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Proof and its three kinds; the definition of the syllogism

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Proof and its three kinds; the definition of the syllogism

Proof · al-ḥujja wa-aqsāmuhā wa-taʿrīf al-qiyās · pp. 78–80

الحُجَّةُ وَأَقْسامُها وَتَعْرِيفُ القِياسِ

Concept · nog niet nagekeken

Persian text after the print of Kanpur 1279/1862–63 · translation by The Mantiqi, draft

About this text

al-Kubrā الكُبْرَى

al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413)

Text
Persian, transcribed by The Mantiqi from the lithograph, without its marginal glosses: Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, Maṭbaʿ-i Alṭāfī, Kanpur 1279/1862–63, pp. 1–42 View the scan
Lessons follow
al-Manṭiq al-manhajī li-l-mubtadiʾīn: al-Ṣughrā wa-l-Awsaṭ wa-l-Kubrā, Arabic version and arrangement by Muḥammad Anwar al-Badakhshānī (Jāmiʿat al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya, ʿAllāma Banūrī Town), Islam Insight, Karachi 1420/1999, pp. 42–86. The lessons are The Mantiqi's own explanations in the order of this edition; its text is under copyright and is not reproduced.
Translation
The Mantiqi's own, into English and into vocalised Arabic; a draft. The Arabic is translated from the Persian, not taken from a printed Arabic version.
Review
Draft, awaiting review by Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf.

The text

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Persian original, Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, Kanpur 1279/1862–63

حجت بر سه قسم است: یکی قیاس که آن استدلال است بحال کلی بر حال جزئی، چنانکه گوئی کل انسان حیوان و کل حیوان جسم فکل انسان جسم، پس استدلال کردی بحال حیوان که کلی است بر حال جزئی وی که انسان است؛ دوم استقرا که آن استدلال است بحال جزئیات بر حال کلی، چنانکه گوئی هر یک از انسان و طیور و بهائم فک اسفل را می جنبانند در حال مضغ پس جمیع حیوان چنین باشند، پس استدلال کردی بحال جزئیات حیوان که انسان و بهائم و طیور اند بر حال حیوان که کلی ایشانست؛ سوم تمثیل که آن استدلال است بحال جزئی بر حال جزئی دیگر، چنانکه گوئی نبیذ حرام است بنابر آنکه خمر حرام است زیرا که هر دو جزئی مسکر اند. فصل. استقرا و تمثیل مفید ظن باشند و قیاس مفید یقین باشد، پس عمده در باب تحصیل تصدیقات قیاس است، و آن عبارت است از قولی مؤلف از قضایا که لازم آید از وی لذاته قول دیگر، چنانکه گوئی عالم متغیر است و هر چه متغیر است حادث است، پس لازم آید که عالم حادث باشد. و قیاس دو قسم است: یکی اقترانی که در وی نتیجه یا نقیض نتیجه بالفعل مذکور نباشد چنانکه مذکور شد، و دوم استثنائی که در وی نتیجه یا نقیض نتیجه بالفعل مذکور باشد، چنانکه گوئی اگر این آدمی باشد حیوان باشد لیکن آدمی است پس حیوان باشد، لیکن حیوان نیست پس آدمی نیست.

Proof is of three kinds. The first is the syllogism, which is arguing from the state of a universal to the state of a particular, as when you say “every man is an animal, and every animal is a body, so every man is a body”: you have argued from the state of animal, which is a universal, to the state of its particular, which is man. The second is induction, which is arguing from the state of particulars to the state of the universal, as when you say “each of man, birds and beasts moves the lower jaw in chewing, so every animal is thus”: you have argued from the state of the particulars of animal — man, beasts and birds — to the state of animal, which is their universal. The third is analogy, which is arguing from the state of one particular to the state of another, as when you say “nabīdh is forbidden because wine is forbidden, since both are particulars of what intoxicates”. Section. Induction and analogy give probable belief, and the syllogism gives certainty; so the mainstay in gaining assents is the syllogism, which is a statement composed of propositions from which another statement follows of itself, as when you say “the world changes, and whatever changes came to be”, from which it follows that the world came to be. The syllogism is of two kinds: conjunctive, in which neither the conclusion nor its contradictory is stated as such, as has been mentioned; and exceptive, in which the conclusion or its contradictory is stated as such, as when you say “if this is a man, it is an animal; but it is a man, so it is an animal”, or “but it is not an animal, so it is not a man”.

