What an assent depends on

Foundations · shurūṭ al-taṣdīq · ص 44–45

شُرُوطُ التَّصْدِيقِ

مسوّدة · بانتظار المراجعة

النَّصُّ بِاللُّغَةِ الفارِسِيَّة عَلَى طَبْعَةِ Kanpur 1279/1862–63 · تَرْجَمَةُ The Mantiqi، مُسَوَّدَة

عَنْ هٰذا النَّصّ

al-Kubrā الكُبْرَى

al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413)

النَّصّ: الفارِسِيَّة, نَقَلَهُ The Mantiqi مِنَ الطَّبْعَةِ الحَجَرِيَّةِ دُونَ حَواشِيها: Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, Maṭbaʿ-i Alṭāfī, Kanpur 1279/1862–63, pp. 1–42 اعْرِضِ الصُّورَة
تَتْبَعُ الدُّرُوس: al-Manṭiq al-manhajī li-l-mubtadiʾīn: al-Ṣughrā wa-l-Awsaṭ wa-l-Kubrā, Arabic version and arrangement by Muḥammad Anwar al-Badakhshānī (Jāmiʿat al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya, ʿAllāma Banūrī Town), Islam Insight, Karachi 1420/1999, ص 42–86. الدُّرُوسُ شَرْحُ The Mantiqi الخاصُّ بِتَرْتِيبِ هٰذِهِ الطَّبْعَة؛ وَنَصُّها مَحْفُوظُ الحُقُوقِ فَلا يُنْقَل.
التَّرْجَمَة: مِنْ عَمَلِ The Mantiqi، إِلَى الإِنْجِلِيزِيَّةِ وَإِلَى عَرَبِيَّةٍ مَشْكُولَة؛ مُسَوَّدَة. العَرَبِيَّةُ مُتَرْجَمَةٌ مِنَ الفارِسِيَّة، لا مَأْخُوذَةٌ مِنْ نُسْخَةٍ عَرَبِيَّةٍ مَطْبُوعَة.
المُراجَعَة: مُسَوَّدَة، بِانْتِظارِ مُراجَعَةِ Ustadh Muhammad Yusuf.

النَّصّ

تَحْتاجُ لُغَةً أُخْرَى؟ «تَرْجَمَةُ Google» تَفْتَحُ المَقْطَعَ فِي التَّرْجَمَةِ الآلِيَّةِ مِنْ Google — مُفِيدَةٌ لِفِكْرَةٍ أُولَى، لٰكِنَّنا لَمْ نُراجِعْها. أَوِ انْسَخِ النَّصَّ إِلَى مُتَرْجِمٍ تَخْتارُه.

اقْرَإِ النَّصَّ كامِلًا بِاللُّغَةِ الفارِسِيَّة →

الأَصْلُ بِاللُّغَةِ الفارِسِيَّة، Majmūʿa-yi manṭiq, Kanpur 1279/1862–63

و چون تصدیق ادراک نسبت چیزی است بچیزی بایجاب یا بسلب، ناچار است او را از سه تصور: یکی تصور منسوب الیه که آن را محکوم علیه خوانند، دوم تصور منسوب که آن را محکوم به خوانند، سوم تصور نسبت میان این که آن را نسبت حکمیه خوانند. مثلاً در تصدیق بآنکه زید قائم است ناچار باشد از تصور زید که محکوم علیه است و از تصور قائم که محکوم به است و از تصور نسبت میان زید و قائم که نسبت حکمیه است، تا بعد از آن ادراک آن نسبت بر وجه ایجاب یا سلب حاصل شود. پس تصدیق موقوف باشد بر تصور محکوم علیه و تصور محکوم به و تصور نسبت حکمیه، لیکن هیچکدام ازین تصورات ثلثه نزد اهل تحقیق جزو تصدیق نیست.

Since assent is the perception of the relation of one thing to another, affirmatively or negatively, it cannot do without three conceptions: first, the conception of what something is related to, which is called the subject judged; second, the conception of what is related, which is called the predicate judged; third, the conception of the relation between them, which is called the judgemental relation. For instance, in assenting that Zayd is standing, one cannot do without the conception of Zayd, who is the subject judged, the conception of standing, which is the predicate judged, and the conception of the relation between Zayd and standing, which is the judgemental relation, so that after that the perception of that relation, affirmatively or negatively, may come about. So assent depends on the conception of the subject, the conception of the predicate and the conception of the judgemental relation; but according to the careful scholars none of these three conceptions is a part of the assent.

