَانِ: اتِّصَالِيٌّ وَانْفِصَالِيٌّ. فَالِاتِّصَالِيُّ مَا تَرَكَّبَ مِنْ مُتَّصِلَةٍ لُزُومِيَّةٍ مَعَ وَضْعِ الْمُقَدَّمِ، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ وَضْعُ التَّالِي، كَقَوْلِكَ: إِنْ كَانَ هٰذَا الْجِسْمُ إِنْسَانًا فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ إِنْسَانٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، أَوْ مِنْ مُتَّصِلَةٍ لُزُومِيَّةٍ مَعَ رَفْعِ التَّالِي، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ رَفْعُ الْمُقَدَّمِ، كَقَوْلِكَ فِي الْمِثَالِ الْمَذْكُورِ: لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوَانٍ فَلَيْسَ بِإِنْسَانٍ. وَالِانْفِصَالِيُّ مَا تَرَكَّبَ مِنْ مُنْفَصِلَةٍ حَقِيقِيَّةٍ مَعَ وَضْعِ أَحَدِ الْجُزْأَيْنِ، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ رَفْعُ الْجُزْءِ الْآخَرِ، أَوْ مَعَ رَفْعِ أَحَدِهِمَا، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ وَضْعُ الْآخَرِ، فَلَهُ أَرْبَعُ نَتَائِجَ، كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الْعَدَدُ إِمَّا زَوْجٌ أَوْ فَرْدٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ زَوْجٌ فَلَيْسَ بِفَرْدٍ، لٰكِنَّهُ فَرْدٌ فَلَيْسَ بِزَوْجٍ، لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِزَوْجٍ فَهُوَ فَرْدٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِفَرْدٍ فَهُوَ زَوْجٌ. أَوْ تَرَكَّبَ مِنْ مُنْفَصِلَةٍ مَانِعَةِ الْجَمْعِ مَعَ وَضْعِ أَحَدِ جُزْأَيْهَا، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ رَفْعُ الْآخَرِ، فَلَهُ نَتِيجَتَانِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الْجِسْمُ إِمَّا شَجَرٌ أَوْ حَجَرٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ شَجَرٌ فَلَيْسَ بِحَجَرٍ، لٰكِنَّهُ حَجَرٌ فَلَيْسَ بِشَجَرٍ. أَوْ تَرَكَّبَ مِنْ مُنْفَصِلَةٍ مَانِعَةِ الْخُلُوِّ مَعَ رَفْعِ أَحَدِ جُزْأَيْهَا، وَنَتِيجَتُهُ وَضْعُ الْآخَرِ، فَلَهُ أَيْضًا نَتِيجَتَانِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: هٰذَا الْجِسْمُ إِمَّا لَا حَجَرٌ أَوْ لَا شَجَرٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ حَجَرٌ فَهُوَ لَا شَجَرٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ شَجَرٌ فَهُوَ لَا حَجَرٌ. تَمَّتِ الرِّسَالَةُ الْكُبْرَى فِي عِلْمِ الْمَنْطِقِ.