Arabic translation

الْحُجَّةُ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ: الْأَوَّلُ الْقِيَاسُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ الْكُلِّيِّ عَلَى حَالِ الْجُزْئِيِّ، كَقَوْلِكَ: كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيَوَانٌ، وَكُلُّ حَيَوَانٍ جِسْمٌ، فَكُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ جِسْمٌ، فَقَدِ اسْتَدْلَلْتَ بِحَالِ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ كُلِّيٌّ عَلَى حَالِ جُزْئِيِّهِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْإِنْسَانُ. وَالثَّانِي الِاسْتِقْرَاءُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ الْجُزْئِيَّاتِ عَلَى حَالِ الْكُلِّيِّ، كَقَوْلِكَ: كُلٌّ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالطُّيُورِ وَالْبَهَائِمِ يُحَرِّكُ فَكَّهُ الْأَسْفَلَ عِنْدَ الْمَضْغِ، فَكُلُّ حَيَوَانٍ كَذٰلِكَ، فَقَدِ اسْتَدْلَلْتَ بِحَالِ جُزْئِيَّاتِ الْحَيَوَانِ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ وَالْبَهَائِمِ وَالطُّيُورِ عَلَى حَالِ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ كُلِّيُّهَا. وَالثَّالِثُ التَّمْثِيلُ، وَهُوَ الِاسْتِدْلَالُ بِحَالِ جُزْئِيٍّ عَلَى حَالِ جُزْئِيٍّ آخَرَ، كَقَوْلِكَ: النَّبِيذُ حَرَامٌ لِأَنَّ الْخَمْرَ حَرَامٌ، إِذْ كِلَاهُمَا جُزْئِيٌّ مِنْ جُزْئِيَّاتِ الْمُسْكِرِ. فَصْلٌ. الِاسْتِقْرَاءُ وَالتَّمْثِيلُ يُفِيدَانِ الظَّنَّ، وَالْقِيَاسُ يُفِيدُ الْيَقِينَ، فَالْعُمْدَةُ فِي تَحْصِيلِ التَّصْدِيقَاتِ الْقِيَاسُ، وَهُوَ قَوْلٌ مُؤَلَّفٌ مِنْ قَضَايَا يَلْزَمُ عَنْهُ لِذَاتِهِ قَوْلٌ آخَرُ، كَقَوْلِكَ: الْعَالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ، وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حَادِثٌ، فَيَلْزَمُ أَنَّ الْعَالَمَ حَادِثٌ. وَالْقِيَاسُ قِسْمَانِ: اقْتِرَانِيٌّ لَا تُذْكَرُ فِيهِ النَّتِيجَةُ وَلَا نَقِيضُهَا بِالْفِعْلِ كَمَا مَرَّ، وَاسْتِثْنَائِيٌّ تُذْكَرُ فِيهِ النَّتِيجَةُ أَوْ نَقِيضُهَا بِالْفِعْلِ، كَقَوْلِكَ: إِنْ كَانَ هٰذَا إِنْسَانًا فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، لٰكِنَّهُ إِنْسَانٌ فَهُوَ حَيَوَانٌ، أَوْ: لٰكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِحَيَوَانٍ فَلَيْسَ بِإِنْسَانٍ.

Google Translate ↗pp. 34–36

The lesson

In the language, ḥujja means overcoming; in the technical sense it is the proof that leads to what is sought. It is so called because whoever has a proof overcomes whoever has none. It is of three kinds. The (qiyās) argues from the state of a to the state of a : “every man is an animal, and every animal is a body, so every man is a body” — man is one of the particulars of animal. (istiqrāʾ) argues from the state of the particulars to the state of the universal: man, birds and beasts all move the lower jaw in chewing, so the animal does. (tamthīl) argues from one particular to another: nabīdh is forbidden because wine is forbidden, and both are particulars of what intoxicates.

and give probable belief; the gives certainty, so it is the mainstay in gaining . The just given, arguing from the to the , defines the syllogism by its goal; the one that follows defines it by its technical , and the two do not conflict.

A is a statement composed of such that knowing them brings of another proposition: “the world changes, and whatever changes came to be” brings “the world came to be”. It is (iqtirānī) when neither the nor its is in it as such, or (istithnāʾī) when one of them is: “if this is a man, it is an animal; but it is a man; so it is an animal” — here the conclusion itself is in it; “but it is not an animal; so it is not a man” — here its contradictory is.

Terms

الحُجَّةُ al-ḥujja
proof: what leads to what is sought
القِياسُ al-qiyās
syllogism
الاسْتِقْراءُ al-istiqrāʾ
induction
التَّمْثِيلُ al-tamthīl
analogy
التَّعْرِيفُ بِالغايَةِ al-taʿrīf bi-l-ghāya
definition by the goal
الاقْتِرانِيُّ al-iqtirānī
conjunctive
الاسْتِثْنائِيُّ al-istithnāʾī
exceptive

Examples

  • النَّبِيذُ حَرامٌ لِأَنَّ الخَمْرَ حَرامٌ

    analogy: from one particular to another

  • العالَمُ مُتَغَيِّرٌ وَكُلُّ مُتَغَيِّرٍ حادِثٌ

    the premises of a syllogism

Test jezelf

3 questions on this lesson. With 6 out of 10 or more (two stars) the next lesson opens.

  1. Vraag 1

    “Nabīdh is forbidden because wine is forbidden, both being intoxicants” is…

  2. Vraag 2

    Why is the proof called ḥujja?

  3. Vraag 3

    “Arguing from the universal to the particular” defines the syllogism…

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