التَّرْجَمَةُ العَرَبِيَّة

وَلَمَّا كَانَ التَّصْدِيقُ إِدْرَاكَ نِسْبَةِ شَيْءٍ إِلَى شَيْءٍ إِيجَابًا أَوْ سَلْبًا، لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ بُدٌّ مِنْ تَصَوُّرَاتٍ ثَلَاثَةٍ: أَحَدُهَا تَصَوُّرُ الْمَنْسُوبِ إِلَيْهِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومَ عَلَيْهِ، وَالثَّانِي تَصَوُّرُ الْمَنْسُوبِ، وَيُسَمَّى الْمَحْكُومَ بِهِ، وَالثَّالِثُ تَصَوُّرُ النِّسْبَةِ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَتُسَمَّى النِّسْبَةَ الْحُكْمِيَّةَ. فَفِي التَّصْدِيقِ بِأَنَّ زَيْدًا قَائِمٌ لَا بُدَّ مِنْ تَصَوُّرِ زَيْدٍ وَهُوَ الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ، وَمِنْ تَصَوُّرِ الْقَائِمِ وَهُوَ الْمَحْكُومُ بِهِ، وَمِنْ تَصَوُّرِ النِّسْبَةِ بَيْنَ زَيْدٍ وَالْقَائِمِ وَهِيَ النِّسْبَةُ الْحُكْمِيَّةُ، حَتَّى يَحْصُلَ بَعْدَ ذٰلِكَ إِدْرَاكُ تِلْكَ النِّسْبَةِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْإِيجَابِ أَوِ السَّلْبِ. فَالتَّصْدِيقُ مَوْقُوفٌ عَلَى تَصَوُّرِ الْمَحْكُومِ عَلَيْهِ وَتَصَوُّرِ الْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ وَتَصَوُّرِ النِّسْبَةِ الْحُكْمِيَّةِ، وَلٰكِنْ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مِنْ هٰذِهِ التَّصَوُّرَاتِ الثَّلَاثَةِ جُزْءًا مِنَ التَّصْدِيقِ عِنْدَ الْمُحَقِّقِينَ.

تَرْجَمَةُ Google ↗ص 4–5

الدَّرْس

Because is the perception of a relation of one thing to another, it needs three before it. The conception of what something is related to, the of the judgement (maḥkūm ʿalayh); the conception of what is related, the of the judgement (maḥkūm bih); and the conception of the relation between them, called the judgemental relation (al-nisba al-ḥukmiyya), the relation on which the judgement rests.

In assenting that Zayd is standing, you must Zayd, who is judged; standing, which is judged of him; and the relation between Zayd and standing. These three are needed so that the relation can then be perceived as holding or not holding, and that perception is the , the judgement, not a further conception — otherwise a conception would depend on itself.

According to the careful scholars (al-muḥaqqiqūn) none of these three is a part of the ; each is a condition of it. The assent is the single act of judging, which can happen only once its three conditions are in place.

المُصْطَلَحات

المَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ al-maḥkūm ʿalayh: what is judged: the subject of the judgement
المَحْكُومُ بِهِ al-maḥkūm bih: what is judged of it: the predicate
النِّسْبَةُ الحُكْمِيَّةُ al-nisba al-ḥukmiyya: the judgemental relation between them
الشَّرْطُ al-sharṭ: condition: needed for something, but not part of it
المُحَقِّقُونَ al-muḥaqqiqūn: the careful scholars, the verifiers

الأَمْثِلَة

زَيْدٌ قائِمٌ
to assent to it: conceive Zayd, standing, and the relation between them

اخْتَبِرْ نَفْسَك

عَدَدُ الأَسْئِلَةِ عَلَى هٰذا الدَّرْسِ 3. بِسِتَّةٍ مِنْ عَشَرَةٍ فَأَكْثَرَ (نَجْمَتَيْن) يُفْتَحُ الدَّرْسُ التّالِي.

السؤال 1
Which is NOT one of the three conceptions an assent depends on?
السؤال 2
According to the careful scholars, the three conceptions are…
السؤال 3
In assenting that “Zayd is standing”, “standing” is…

الدَّرْسُ التّالِي: Self-evident and acquired; reflection

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